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When do psychotic patients act on their delusions? Eugen
Bleuler thought that the question was unlikely to arise.
Psychotic subjects acted only rarely in accordance with
their abnormal beliefs:
"They really do nothing to attain their goal; the
emperor and the pope help to manure the fields; the
queen of heaven irons the patients' shirts or besmears
herself and the table with saliva" (Bleuler (1924), p.
392) .
Bleuler1s contemporaries shared his view (Kant, 1927;
Jaspers, 1963). Since then those writers who have not
ignored the issue have argued similarly that delusional
action is uncommon (Anderson & Trethowan, 1973; Hamilton,
1985; Merskey, 1980; Slater & Roth, 1969).
There have, however, been hints to the contrary. In a study
of pre-trial prisoners Taylor (1985) found that one fifth of
psychotic subjects were driven to offend by their symptoms
and described an association between delusions and violent
acts. Gibbens' (1958) review of 115 cases of homicide
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admitted to New Jersey State Hospital described one third of
insane murderers as having "well structured" delusional
motives for their crimes. And Lanzkron (1963) reported that
40% of insane homicides occurred, "as offspring of a
delusional system". Despite the high rates of acting on
delusions suggested by these studies, it is difficult to
know to what extent one can generalise from the results.
Prisoners are an atypical group.
Recently, however, it has been suggested that delusional
action is a common phenomenon in general psychiatry. Wessely
et al (1993) found that 60% of deluded patients reported
acting on one of their delusions and that 20% of patients
had acted on their delusions three times or more. Similar
frequencies obtained whether delusional action was rated by
other people or by the patient himself. Self-reported
delusional action was associated with delusions of
catastrophe and when delusional action was defined on the
basis of information provided by informants persecutory
delusions were more likely to be acted upon than were other
categories of abnormal belief.
The purpose of the present research is to describe the
phenomenological correlates of delusional action. There are
several reasons to do this. Firstly, when the action is
violent, it may benefit risk assessment. Secondly, it may
benefit the investigation of other elements of psychotic
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phenomenology. One such element is insight; delusionally
based actions may test the veracity of the delusion and lead
to an awareness that it is a symptom of illness. Finally, it
will benefit the study of the nature of delusions.
Authoritative definitions of delusions describe them as
false beliefs, held with conviction and regarded by the
subject as self-evident, which are not amenable to reason
and inherently unlikely in content (Kraupl Taylor, 1983;
Mullen, 1979). It is easy to identify exceptions, however,
and the extent to which individual delusions display each of
these qualities varies (Kendler et al, 1983; Mullen, 1979;
Garety and Hemsley, 1987). Perhaps as a result, some authors
have attempted to identify different characteristics which
distinguish delusions from normal beliefs; one suggestion is
that delusions represent "defective reasons for action"
(Fulford, 1989). Central to this debate is the degree to
which delusions are acted upon and the way in which this
occurs.
This chapter has three purposes. The first is to describe
some theoretical aspects of the study of delusional action.
The second is to review the literature relating to acting on
delusions. Most of this literature is anecdotal, allowing no
estimate of rates or frequencies. In these circumstances an
attempt will be made to illustrate the nature of the link
between delusion and action by providing as full a
phenomenological description as the literature allows. The
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third purpose of the chapter is to review the limited
literature concerning other aspects of psychotic
phenomenology which are associated with acting on delusions.
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1.2 Theoretical aspects of belief and behaviour
A review of the link between abnormal belief and behaviour
demands some discussion of the role of normal beliefs in the
genesis of action. In the nineteen forties and nineteen
fifties behaviourists such as Hull (1943) and Guthrie (1952)
opposed the then widespread notion that action must be
explained in terms of purpose. They argued that human
behaviour could be better explained in terms of "receptor
impulses" and "movements". The elucidation of these "primary
principles" would then, in turn, allow a rigourous
definition of terms such as "purpose" and "intention". In
the words of Hull,
"The present approach does not deny the motor reality
of purposive acts (as opposed to movements), of
intelligence, of insight, of goals, of intents, of
stirrings or of value; on the contrary, we insist upon
the genuineness of these forms of behaviour. We hope
ultimately to show the logical right to the use of such
concepts by deducting them as secondary principles from
more elementary objective primary principles." (pp. 25-
26) .
While beliefs are clearly important if behaviour is to be
explained in terms of purpose, their role is less clear when
this behaviour is explained in terms of "primary
principles". Hull was clear that an explanation of purposive
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behaviour could be derived from postulates involving only
"stimulus" and "movement".
The role of goal directed thought was similarly dismissed by
Guthrie (1952) who suggested that thinking, like action, was
a product of conditioning and tended to occur when action
was blocked. These authors aspired to a science which was
more rigourous and quantitative. As Hull wrote in 1951,
"the continuous quantitative use of relevant postulates
and corollaries will hasten the elimination of errors
and the day when mammalian behaviour will take its
place among the recognised quantitative systematic
sciences." (p.2).
But it was not the advocacy of a rigourous scientific method
which concerned other authors, rather the theory which lay
behind the writings of Guthrie and Hull. Keith Campbell
(1970) noted that behaviourists had placed "the mind" not
behind an action but in the behaviour itself and hence,
worryingly for him, omitted the causal element in mental
concepts. In the second half of the twentieth century
philosophers' arguments have followed two related themes,
both of which allow a pivotal role for belief in the
explanation of action.
The first has been expanded by Papineau (1978) who argues
that the reasons behind an action involve, firstly, a desire
and, secondly, a belief that the action will contribute to
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the satisfaction of that desire. He acknowledges that
everyday explanations of action commonly invoke only a
desire or a belief but argues that both are in fact
required; we mention only that part of the cause which is
most surprising, least generally known or most morally
significant. The second theme has been described by Charles
Taylor. Taylor (1964) explains behaviour in terms of
Aristotelian teleology, that is, he argues that our present
use of the terms "action" and "behaviour" do not allow them
to be broken down into units of stimulus and response but
require an explanation of behaviour in terms of its purpose.
Thus he differs from Papineau in regarding behaviour as
"pulled" into existence by its purpose, as opposed to
"pushed" into existence by the belief and desire of its
agent. Taylor's explanation of human behaviour, however,
shares with that of Papineau a recognition of the importance
of knowledge or beliefs. The author refers to the "Canute
view" of those who reject purposive explanations of action
and is graphic in his description of the logical
consequences of behaviourist theory:
"The area in which we can attribute responsibility,
deal out praise or blame, or mete out reward or
punishment, will steadily diminish until in the
limiting case, nothing will be left; the courts will be
closed or become institutes of human engineering, moral
discourse will be relegated to the lumber-room of
history." (pp.42-43).
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The emotive quality of Taylor's plea is not a new feature of
the debate. In the sixteenth century the use of teleological
arguments to demonstrate the existence of a deity led
Francis Bacon to compare teleological explanations to vestal
virgins: "They are dedicated to God, and are barren" (quoted
by Papineau, 1990).
Even as they were written the views of Hull and Guthrie were
not universally held. William Hunter (1930) referred to the
importance of "symbolic processes" in influencing man's
instinctive behaviour, invoking a model more cognitive than
that allowed by some behaviourists. And in 1932 Krechevsky
published his claim to have found empirical evidence that
rats running mazes formed hypotheses to assist them in
solving problems. In the second half of the twentieth
century writers in medicine and psychology have been more
prepared to entertain a cognitive view of behaviour where a
subject's knowledge and beliefs assume a greater role.
Austin (1956-7) described some of the elements in his
"machinery of action" as consciousness, voluntariness, self-
control, knowledge and foresight. Fulford (1989) developed
this theme in Moral Theory and Medical Practice, writing,
"in the case of raising my arm, what has to be specified, in
addition to the state of motion of my arm, is my purpose in
raising it." Psychologists such as Spence (1956) and Mowrer
(1960) still draw heavily on a view of learning based on
Pavlovian conditioning but Mowrer's references to subjects
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"learning to be afraid" and "learning what to do" make it
clear that he gives greater weight to the cognitive
processes of his subjects than did his predecessors.
McGinn (1979), developing the work of Davidson (1971),
divides bodily movements into active and passive. Action is
based on reasons and reasons for actions are based on a
combination of desires and beliefs; in McGinn's words,
"desire without belief is blind, belief without desire is
purposeless." He adds several qualifications to this
description of action. Firstly, he argues that desires and
beliefs exist in a dynamic state in the conscious mind and
that interaction occurs between them; beliefs must be
reckoned in the light of the pattern of desires. Secondly,
he concedes that no general law of action can be derived
from this framework; "what was sufficient to make me cross
the road on a certain occasion will almost certainly not be
repeated." Finally, he acknowledges that belief and desire
are not in themselves sufficient to produce the will to act.
We can desire an end, and believe that a particular course
of action will produce that end, without ever getting around
to doing something about it. The will to act is partly
dependent on what he calls "noticings", internal or external
cues which precipitate action. Someone who believes that
their drinking is damaging their health, and who desires to
stop, may only be precipitated into action by an event such
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as being convicted of drunk driving or seeing a friend die
from gastro-intestinal haemorrhage.
In the second half of the twentieth century the influence of
purely behaviourist explanations of human action has
diminished. Recent medical and psychological writing has
focused more on the influence of belief on human action and
this reflects the tenor of philosophical writing on the
subject. The role of beliefs in behaviourist theory is vague
and this may go some way to explaining the lack of research
in the psychological literature into actions based on
delusions.
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1.3 Delusions implicated in action
The literature pertaining to the behavioural consequences of
delusions will now be reviewed. Ideally, such a review would
be informed by epidemiological data providing information as
to the likelihood of a particular type of delusion being
acted upon. Unfortunately, most reports in this area are
anecdotal and allow no such estimate of risk. Indeed, it
seems reasonable to assume that such reports as do exist
concentrate disproportionately on actions which are violent
or attract attention in other ways. When delusions lead
people to stop doing things, the reporting of such delusions
will be less common. It seems unlikely, for instance, that
the progressive social isolation of some people with
persecutory delusions will be described in the literature,
even if that social isolation is delusionally driven.
Delusions of persecution
Reports of actions based on delusions most frequently
concern persecutory delusions; often these reports focus on
violence inflicted on others. On 20th January 1843 Daniel
M'Naghten, apparently under the impression that he was
attacking the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, fired at and
mortally wounded Edward Drummond who was Sir Robert1s
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Private Secretary. M'Naghten believed he was the victim of a
conspiracy and that he was being followed by spies sent by
Catholic priests with the aid of the Tories, of whom Peel
was the leader. At his trial he stated,
"The Tories in my native city have compelled me to do
this ... They have accused me of crimes of which I am
not guilty; they do everything in their power to harass
and persecute me; in fact, they wish to murder me."
(Rollin, 1977, p.92).
M'Naghten was found not guilty and the "M'Naghten Rules",
which govern the use of an insanity defence in English
courts, were the direct outcome of his case. In this century
many authors have recorded persecutory delusions in mentally
ill offenders but often make only vague reference to the
motive for the crime. Bach-y-rita (1974) and Bach-y-rita and
Veno (1974), examining 62 violent prisoners, found 13 who
demonstrated "subtle delusional systems" and who "warranted
a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia." Green (1981),
looking at 58 male homicidal patients in Broadmoor Hospital
reported that in 27 cases the act of killing "appeared to be
a response" to the patients' persecutory beliefs. Shore et
al (1988, 1989) examined the subsequent criminal records of
mentally ill people arrested near the White House, in many
cases trying to see the President. They found that amongst
those with no record of violent behaviour persecutory
delusions were significantly associated with future
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violence. They gave no further details as to the nature of
the delusions.
Other authors give fuller descriptions. Maas et al (1984)
describe the case of a man who killed both parents claiming
that they had tried to kill his children by drowning them in
battery acid. Reviewing the records of ten men charged with
patricide, Cravens et al (1985) found four cases where the
father was considered by the patient to pose threats of
"physical of psychological annihilation." Mawson (1985)
found 14 patients with delusions of poisoning in a case note
study at Broadmoor Hospital and "in all but one the symptom
seemed an important antecedent factor to serious violence."
In a study of 15 matricidal men Campion et al (1985) refer
to a schizophrenic patient who killed his mother because he
was convinced that she was a sadist who tortured him. Other
authors have reported actions based on persecutory beliefs
in association with Capgras delusions (Crane, 1976;
Weinstock, 1976; Christodoulou, 1978; Romanik and Snow,
1984; Tomison and Donovan, 1988); De Pauw and Szulecka
(1988) report that a patient attacked her mother believing
that every time her mother put on her glasses she changed
into a local woman whom she disliked intensely. Hafner and
Boker (1973) found that eight percent of their sample of 263
violent schizophrenics exhibited 'paranoid feelings of
malaise' and felt that these patients were especially likely
to act on their delusions when they perceived an immediate
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threat to their lives or when persecutory beliefs were
accompanied by bodily hallucinations or delusions of bodily
harm.
Persecutory delusions have also been described in cases of
self harm but here again the degree to which the delusion
motivates the act is often unclear. In some cases, such as
that described by Mintz (1964) where a cook on board ship
cooked and ate his index finger in attempt to "rise above
his persecutors in the way that Christ had", it is difficult
to see any logical link. In other cases, such as those of
ocular self-mutilation described by Shore et al (1978),
Shore (1979) and Yang et al (1981) or of auto-castration
described by Mendez et al (1972), the link between
persecutory belief and action seems vague. Blacker and Wong
(1963) are more specific describing the case of a man who
castrated himself believing that evil spirits were using his
body to perform unnatural acts. Standage et al (1974)
describe a case of genital self-mutilation in a female
schizophrenic who believed that the men in her community
were going to sexually molest her. Firesetting, eating and
hospital attendance have also been claimed to be influenced
by persecutory delusions. Virkkunen (1974) found that three
out of 30 cases of arson committed by schizophrenics
represented an attempt to escape persecutors. In 1911
Bleuler had described the case of a woman refusing to drink
milk because she believed it was poisoned and Lyketsos et al
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(1985) have described cases where the eating habits of
chronic schizophrenics have been influenced by similar
fears. Hutchesson and Volans (1989) have described patients
whose persecutory delusions led them to attend hospitals
with unsubstantiated complaints of being poisoned.
Delusions of infidelity and grandiose delusions
The propensity of delusions of infidelity to be acted upon
in a manner dangerous to others has been described by
Shepherd (1961) and Mowat (1966). Gillies (1965) described
the case of a schizophrenic who murdered his wife, telling
his psychiatrist, "a mysterious power told me she was being
unfaithful." More recently, Hafner and Boker (1973) noted
delusions of love and infidelity in 11.2% of their sample of
violent schizophrenics as against 1.4% of non-violent
schizophrenic controls. Of the 14 patients at Broadmoor with
delusions of poisoning described by Mawson (1985), six also
had delusions of infidelity.
Actions based upon grandiose delusions were described in
1823 by John Haslam. Shortly after the New Bethlem Hospital
was built in St George's Fields in London Haslam described
the case of Thomas Lloyd whose confidence in his madrigal
and linguistic abilities led him to dance and sing in public
and address foreign visitors in miserable French. In the
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presence of a hypomanic affect, however, it becomes
debatable whether such phenomena should be attributed to the
mood state or to the delusion. Kraines (1957) wrote that,
"the manic patient who says that he is the son of God
is not expressing a delusion of symbolic significance
as would be true in schizophrenic thinking, but has
merely left unsaid the feelings that he is superior,
that he is capable of undertaking any enterprise, that
he is superior enough to be as powerful as the poetic
concept of 'Son of God'." (p.280-281).
Should such a patient attempt to walk on water it is not
clear whether this would occur as a consequence of his
belief or his mood. This point will be returned to in the
discussion of drive, motivation and affect.
Delusions of passivity, ill health or bodily change
The influence of delusions of passivity on behaviour was
alluded to by Tomison and Donovan (1988) in their
description of a 23 year old man who attacked two others
with a Stanley knife but no details were given. Two studies
of matricidal men (Campion et al, 1985; Green, 1981) have
also described delusions of passivity in association with
acts of violence but command hallucinations were also
present and it is not clear to which element of
phenomenology the act can best be attributed, if indeed it
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can be attributed to either. Planansky and Johnston (1977)
are more explicit. Looking at 59 male schizophrenics who had
attacked others or made verbal threats to kill, they
identified nine cases where the subject "had to attack
against their will, as if directed by others or by an
impersonal force". Delusions of passivity have also been
described in cases of self-mutilation (Rosen and Hoffman,
1972; Sweeney and Zamecnik 1981); Shore et al (1978)
describe the case of a man who enucleated both of his eyes
believing that "a force" had overpowered him and had taken
control of his actions.
Delusions of ill health or bodily change have been described
by Green (1981) in matricidal men and by d'Orban and
O'Connor (1989) in women who kill their parents. Jones
(1965) studied 13 chronic schizophrenic patients with
stereotypies. One of his cases touched his car repeatedly,
explaining that it controlled the pumping of his blood.
Hafner and Boker (1973) considered that delusions of bodily
harm, when linked with persecutory delusions, were
associated with violence in schizophrenics. Delusions of
bodily change leading to self harm were described in 1928 by
Lewis while Beilin (1953) reported the case of a Polish
labourer who amputated his penis claiming that there had
been a change in his body contour and that he was assuming
the form of a woman. Sweeney and Zamecnik (1981), reviewing
predictors of self-mutilation in patients with
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schizophrenia, described instances of patients acting on
beliefs that their blood needed to be cleansed or that a
limb required surgical investigation.
De Clerambault's syndrome and Capgras; delusions of guilt
De Clerambault (1942), quoted by Goldstein (1987), included
a description of a man who repeatedly struck his ex-wife in
public in his original description of the eponymous
syndrome. Goldstein reviewed seven cases of erotomania and
found that all had acted on their delusions, several to the
extent of making physical assaults. Enoch et al (1967) and
Taylor et al (1983) both emphasised the possibility of
physical assaults consequent upon the imagined infatuation
but a recent review referring to the "spectre of
dangerousness" in de Clerambault's syndrome has concluded
that "the evidence that it usually represents anything more
than an apparition remains unconvincing" (Bowden, 1990).
Capgras syndrome has been linked with violent behaviour in
several case reports (Weinstock, 1976; Crane, 1976;
Christodoulou, 1978; Shubsacks and Young, 1988; De Pauw and
Szulecka, 1988; Tomison and Donovan, 1988; Silva et al
1989); Romanik and Snow (1984) described the case of a 57
year old woman who pointed a loaded gun at two meter readers
believing that one of them was a homosexual who had been
impersonating her by wearing a mask since he was eight. He
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had acted like a prostitute and sullied her reputation.
Fishbain (1987) attempted to quantify the frequency of
Capgras delusions but his paper highlights the
methodological problem that Capgras delusions are usually
reported only when attention is drawn to them by violent
behaviour.
Reports of delusions of guilt associated with behaviour
usually involve self harm. Numerous examples exist in the
literature of such an association in depression (e.g. Albert
et al, 1965) and even mania (Hartmann, 1925) and in
depression the frequency of suicide attempts has been shown
to correlate with the presence of delusions (Miller and
Chabrier, 1988). In schizophrenia, MacLean and Robertson
(1976) described the case of a man who enucleated his own
eye when preoccupied with his "sins". Numerous reports exist
of self-inflicted eye injuries (Westmeyer and Serpass, 1972;
Shore et al, 1978; Crowder et al, 1979) and genital self-
mutilation (Beilin and Gruenberg, 1948; Greilsheimer and
Groves, 1979; Waugh, 1986) in the presence of delusions of
guilt which do not appear to be mood congruent.
Religious and sexual delusions
Delusions with religious or sexual themes are common in
psychiatry and similar themes are evident amongst those
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delusions which are acted upon. Witherspoon et al (1989),
reviewing the literature on self-inflicted eye injuries,
found that 34 out of 85 patients gave religious reasons for
their action. Often these were associated with delusions of
guilt. Waugh (1986) describes a schizophrenic man who
severed his testicles with a razor blade stating that he
felt evil and that self-castration was the only way to gain
forgiveness. In other cases religious beliefs in themselves
seem to have motivated an act of self harm. Kushner (1967)
quotes a schizophrenic who was "sure that he had castrated
himself in search of purification and not because of
feelings of guilt". In many cases the religious motivation
is described in very general terms (Gorin, 1964; Anaclerio
and Wicker, 1970; Tapper et al, 1979; Crowder et al, 1979;
Sweeney and Zamecnik, 1981); Tenzer and Orozco (1970)
describe the case of a woman who removed her own tongue
after receiving a message from God that "duty demanded it".
In other cases the motivation seems more specific. The
series of cases of filicide reported by Resnick (1960)
includes that of a psychotic woman who threw her baby out of
the window in the belief that this was what the Lord wished.
Shore (1979) describes a patient who was found with a pencil
lodged in his right eye who quoted Mathew 5 : 29, "And if
they right eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from
thee, for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members
should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast
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into hell." This concrete interpretation of a biblical
passage might be described, not as an example of delusional
motivation, but as retrospective justification. That Shore's
patient was delusionally motivated, however, is further
suggested by his later explanation that he had,
"misconstrued the spiritual meanings." Waugh (1986)
describes a man who castrated himself in response to Mathew
19 : 12, "There are eunuches made so by men and there are
eunuches who have made themselves that way for the sake of
the Kingdom of Heaven," while Greilsheimer and Groves (1979)
describe a case of genital self-mutilation invoking a
similar passage at Mathew 18 : 7-9. A religious component is
frequently present in delusionally based acts which harm
others (Maas et al 1984); Campion et al (1985) report the
case of a 23 year old man who killed his mother believing
she was the devil. Sexual ideation was present in the
motivation of 21 out of 85 cases of ocular self-mutilation
reviewed by Witherspoon et al (1989). Frequently associated
with guilt in such cases (e.g. MacLean and Robertson, 1976;
Crowder et al, 1979), such ideation may also be implicated
when the harm is directed at others. Cravens et al (1985)
described homosexual delusions focused on the father in
three out of their ten cases of patricide.
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1.4. Other psychotic phenomena affecting action
The previous section described cases where a delusion
apparently contributed to a psychotic individual1s
behaviour. In many of these cases, however, the belief in
question was held for a considerable period before being
acted upon. And many patients hold similar beliefs without
doing anything about them. The mere presence of a delusion
is insufficient to generate action. As described in the
discussion of theoretical considerations, McGinn (1979) has
argued that, in addition to a belief itself, "desire" and
"noticings" are required to explain behaviour. Is it
possible to find equivalents for these terms in psychiatric
phenomenology and hence use McGinn's model as a framework to
investigate delusional action? This section will consider
those elements of psychosis which might be expected to
affect the likelihood of a belief influencing a patient's
behaviour.
Perceptual changes
Foremost amongst these elements may be the perceptual
changes associated with schizophrenia. These will be
examined with regard to two areas, namely, the perception of
form and the perception of emotion. Cutting (1985) considers
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that although basic visual processes are probably normal in
schizophrenia a deficit exists in the appreciation of visual
form. He quotes Levin and Benton (1977) who demonstrated
that chronic schizophrenics were worse than neurotics in
their ability to recognise faces. Auditory perception may
also be affected and, reviewing other modes of perception,
Cutting concludes that there is evidence for a disorder of
body image perception in some patients (Weckowicz and
Sommer, 1960; Cleveland et al, 1962). Examples given by the
authors make clear the threatening nature of these
perceptual changes: Weckowicz and Sommer quote the case of a
man who, when he looked in the mirror, saw his eyes
completely out of their sockets. Several writers have
commented on the propensity of perceived threat to lead to
violent action in psychosis (e.g. Mullen, 1988).
Perception of emotion has been found by several authors to
be abnormal in schizophrenia. Dougherty et al (1974) showed
photographs of facial expressions to schizophrenic and
control subjects and found that schizophrenics were
significantly worse at identifying the emotion shown. Iscoe
and Veldman (1963) found that schizophrenics did worse than
controls when asked to arrange nine drawings in order from
"happy" to "sad" and argued that they had difficulty in
perceiving "subtle emotional graduations". Spiegel et al
(1962) found schizophrenics "normally sensitive to the
nuances of facial expression" but found that, while they
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were able to arrange facial expressions in order from angry
to happy, they were unable to derive the criteria they were
using. Similar findings have been described with reference
to emotion in speech. Turner (1964) tested the ability of 60
schizophrenics and 30 controls to identify the emotional
flavour of a taped nonsense sentence and found that the
performance of schizophrenics was impaired. Studying 24
acute schizophrenics Jonsson and Sjostedt (1973) found that
they did worse than controls when asked to identify the
emotional intonation of spoken single words. Perceptual
changes such as these may correspond to the "noticings"
described by McGinn (1979) as triggers for action based on
belief. The abnormal sensitivity of schizophrenics to
certain emotional themes (Brodsky, 1963; Cutting, 1985) may
also affect the likelihood of their acting on their
delusions. Finally it is possible that the decreased
empathic ability of schizophrenics described by Milgram
(1960) allows them to act in ways which cause harm to
others.
The importance of these perceptual changes has been alluded
to by several authors. MacLean and Robertson (1976)
considered that a perception that an alarming change was
occurring in one's body contributed to self-mutilation in
psychotic patients. Mowat (1966) found that many of his
sample of morbidly jealous murderers described, as grounds
for their delusions and subsequent action, a change in their
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wives' emotional attitudes. In their review of homicidal
aggression in schizophrenic men Planansky and Johnston
(1977) conclude that "transient misperception of danger to
life, very frightening and potentially ominous, was
distinctly revealed by some men." Of relevance here may be
the work of Bemporad (1967) and Reich and Cutting (1982)
showing that schizophrenics faced with visual problems were
more likely to approach them by concentrating on details
rather than on any overall view. In the words of Shakow
(1950): "If there is any creature who can be accused of not
seeing the forest for the trees, it is the schizophrenic."
It may be that schizophrenia renders sufferers prone to
concentrate on one or two threatening aspects of a situation
which would be innocuous if viewed in overall perspective.
Insight
The meaning, in psychiatric phenomenology, of the term
insight is notoriously confused. Some authors have gone so
far as to suggest that the concept is "Eurocentric" and
"arrogant" and ought to be abandoned (Perkins and Moodley,
1993). Aubrey Lewis defined the phenomenon as, "A correct
attitude to morbid change in oneself" (Lewis, 1934). While
concise, this definition is less than complete, begging, as
it does, the question of what is a correct attitude. Does
this involve recognising that something is wrong or
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recognising the need to do something about it? The issue has
been reviewed by David (1990). He and other authors (see
McEvoy et al, 1989) have distinguished three elements of
insight: the ability to recognise that one is ill, a
willingness to seek treatment and an ability correctly to
label certain phenomena as abnormal. It seems reasonable to
suppose that the third of these elements, at least, would
influence the likelihood of a patient acting on his or her
delusions. A persecuted man should be less likely to take
defensive measures if he appreciates that his persecutory
beliefs are part of a psychiatric illness.
Little research has been conducted in this area. Roback and
Abramowitz (1979) studied the behaviour of patients with
schizophrenia in hospital and found that those with a
greater level of insight were rated as better adjusted
behaviourally on nine out of twelve measures. Van Putten et
al (1976), Lin et al (1979) and Bartko et al (1988) all
found that compliance with treatment was improved in
patients who were rated as exhibiting more insight. There is
a methodological problem, however, which is shared by all
four of these studies. Decreased insight and behaviour could
both be indicators of the severity of a patient's illness.
The patients of Roback and Abramowitz who were insightful
and behaviourally adjusted may have been less ill as may
have been the subjects in the other three studies who
possessed insight and complied with medication. In any case,
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influencing behaviour in general is not the same as
influencing actions based on delusions.
Motor changes
In depression, psychomotor retardation inhibits all types of
action and the increased risk of suicide attendant on the
lifting of this retardation with treatment has long been
recognised. In schizophrenia, the catatonic symptoms have
been reviewed by Abrams and Taylor (1 976) . Of these, the
possibility of explaining stereotypies in delusional terms
has already been mentioned (Jones, 1965). As pointed out by
Mayer Gross et al (1960), however, this is very different
from establishing a psychological cause and in any case the
behaviours described by Jones are invariably of little
consequence. Other catatonic symptoms such as negativism and
stupor can be expected to influence actions based on
delusions in the same non-specific and inhibitory way in
which they influence all behaviour.
Drive, motivation and affect
Perhaps more important influences on motor behaviour in
psychosis are such factors as drive, inclination and
motivation. These concepts are very close to that of
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"desire" as described by McGinn (1979) who considered it a
pre-requisite for action based on belief. They also bear
comparison with the concept of "affectivity" described by
Eugen Bleuler in 1924:
"Action is for the most part influenced by affectivity,
if one at least agrees with us when we designate the
force and direction of the impulses, or of the 'will'
as partial manifestations of the affects. He who is
happy, sad or furious will react accordingly." (p.143).
In normal subjects the drive and inclination to act are
closely linked to the affective and emotional aspects of a
belief and it seems likely that the chances of a delusion
being acted upon will be influenced by similar factors. In
depression the link between a delusion and its affective
component is so close that it becomes impossible to
distinguish the two: the fact that psychiatrists use the
term "mood congruent" to describe certain delusions reflects
the fact that these delusions are regarded as having an
emotional quality which is inseparable from the belief
itself. Any discussion of whether a psychotically depressed
patient kills himself because of what he believes or because
of what he feels rapidly becomes one of semantics. Similarly
in mania it is difficult to differentiate between grandiose
delusions and hypomanic affect as the cause of a patient's
extravagant behaviour.
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In chronic schizophrenia a reduction in the capacity to
experience pleasure has been described by several authors
(Harrow et al, 1977; Watson et al 1979; Cook and Simukonda,
1981). It is unclear whether a similar reduction occurs in
the capacity to experience other emotions although work
previously mentioned, describing schizophrenics'
difficulties in perceiving such emotions as anger (Spiegel
et al, 1962) provides some circumstantial evidence that this
is the case. If so, it might be expected that the delusions
of schizophrenics, charged with less emotion than those of
others, should be acted upon less often. Other workers,
however, have reached different conclusions. Feffer (1961)
presented neutral and emotionally charged words to
schizophrenic subjects and normal controls and found that
schizophrenics avoided words with an affective connotation.
Garety and Hemsley (1987) found that a high proportion of
deluded subjects found their delusions distressing. The work
of Vaughn and Leff (1976), showing that schizophrenics
living with high "expressed emotion" (EE) relatives were
more prone to relapse, and later work (Leff et al, 1982)
showing that relapse rates fell when EE was reduced, would
suggest that people with schizophrenia are sensitive to the
emotional aspects of their environment. It seems likely that
the emotional responsiveness of schizophrenics is not simply
reduced but altered in quality. It may be that people with
schizophrenia attach emotion inappropriately to certain
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beliefs, including delusional ones, and are then more likely
to act upon them.
Cognitive factors
The non-specific effect on behaviour of depressive
psychomotor retardation has already been mentioned. With
regard to schizophrenia, several varieties of cognitive
deficit, which could affect the likelihood of a delusion
being acted upon, have been proposed. Firstly, Frith (1987)
described a model for first rank symptoms and "negative
signs" in schizophrenia. First rank symptoms, he argued, are
consequent upon defective monitoring of action while
negative signs result from an imbalance between "willed
intentions" and "stimulus based intentions". A later paper
(Frith and Done, 1989) provided some experimental evidence
for the first of these proposals but not for the second
relating to negative symptoms and the specific implications
for delusional behaviour are unclear. Secondly, an impaired
ability to make probabilistic judgements has been described
(Huq et al, 1988). Thirdly, and as discussed earlier,
specific cognitive deficits have been invoked with regard to
perception. In more general terms, it has been argued that
the relatively intact cognitive function of chronic paranoid
patients is associated with a greater propensity for planned
violence than is the impaired cognitive function of patients
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with an acute psychosis (Krakowski et al, 1986; Wessely,
1993). It is not clear that this association represents a
causative link, however, or what form such a link might
take.
Finally, there are numerous reports of memory impairment in
schizophrenia independent of the effects of poor motivation
and drug treatment (see Tamlyn et al, 1992). The nature of
this impairment, however, is unclear. There are reports of
selective deficits in respect of items with an emotional
content (Koh et al, 1981) and verbal recall (Lawson et al,
1964; Yu and Johnson, 1979). Some have suggested a failure
of long-term, semantic memory (Koh, 1978; Calev et al,
1987), while others have described a loss of recall for more
recent events. Robertson and Taylor (1985), for instance,
tested a group of men held in prison or maximum security
hospital on criminal charges and found that their deluded
group showed a deficit of "immediate memory". It is possible
that such memory deficits are the result of the impaired use
of mnemonic strategies (Lawson et al, 1964; Yu and Johnson,
1979): Bauman (1971) showed that schizophrenics' memory for
three letter sequences failed to improve even when it was
pointed out to them that the sequences began with
consecutive letters of the alphabet. Robertson and Taylor
argued that, as a consequence of their memory deficits,
deluded patients were likely to misinterpret external
stimuli.
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Although a distinct thread has yet to emerge from the
investigation of cognitive function in schizophrenia, this
area of research does offer some correspondence with
theoretical writing on the subject of delusions. The views
of Fulford (1989) with regard to the importance of belief in
the genesis of action have already been mentioned. The work
of the same author offers the tantalising suggestion that
the link between a delusion and an ensuing action may be
impaired in a way which is inseparable from the genesis of
the belief itself. Fulford rejects the conventional
definitions of delusion pointing out, inter alia, that many
delusions are not beliefs at all but value judgements. He
suggests that delusions could better be described as
"defective reasons for action." Could these defective
reasons be the products of defective reasoning, defective
reasoning which also produces the cognitive deficits
described here? Fulford argues that the nature of any such
link is unclear and that considerable clinical and
philosophical work is required even to clarify the issues
involved.
Other factors
Several other aspects of the mental states of psychotic
patients have been implicated in delusional action. Numerous
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reports exist describing an association between blunting of
affect and self harm based on delusions (Shore, 1979;
Greilsheimer and Groves, 1979; Waugh, 1986). Mullen (1988)
has argued that emotional blunting is associated with
violence in schizophrenia. Hafner and Boker (1973), however,
in their large study of mentally abnormal offenders, found
that "only a small proportion of schizophrenic offenders
have flatness of affect." Some of the issues involved have
been discussed in the section covering drive, motivation and
affect. The degree of systemisation of delusions was found
by Hafner and Boker to be related to violent behaviour and
several less methodologically sound studies, reviewed by
Krakowski et al (1986), have reached similar conclusions.
The presence of hallucinations or perceptual changes in
cases where delusions of infidelity and poisoning are
associated with violence has been referred to by Shepherd
(1961), Mowat (1966) and Varsamis (1972). In mania,
Schipkowensky (1968) has invoked the "pathologically
increased social connection of the manic" to explain what he
regards as a very low incidence of violence in these
patients (quoted by Krakowski et al, 1986).
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1.5. Conclusions regarding the literature
This chapter has reviewed the theoretical basis for action,
pointing to the reappearance of beliefs as important causes
of action after a period during which more behaviourist
explanations held sway. A model has been described whereby
action is seen as caused by a combination of belief and
desire and triggered by factors such as "noticings". It has
been argued that these concepts correspond to some of the
findings of psychiatric research. "Desire" may well
correspond to psychiatric concepts of motivation, drive and
affect and "noticings" find likely equivalents in the field
of perceptual changes, perhaps influenced by other cognitive
aspects of psychosis. The correspondence is far from exact,
however, and the details of how desires and beliefs are
triggered by "noticings" to form the intention to act have
not been clarified for healthy subjects, let alone for
patients suffering from psychosis. As Fulford (1989) has
pointed out, avenues of research in this area are legion and
underexplored.
♦
An improved understanding of the likelihood of delusions
being acted upon would help psychiatrists to assess the risk
to the psychotic patient and to others. To this end it would
be advantageous to be able to attribute risk either to the
belief itself or to other features of the patient's
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psychosis. Unfortunately, most of the studies quoted here
rely on a violent or otherwise spectacular act for their
case ascertainment. As a consequence, it is impossible to
judge how likely it is that a particular delusion will be
associated with action. We do not know how many people have
similar beliefs without acting on them because such cases do
not tend to be reported. There is a clear need for more
broadly based studies of delusional action if an
understanding of the risk of delusional action is to be
approached.
In 1941 Aubrey Lewis wrote:
"Patients often do not act in accordance with their
delusional beliefs, especially when these are fleeting
or chronic ... But this is, on the whole, unusual in
the early or acute stages of the illness: a patient
will then act on his beliefs violently or in terror; he
may go to the police or be driven to suicide" (p.1189).
Lewis alludes to two factors which have been discussed here,
namely the chronicity of delusions and their emotional
context. It seems that research could also usefully measure
such aspects of phenomenology as conviction and
preoccupation and quantify the behavioural correlates of
these components. Measurement of the behavioural correlates
of other aspects of psychosis such as insight and affective
incongruity and also seems likely to be of value. It was in





The general aim of the present research was the description
of the phenomenological correlates of acting on delusions.
More specifically, four predictions were being tested.
The first was that certain aspects of the phenomenology of a
delusion would be associated with action. People who hold
their beliefs with conviction seem likely to act. The work
of McGinn (1979) suggests that those who notice things in
the world around them which relate to their beliefs should
similarly be more prone to do so. Where there is a strong
affective component to the belief, action should also be
more common. Systematisation of delusions, it has been
suggested, is associated with an increased likelihood of a
subject acting. Pre-occupation ought to have a similar
effect. Finally, increasing levels of insight should reduce
the chances of a subject acting on a delusion, particularly
where this increased insight involves a recognition, on the
part of the subject, that his delusion is a symptom of
illness.
The second prediction was that these "phenomenological
correlates of action" would be stable over time. This is not
an issue discussed in the literature. Clinical experience
suggests, however, that many other aspects of phenomenology
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are stable in this way. It seems reasonable to predict,
therefore, that the correlates of action will also be more
than ephemeral. If the phenomenology of acting on delusions
is transitory then the potential for predicting action is
limited.
The third was that the phenomenology of acting on delusions
would be independent of the classification of delusions on
other grounds. Again, this is not an issue discussed in the
literature. Delusions are usually classified according to
content (persecutory, grandiose, religious and so on). Part
of an understanding of delusional action must involve
establishing whether it is the content of the delusion, or
some other aspect of the phenomenology, which is associated
with action.
The fourth prediction was that the phenomenology of action
would be independent of the nature of that action. Action,
as noted above, takes many forms. Some aspects of delusional
action are of particular interest for specific purposes. The
phenomenological correlates of aggressive acts, for
instance, are of relevance in risk assessment. It is
important to establish whether particular features of





A daily check was made on the adult wards of the Bethlem and
Maudsley Hospital and Dulwich Hospital in London over a
seven month period to identify those patients who had been
admitted and who were likely to fulfil the entry criteria.
These were that the subject be aged 18 or over, not suffer
from an organic psychosis and describe at least one delusion
which was not mood-congruent. Sufferers from organic
psychoses were excluded because it was felt that the
transience of many of their psychotic phenomena would make
it difficult to conduct serial testing. Mood-congruent
beliefs were excluded because of the difficulty, described
in the introduction, of distinguishing the behavioural
consequences of the mood state from the behavioural
consequences of the delusion.
One hundred and six subjects, identified in this way, were
presented with that section of the Present State Examination
(P.S.E.; Wing et al, 1974) which covers the presence or
absence of delusions (items 71-92). The delusion was
required to be a "full" delusion according to P.S.E.
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criteria, that is, the subject required to be convinced as
to the veracity of the belief. In eight instances no such
delusion was identified and the subject was not asked to
participate; ninety eight patients fulfilled the entry
criteria. Fifteen of these either refused to participate in
the study or were too thought disordered to be interviewed,
the minimum requirements of an interview being the
identification of a Principal Belief (see below) and the
recording of the subject's own description of his or her
behaviour (Section 4 of the M.A.D.S.; see below and Appendix
1, page 208). The final sample therefore consisted of 83
subjects. All were interviewed within four weeks of
admission.
At interview the remaining items of the P.S.E. were
completed. Those delusions which had been identified using
the P.S.E. were then presented to the subject who was asked
which of them was most important to him or her. The
phenomenology of this delusion, henceforth labelled the
"Principal Belief", was then investigated using a new
instrument which was being tested, the Maudsley Assessment
of Delusions Schedule (M.A.D.S.; Wessely et al, 1993; Taylor
et al, 1994). The items contained in this instrument, along
with their inter-rater reliabilities, are attached as
Appendix 1. Where two or more delusions were adjudged to be
equally important by the subject the decision as to which
was to be labelled the Principal Belief was made according
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to which was held with the greatest degree of conviction.
Three to five days later each subject was re-interviewed and
the M.A.D.S. again completed.
At either the first or the second interview estimates were
made of each subject's pre-morbid and current intellectual
function. Pre-morbid I.Q. was estimated using the National
Adult Reading Test (N.A.R.T.; Nelson, 1991). Current
function was estimated using the Digit Symbol Sub-Test of
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (W.A.I.S.-R.;
Wechsler, 1981). Various short forms of the W.A.I.S.-R. are
available and would have provided alternative means of
assessing current function (see Crawford et al, 1992). All
involve a compromise between ease of administration and
validity. The Digit Symbol Sub-Test was chosen for this
study partly for ease of administration to a sample who were
already being asked to participate in a lengthy interview
and partly because of its emphasis on attention and
concentration, those aspects of cognitive function which
were felt to be of most relevance to subjects' performance
in such an interview.
For each subject an attempt was made to obtain, from an
informant, a description of the subject's behaviour in the
month prior to the interview. Fifty nine informants were
interviewed by an investigator blind to the nature of the
subject's delusions. No informants could be identified for
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16 subjects and for eight an informant was identified who
could not be traced. The informants were usually close
relatives of the subject but social workers, nurses and
hostel staff were also contacted where they, rather than
relatives, were best able to describe the subject's
behaviour. The informants were interviewed using the
instrument shown in Appendix 2.
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3.2. The sample
The mean age of the sample was 33 (minimum 18, maximum 66,
standard deviation 11.9) and 46 (55%) were male. Fifty two
(63%) had never been married, 11 (13%) were currently
married and 20 (24%) were widowed or divorced. Fifty two
subjects (63%) were unemployed on the day they were admitted
and twenty three (28%) had been continuously unemployed for
the previous five years. Only 8 (10%) had been continuously
employed over the same period. The mean interval between the
onset of the subject's illness and interview was 7.4 years
(minimum 0, maximum 32, standard deviation 8.2, median 5)
and the mean number of admissions which the subject had
experienced over this period was 2.8 (minimum 0, maximum 12,
standard deviation 3.0). For 35% of the subjects this was
their first admission.
For the 69 subjects who completed a full P.S.E. the CATEGO
classifications were schizophrenia (62%), paranoid psychosis
(9%), affective psychosis (26%) and other psychosis (3%).
The prevalence of affective psychosis is higher than one
might expect given that mood-congruent delusions were
excluded. This may indicate that people with substantial
abnormalities of mood can nevertheless demonstrate non mood-
congruent delusions. It may also reflect the difficulty of
determining whether or not a delusion is mood congruent.
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Mean pre-morbid full-scale I.Q. as estimated from the
N.A.R.T. was 102 (minimum 69, maximum 127, standard
deviation 17). The mean score on the Digit Symbol Sub-Test
of the W.A.I.S.-R. was 34 (minimum 9, maximum 61, standard
deviation 12.4). This is considerably below the average
score for this age group, which lies between 57 and 61, and
the standard deviation is considerably larger. This is what
one would expect in a patient group of average pre-morbid
intelligence who have recently been hospitalised as a result
of becoming psychotic. The mean interval between admission
and interview was 10.1 days (minimum 0, maximum 26, standard
deviation 6.9).
The interview required, at least, the identification of a
Principal Belief (which required, in turn, the completion of
items 71 to 92 of the P.S.E.) and scoring of the behavioural
ratings contained in Section 4 of Appendix 1. The completion
of items 71 to 92 of the P.S.E. also allowed the description
of the full range of each subject's delusions. Two ratings
are available. The first is for "partial delusions", defined
as, "delusions which are expressed with doubt, or as
possibilities which the subject entertains but is not
certain about. This rating should not be used if it is clear
that full delusions have been present during the month, or
if the subject has acted as if fully deluded." The second is
for "full delusions" which are described much more briefly:
"Fully convinced. No insight" (Wing et al 1974, p.215). The
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frequency of each rating for each category of delusion is
shown in Table 3.2.1.
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Table 3.2.1. Frequencies of occurrence of partial and full
delusions by content of the delusion.







Religious 1 1 7 1 8 22
Paranormal 6 1 5 21 25
Physical influence 5 8 1 3 1 6
Infidelity 0 2 2 2
Assistance 4 9 1 3 1 6
Persecution 21 31 52 63
Catastrophe 7 7 14 1 7
Grandiose 3 1 6 1 9 23
Guilt 2 7 9 11
Physical appearance 1 4 5 6
Hypochondriasis 4 6 1 0 12
Depersonalization 0 0 0 0
Sexual 2 9 1 1 1 3
Pregnancy 1 0 1 1
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Reference 8 26 34 41
Control 4 12 1 6 1 9
Fantastic
or memories 4 24 28 34
Thought insertion 3 1 5 1 8 22
Thought broadcast 5 14 1 9 26
Thought echo,
commentary 10 5 1 5 1 8
Thought block,
withdrawal 4 1 2 1 6 1 9
Thoughts read 1 2 1 3 25 30
The category "Reference" consists of responses to items 72
and 73 of the P.S.E., items which cover "delusions of
reference" and "delusional misinterpretation" respectively
but which define the two phenomena in similar terms. Other
categories contain responses to one P.S.E. item only. Two of
the categories described here, namely, delusions of physical
influence and delusions of control, sound extremely similar.
The distinction employed was that described in the P.S.E.
where, in describing delusions of control, it is stated,
"The essence of the symptom is that the subject experiences
his will as replaced by that of some other force or agency"
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(p.167). This definition is almost identical to that
provided by Hamilton in respect of "passivity feelings"
(Hamilton, 1985, p.85). Delusions of physical influence, as
defined here, are the responses to Item 80 of the P.S.E.,
"Is anything like electricity, or X-rays, or radio-waves
affecting you?" The category thus includes delusional
explanations of normal and abnormal phenomena but invokes no
requirement that the subject's will be subjugated to outside
forces. "Fantastic or memories" refers to item 87 of the
P.S.E. and includes delusional memories, confabulations and
fantastic delusions. There are two reasons why the sum of
the "Total" column of Table 3.2.1 is much larger than the
sample size. Firstly, many subjects had more than one
delusion. Secondly, one delusion can belong to more than one
category. Thus the Principal Belief of one subject was that
evil spirits were trying to harm her: this was rated as a
full delusion in two content categories, religion and
persecution.
If a subject identified more than one "full" delusion
(according to P.S.E. criteria) they were asked to state
which of the beliefs was the most important to them. This
delusion was labelled the Principal Belief and the
categories into which it fell are indicated in Table 3.2.2.
55
Table 3.2.2. Frequency of occurrence of various types of
delusional content in the Principal Belief













The commonest category of Principal Belief was, therefore,
persecutory. Examples included, "My mother wishes to harm
me," "Mr. X [a neighbour] is making plans to harm me," and,
"I believe an Irish republican group has an interest in me."
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The second commonest category was that of religious
delusions: "Jesus speaks to me because I am special," and,
"I am in telepathic contact with God."
Next most common were delusions of physical influence,
reference and control and the combined category,
corresponding to item 87 of the P.S.E., which included
delusional memories, confabulations and fantastic delusions.
Examples of delusions of physical influence included,
"Electricity is being beamed through the floor and is
affecting my body," and, "I can make and receive radio
signals." Delusions of reference included, "People discuss
me by saying things to each other with double meanings,"
and, "People say things with double meanings to see which
side I'm on." The presence of delusions of control hinges on
whether the subject feels that his will has been replaced
(see page 53). This is not an experience which can easily be
described in a sentence. Statements made by subjects with
delusions of control included, "The voice which talks to me
can control the way I feel," and, "I believe I am controlled
by an outside influence." The combined category included,
"Evil spirits touch my skin and take my flesh," "White
people follow evil," and, "Whatever I do affects the
subconscious of the whole race." Finally, the "Other" group
in Table 3.2.2 includes delusions of guilt such as, "I
believe I was possessed by a force of evil," delusions of
thought reading or thought insertion and delusions of
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infidelity such as, "My wife is having affairs." Thought
reading and thought insertion, as well as other disorders of
the possession of thought such as thought broadcasting, are
sometimes regarded as experiences rather than as delusions.
They are classified as delusions here because this is the
approach taken by the P.S.E.. Each of the content categories
in the "Other" group in Table 3.2.2 included the Principal





Information regarding the subject's behaviour was available
from the subjects themselves for 83 (100%) of the sample.
Each subject was asked a number of questions pertaining to
the behavioural consequences of the Principal Belief; these
questions are shown in Section 4 of Appendix 1. The period
covered was the month prior to the interview. As part of an
examination of the prevalence of delusional action, the
responses to these items were subjected to a latent class
analysis (Wessely et al, 1993). This technique assumes that
the associations among observed variables are generated by
underlying classes within which the variables themselves are
independent (Everitt, 1986). The data were best fitted by a
three class model. One class was characterised by lack of
self-reported action based on the delusion or by single such
actions; this class contained 60 subjects (72% of the
sample). The other two were associated with higher levels of
delusion-based action, one characterised by aggressive acts
such as hitting people or breaking things (9 subjects, 11%
of the sample) and the other by defensive acts such as
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taking steps to protect themselves (14 subjects, 17%). For
the purpose of the present research the classes
characterised by aggressive and defensive actions were
combined to produce a group of 23 Principal Beliefs (the
Principle Beliefs of 28% of the sample) which were, in the
opinion of the subjects themselves, associated with action.
Informant-reported delusional action
Information regarding the subject's behaviour was available
from informants for 59 subjects (71% of the sample). As part
of the investigation of the prevalence of acting on
delusions, each element of behaviour described by these
informants had been rated by a panel of four (see Wessely et
al, 1993). The panel consisted of a forensic psychiatrist,
two general psychiatrists and a psychologist. The behaviour
was rated as being unrelated (31 subjects, 52% of those for
whom information from informants was available), probably
related (11, 19%) or definitely related (17, 29%) to the
Principal Belief (Wessely et al, 1993). For the purposes of
the present research the probable and definite categories
were combined to form a group of 28 Principal Beliefs (48%
of that part of the sample for whom information from
informants was available) which were judged to have been
acted upon. The differences in the prevalences of delusional
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action, as measured by the two behavioural variables
described here, will be returned to on page 161.
Phenomenological variables
The items used to assess the phenomenological variables are
shown in sections one to three and five to eight of Appendix
1 (see page 208). Pronounced formal thought disorder limited
the amount of information which could be obtained in a small
number of cases. Data were obtained for between 73 and 79
subjects, depending on the item. The exact numbers are given
in the Results.
Conviction
Subjects were asked how sure they were about the truth of
their delusion and their responses rated. There were five
possible responses: "absolutely certain", "almost certain",
"quite certain", "have some doubts" and "doubt it".
Belief maintenance factors
Subjects were asked why they continued to believe their
delusion. They were asked whether internal events (such as
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mood changes) or external events had occurred and whether
these had occurred at any time since the idea first came to
them or in the last week. Finally, they were asked whether
they actively sought out information to confirm or refute
their belief.
Affect
Subjects were asked whether the delusion in question made
them feel happy or elated, unhappy or miserable, frightened,
anxious or, finally, angry. Their responses were rated as
"yes" or "no".
Preoccupation
This was rated according to the criteria used in the P.S.E..
There were four ratings. The first was used where the
subject was "preoccupied with past delusions only," the
second where the subject was, "not preoccupied with them for
much of the time," and could, "turn attention to other
things without difficulty." The third rating was employed
where it was felt that the delusion, "took up most of the
subject's attention," and that he or she, "was preoccupied
to the exclusion of many other matters." The fourth was used
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where the subject could, "hardly discuss anything but
delusions."
Systematisation
This was also rated according to the criteria used in the
P.S.E.. Thus there were three ratings. The first was defined
as, "The delusion is not elaborated into a general system
affecting much of the subject's experience. This includes
encapsulated delusions." The second comprised, "There is
some systematic elaboration, but substantial areas of the
subject's experiences are unaffected," and the third, "The
subject interprets practically all his experience in
delusional terms."
Insight
David (1990) has suggested that insight in psychosis can
usefully be regarded as having three components, namely, a
recognition of illness, an awareness of the need for
treatment and an ability correctly to label as abnormal
delusions and hallucinations. There is some evidence that a
sub-division of this type is valid (David et al, 1992) and
it will be used here.
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The ability to recognise illness is addressed directly by
the first question in Section 7 of Appendix 1, "Are you
psychologically unwell in any way ... is there anything
wrong with your nerves?" and tangentially by the second
question in the same Section, "Do you think that seeing a
psychiatrist might help you (has helped you) in any way?"
The subject's willingness to take treatment is examined by
the third question, "Do you think that medication might help
you (has helped you in any way) ... how?" The ability to re¬
label psychotic experiences as abnormal is possibly the most
difficult element of insight to investigate. Several
approaches were adopted. First, subjects were presented with
a "hypothetical contradiction" to their delusion (see David,
1990). Thus a patient who believed that other people
controlled his actions using radio waves was told by the
interviewer that there was no mechanism whereby this could
happen. The subject's responses were scored according to
whether he ignored the contradiction or denied its
relevance, accommodated it into his delusional system ("but
you're only saying that because they want you to"), changed
his level of conviction in his belief or abandoned his
belief completely.
Second, the subject was asked about the possibility that the
belief was false using three questions: "Asking you to think
about it now, can you think of anything at all that has
happened that goes against your belief?" "When you think
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about it now is it at all possible that you are mistaken
about X?" and, "What would have to happen to make you think
that you might be wrong about X?" The first two of these had
to be answered "yes" or "no". The subject's response to the
third was allocated to one of three categories, according to
whether he or she was able to outline evidence which was
logically possible, was able to outline evidence but this
evidence was not logically possible or was unable to
describe any evidence which would lead them to abandon their
Principal Belief.
Finally, the degree to which the subject believed that
others shared his belief was investigated on the basis that
if a subject believed that others shared his delusion he was
failing to recognise that it was abnormal. Thus the subject
was asked four guestions. In response to the first, "How far
do you think others share your beliefs?" there were five
possible responses: "completely," "to a considerable
extent," "to some extent," "hardly at all," "not at all." In
response to the second, "Do you ever discuss your ideas with
others?" there were two, yes and no. In response to the
third, "Do you ever have arguments about your beliefs?"
subjects could answer, "frequently (most days)," "quite
often (at least once a week," "sometimes (at least once a
month)," "once or twice ever," or "never." The replies of
subjects to the fourth, "Earlier I asked you whether or not
you felt others shared your belief about X. I'd like to
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clarify whether you feel that other people also believe X-
either openly, or perhaps without talking about it?", were
allocated by the rater into three categories. The first was
used where the subject accepted the uniqueness of the
delusion or its exclusiveness to a select few people, such
as those involved in a plot. The second was used where the
subject accepted that others did not openly share their
belief but felt that some might do so in private. The third




Data analysis proceeded in five stages. The first involved
the use of cross-tabulation, in combination with the chi
square statistic and the Mann-Whitney U test, to establish
the phenomenological correlates of acting on delusions when
delusional action is defined by the subjects themselves. In
the second stage the same techniques were employed to
establish the phenomenological correlates of delusional
action when that action is defined on the basis of
informant-reported action.
In the third stage the data from the second interview with
the subjects, three to five days after the first, were
examined to establish whether those correlations,
established from the first interview data, persisted. The
fourth stage of the analysis involved investigating the
effect of persecutory content, one of only two types of
content which were found to increase the likelihood of a
delusion being acted upon in a study of the prevalence of
delusional action conducted using the present sample
(Wessely et al, 1993). The other type of content which
demonstrated such an association was catastrophe but
delusions of catastrophe were uncommon and it was not
possible to investigate independently their effect. The
fifth stage of the analysis investigated the differences
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between the phenomenological correlates of aggressive and
defensive action.
A large number of statistical analyses were conducted. In
Section 4.1, for example, 24 phenomenological variables were
examined to identify those associated with action. This
approach increases the number of "type one" errors, that is,
the appearance of a statistically significant result by
chance. The best known correction for multiple comparisons
is the Bonferroni criterion (see Fleiss, 1986). This
requires the level of statistical significance at which an
association is said to exist, usually a "p" value of less
than 0.05, to be adjusted according to the number of
comparisons which are to be undertaken. In Section 4.1,
application of the Bonferroni criterion would require a "p"
value of less than 0.0021 before an association could be
said to be present.
The reader may prefer to read the next chapter with this in
mind. Some of the associations with self-reported acting in
Section 4.1, such as seeking information to confirm the
delusion, persist when the Bonferroni criterion is applied.
Others, such as feeling frightened by the belief, do not.
The study was exploratory, however, and examined the
hypotheses described on page 43. The overall error rate is
less important than would be the case if no hypotheses had
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been identified. All associations found without the use of
the Bonferroni criterion are, therefore, reported.
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4. The Results
The results are presented in tabular form as Appendix 3 on
page 221. The term "significant", when employed in relation
to a statistical association, will be used to indicate a "p"
value of less than 0.05. The term "non-significant trend"
will be used where the "p" value lies between 0.05 and 0.1.
For brevity the letter X will be employed to refer to a
subject's Principal Belief and the term "actors" to refer to
subjects who were judged, according to the criteria
described in Section 3.3, to have acted upon their Principal
Belief.
4.1. What are the phenomenological correlates of acting on
delusions when action is defined by subjects
themselves?
Conviction
Phenomenological data relating to the degree of conviction
with which the Principal Belief was held were available for
79 subjects (95% of the sample). Fifty two of these 79 (66%)
reported that they were "absolutely certain", thirteen (16%)
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that they were "almost certain", six (8%) that they were
"quite certain", another six (8%) that they "had some
doubts" and two (3%) that they doubted whether the belief
was, in fact, true. When the levels of conviction of actors
and non-actors were compared no statistically significant
differences were found.
Belief maintenance factors
Phenomenological data on the reasons offered by subjects in
support of the Principal Belief were available for 78
subjects (95% of the sample). When patients were asked why
they believed their delusions, 42 described evidence from
external events, such as weather changes and events in the
news. Thirty six failed to do so. Forty five described
evidence in the form of internal events, such as mood
changes or hallucinations. Thirty three failed to do so.
There was no statistically significant association between
describing external or internal evidence in isolation and
acting on a delusion. There was, however, a non-significant
trend towards those who could identify internal evidence
being likely to act (chi-square 7.57; p < 0.06) and a
similar trend towards an ability to identify external events
being associated with action (chi-square 3.24; p < 0.08).
When subjects were asked whether either type of evidence
existed an association was found with acting on the delusion
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as shown in Table 4.1.1. When subjects were asked whether
either type of evidence had been apparent in the past week a
similar association was found (Table 4.1.2). When subjects
were asked whether they sought out evidence to confirm or
refute their belief an association was again found with
acting on that delusion as shown in Table 4.1.3.
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Table 4.1.1. Association between the ability to identify
evidence (internal or external) supporting the delusion
and acting on that delusion
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Evidence present 23 (100) 46 (84)
Evidence absent 0 (0) 9 (16)
Total 23 (100) 55 (100)
chi square 4.25
p < 0.04
Table 4.1.2. Association between the ability to identify
evidence (internal or external) from the past week
supporting the delusion and acting on that delusion
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Evidence past week 22 (96) 34 (62)
No such evidence 1 (4) 21 (38)




Table 4.1.3. Association between seeking information to
confirm or refute a delusion and acting on that
delusion.
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Search made 13 (57) 9 (16)
No search made 10 (43) 46 (84)




Phenomenological data relating to the affective aspects of
the Principal Belief were available for 79 subjects (95% of
the sample). Eighteen of these (23%) reported feeling happy
or elated as a result of their delusion; happiness or
elation was not associated with action. Fifty two subjects
(66%) reported feeling unhappy or miserable and 45 (57%)
frightened as a result of their Principal Belief. The
presence of each of these emotions was associated with
action (see Tables 4.1.4 and 4.1.5). Fifty three subjects
(67%) reported feeling anxious and this was also associated
with action (Table 4.1.6). Unsurprisingly, the degree of co-
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variance with feeling frightened was very high: of the 45
subjects who reported feeling frightened as a consequence of
their Principal Belief, 42 also said that it made them feel
anxious.
Table 4.1.4. Association between feeling unhappy or
miserable as a result of a delusion and acting on that
delusion.
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Feel unhappy 20 (87) 32 (57)
Don 11 feel unhappy 3 (13) 24 (43)




Table 4.1.5. Association between feeling frightened as a
result of a delusion and acting on that delusion.
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Feel frightened 19 (83) 26 (46)
Don't feel frightened 4 (17) 30 (54)
Total 23 (100) 56 (100)
chi square 8.71
p < 0.004
Table 4.1.6. Association between feeling anxious as a
result of a delusion and acting on that delusion.
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Feel anxious 21 (91) 32 (57)
Don't feel anxious 2 (9) 24 (43)
Total 23 (100) 56 (100)
chi square 8.61
p < 0.004
Fifty three subjects (67%) said that their Principal Belief
made them feel angry. There was a non-significant trend
76
(chi-square 3.54; p < 0.06) towards these subjects being
more likely to act.
Preoccupation
Phenomenological data relating to preoccupation were
available for 78 subjects (94% of the sample). Two of these
(3%) were rated as, "preoccupied with past delusions only."
Fifty two (67%) were, "not preoccupied with them for much of
the time," and could, "turn attention to other things
without difficulty." For a further twenty (26%) the
delusion, "took up most of the subject's attention," and he
or she, "was preoccupied to the exclusion of many other
matters." Four subjects (5%) could, "hardly discuss anything
but delusions." No association was found between the level
of preoccupation associated with a delusion and the
likelihood of that delusion being acted upon.
Systematisation
Phenomenological data relating to the level of
systematisation of the Principal Belief were available for
78 subjects (94% of the sample). Twenty of these (26%) were
assigned to the first rating category, "The delusion is not
elaborated into a general system affecting much of the
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subject's experience. This includes encapsulated delusions."
Another forty five (58%) were assigned to the second, "There
is some systematic elaboration, but substantial areas of the
subject's experiences are unaffected." Finally, thirteen
(17%) were assigned to the third where, "The subject
interprets practically all his experience in delusional
terms." No association was found between the level of
systematisation of a delusion and the likelihood of that
delusion being acted upon.
Insight
The effect of a recognition of illness was tested in two
ways. Firstly, the subject was asked, "Are you
psychologically unwell in any way ... is there anything
wrong with your nerves?" Data were available for 76 subjects
(92% of the sample). A total of 19 (25% of those for whom
data were available) accepted that they had a mental illness
or nervous problem which included the delusion. A further 18
(24%) accepted that they suffered from a mental illness or
nervous condition but did not accept that the Principal
Belief was part of this illness. Thirty nine (51%) did not
regard themselves as ill. The three responses were allocated
scores of zero, one and two respectively and the responses
of actors and non-actors compared using the Mann-Whitney U
test. There was no statistically significant difference
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between subjects who acted on their Principal Belief and
those who did not. Secondly, the effect of a recognition of
illness was tested by asking, "Do you think that seeing a
psychiatrist might help you (has helped you) in any way?"
Data were available for 76 subjects. Forty six (61%) said
that they thought that they needed to see a psychiatrist.
Twenty three subjects (30%) did not think that they needed
to see a psychiatrist but agreed that they would see one if
asked to do so. Seven subjects (9%) saw no need to see a
psychiatrist and said that they would only do so under
duress. Again, the Mann-Whitney U test was used to
investigate the association between the responses of
subjects to this item and acting on the Principal Belief.
None was found.
The second aspect of insight studied was whether or not the
subject indicated a willingness to accept treatment in
response to the question, "Do you think that medication
might help you (has helped you in any way) ... how?" Data
were available for 74 subjects (89% of the sample). Forty
four (59%) accepted the need for drug treatment. Twenty five
(34%) saw no need for drug treatment but had accepted it
when it was offered and five (7%) said that they were
refusing medication. The data for actors and non-actors were
compared, as described in the last paragraph, using the
Mann-Whitney U test. There was a non-significant trend
towards actors being more likely to recognise that they
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needed treatment (Mann-Whitney U test. Mean rank actors:
31.9. Mean rank non-actors 39.9. U = 449.0. Z = -1.68. 2-
tailed p < 0.1).
The final aspect of insight to be examined was the ability
to label delusions and hallucinations as abnormal. As
described on page 62 et seg, this was done in three ways.
First, the subject was presented with a contradiction to
their Principal Belief, a contradiction couched in
hypothetical terms. Data were available for 79 subjects. An
association was found between their answers and the
likelihood of them acting on that delusion as shown in Table
4.1.7.
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Table 4.1.7. Association between the reaction to the
hypothetical contradiction of a delusion and the
likelihood of a subject acting on that belief.
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Ignores contradiction 9 (39) 45 (80)
Accommodates into system 1 (4) 0 (0)
Changes conviction 12 (52) 8 (14)
Dismisses delusion 1 (4) 3 (5)




Those who acted on their Principal Belief were more likely
to change their level of conviction when challenged. Those
who failed to act, on the other hand, were more likely to
ignore the hypothetical contradiction.
The second way in which the ability to label delusions and
hallucinations as abnormal was measured was by asking three
questions which suggested that the belief might be false:
"Asking you to think about it now, can you think of anything
at all that has happened that goes against your belief?"
81
"When you think about it now is it at all possible that you
are mistaken about X?" and, "What would have to happen to
make you think that you might be wrong about X?" Data were
available, with regard to the first two of these questions,
for 79 subjects and, with regard to the third, for 75. In
response to the first, "Asking you to think about it now,
can you think of anything at all that has happened that goes
against your belief?", 20 subjects (25%) said that they
could. Examples offered included the failure of the police
to find anything amiss in response to complaints of
persecution and one subject's acknowledgement that he was
ill and that the delusion might be a product of his illness.
There was a non-significant trend (chi-square 3.27; p <
0.08) towards those who could identify evidence going
against their Principal Belief being more likely to act on
that delusion.
In response to the second question, "When you think about it
now is it at all possible that you are mistaken about X?",
31 (39%) of subjects acknowledged that it was. In response
to the third, "What would have to happen to make you think
that you might be wrong about X?", 23 subjects (31%) were
able to outline evidence which it was logically possible to
obtain, such as an X-ray picture of their head which showed
no sign of a radio transmitter. Eleven (15%) were able to
outline evidence but it was not logically possible to obtain
this evidence. One subject who believed that "space people"
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were reading her thoughts said that she would know that this
was no longer happening when she received a message from
them saying that they had stopped. Forty one (55%) were
unable to describe any evidence which would lead them to
abandon their Principal Belief. The responses to the second
and third questions were examined, using the chi-square and
Mann-Whitney U test respectively, for an association with
acting on the Principal Belief. None was found.
The third way in which the ability to label delusions and
hallucinations as abnormal was investigated was by asking
subjects about the beliefs of others. The subjects were
asked four questions. In response to the first, "How far do
you think others share your beliefs?" data were available
for 74 subjects. Nine (12%) said, "completely", nine (12%)
"to a considerable extent," twelve (16%) "to some extent,"
six (8%) "hardly at all," and 38 (51%) "not at all". In
response to the second, "Do you ever discuss your ideas with
others?", data were available for 77 subjects. Fifty three
(69%) said that they did. In response to the third, "Do you
ever have arguments about your beliefs?" data were available
for 77 subjects. Three (4%) said, "frequently (most days)",
seven (9%), "quite often (at least once a week", six (8%),
"sometimes (at least once a month)", seven (9%), "once or
twice ever", and 54 (70%), "never". In response to the
fourth, "Earlier I asked you whether or not you felt others
shared your belief about X. I'd like to clarify whether you
83
feel that other people also believe X- either openly, or
perhaps without talking about it?", data were available for
73 subjects. Thirty nine (53%) accepted the uniqueness of
their delusion or its exclusiveness to a select few
allegedly directly involved. Eleven (15%) accepted that
others did not openly share their belief but felt that some
might do so in private. Twenty three (32%) said that the
belief was shared by many others. The responses to all four
questions were examined for an association with acting on
the Principal Belief, using a chi-square test for the
second, "Do you ever discuss your ideas with others?" and
the Mann-Whitney U test for the others. None was found.
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4.2. What are the phenomenological correlates of acting on
delusions when action is defined on the basis of
information provided by informants?
Information regarding the subjects' behaviour was available
from informants for 59 (71%) of the sample. The
phenomenological characteristics of the 28 Principal Beliefs
which were adjudged probably or definitely to have been
acted upon were compared with the same characteristics of
the 31 which were not associated with action.
Conviction
Data were obtained for 57 subjects (97% of those for whom a
behavioural rating, based on information provided by
informants, was available.) No association was found between
the degree of conviction with which a Principal Belief was
held and the likelihood of that subject being adjudged to




For each of the five items in Section 2 of Appendix 1 (see
page 208), data were obtained for 56 subjects (95% of those
for whom a behavioural rating, based on information provided
by informants, was available.) No association was found
between the responses to the first, second, third and fifth
of these items. Only in response to the fourth, relating to
the presence or absence of external events lending credence
to the Principal Belief, was an association found with
acting on that belief. The association is shown in Table
4.2.1 .
Table 4.2.1. Association between the ability to identify
external events supporting the delusion and acting on
the delusion
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Events present 18 (69) 12 (40)
Events absent 8 (31 ) 18 (60)




Those who were able to identify evidence supporting the
Principal Belief were more likely to act on that delusion.
Affect
For each of the five items in Section 3 of Appendix 1, data
were obtained for 57 subjects (97% of those for whom a
behavioural rating, based on information provided by
informants, was available.) No association was found between
the responses on these items and acting on the Principal
Belief. There was a non-significant trend towards a lack of
action consequent upon delusions which were associated with
a feeling of elation (chi square 3.45, p < 0.07).
Preoccupation
Data were obtained for 56 subjects (95% of those for whom a
behavioural rating, based on information provided by
informants, was available.) No association was found between
the degree of preoccupation associated with a Principal
Belief and the likelihood of that belief being acted upon.
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Systematisation
Data were obtained for 56 subjects (95% of those for whom a
behavioural rating, based on information provided by
informants, was available.) No association was found between
the degree of systematisation of the Principal Belief and
the likelihood of that Belief being acted upon.
Insight
The ability to recognise that one is ill is addressed by the
first two items from Section 7 in Appendix 1. On these items
data were obtained from 54 subjects (92% of those for whom a
behavioural rating, based on information provided by
informants, was available.) There was no association between
the subjects' responses, on the one hand, and acting on the
Principal Belief, on the other. The recognition of a need
for treatment is addressed by the third item in Section 7.
Data were obtained from 52 subjects (88% of those for whom a
behavioural rating, based on information provided by
informants, was available) and no association was found with
acting. The ability to label delusions and hallucinations as
abnormal is addressed by the final eight items in Section 7.
Data were obtained from between 52 and 57 subjects (88% and
97% of those for whom a behavioural rating, based on
information provided by informants, was available) and,
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again, no association was found with acting on the Principal
Belief when such action was defined using information
provided by informants.
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4.3. Are the phenomenological correlates of acting on
delusions stable over time?
Data from the second interview with the subjects, three to
five days after the first, were examined to establish
whether those correlations, established from the first
interview data, persisted. A total of 25 subjects who had
originally been included in the study either refused to be
interviewed for a second time (18), were discharged (five)
or deteriorated to the point where it was not possible to
interview them (two). Second interviews were therefore
conducted with 58 subjects, or 70% of the original sample.
Action on the Principal Belief was defined as before using,
firstly, information provided by the subjects themselves




Data were obtained from 58 subjects (100% of those on whom
second interview was conducted.) There was no association
between the level of a subject's conviction that the
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Principal Belief was true and the likelihood of his or her
having acted on that belief.
Belief maintenance factors
Data were obtained from 58 subjects (100% of those on whom a
second interview was conducted). With regard to the first,
second, fourth and fifth items of Section 2 of Appendix 1,
relating to the presence or absence of external events or
internal states since formation, the presence or absence of
external events or internal states within the last week, the
presence of external events in isolation or a history of
searching for evidence on the part of the subject, there was
no association with self-defined action. Only with regard to
the ability to identify an internal state, such as a mood
change or a hallucination, maintaining the belief was such
an association apparent as shown in Table 4.3.1.
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Table 4.3.1. Association between the ability (on second
interview) to identify internal states supporting the
delusion and acting on the delusion.
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
State present 5 (26) 22 (56)
State absent 14 (74) 17 (44)




Data were obtained from 57 subjects (98% of those on whom a
second interview was conducted.) There was a non significant
trend towards an association between a Principal Belief
making the deluded subject feel happy or elated and action,
by the subject, on that belief (chi square 2.97, p < 0.09).
All of the other affects examined, namely, unhappiness,
fear, anxiety and anger, showed statistically significant
associations with action as shown in Tables 4.3.2 to 4.3.5.
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Table 4.3.2. Association between feeling unhappy or
miserable (on second interview) as a result of a
delusion and acting on that delusion.
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Feel unhappy 18 (95) 24 (63)
Don't feel unhappy 1 (5) 14 (37)
Total 19 (100) 38 (100)
chi square 6.51
p <0.02
Table 4.3.3. Association between feeling frightened (on
second interview) as a result of a delusion and acting
on that delusion.
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Feel frightened 16 (84) 17 (45)
Don't feel frightened 3 (16) 21 (55)




Table 4.3.4. Association between feeling anxious (on second
interview) as a result of a delusion and acting on that
delusion.
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Feel anxious 18 (95) 24 (63)
Don't feel anxious 1 (5) 14 (37)
Total 19 (100) 38 (100)
chi square 6.51
p <0.02
Table 4.3.5. Association between feeling angry (on second
interview) as a result of a delusion and acting on that
delusion.
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Feel angry 17 (89) 20 (53)
Don't feel angry 2 (10) 18 (47)





Data were obtained from 58 subjects (100% of those on whom a
second interview was conducted.) There was a non-significant
trend towards subjects who exhibited greater pre-occupation
with a Principal Belief being less likely to act upon that
delusion (Mann-Whitney U test. Mean rank actors: 25.3. Mean
rank non-actors 31.5. U = 291.0. Z = -1.72. 2-tailed p <
0.09) .
Systematisation
Data were obtained from 58 subjects (100% of those on whom a
second interview was conducted.) No association was found
between the level of systematisation of a Principal Belief,
on the one hand, and the likelihood of that belief being
acted upon, on the other.
Insight
With regard to the capacity to recognise that one is ill,
data in response to the first two items of Section 7 of
Appendix 1 were collected from 57 and 58 subjects
respectively (98% and 100% of the second interview sample).
Neither showed an association with action. With regard to
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the recognition of the need for treatment, data were
obtained from 58 subjects. Again, no association was found
between a subject's response on this item and the likelihood
of that subject acting on his or her Principal Belief. With
regard to the ability to label delusions and hallucinations
as abnormal, data were collected on between 56 and 58
subjects. Seven of the eight items showed no association
with action. Only with regard to the second, "Asking you to
think about it now, can you think of anything at all that
has happened that goes against your belief?" was there a
trend towards those who answered in the affirmative being
likely to act. This trend did not reach statistical
significance (chi-square 2.98; p < 0.09).
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Action as defined using information provided by informants
Of the 58 subjects who completed a second interview, a
rating of action on the Principal Belief based on
information provided by informants was available for 42 (51%
of the original sample).
Conviction
Data were available for 42 subjects. No association was
found between the level of conviction with which the
Principal Belief was held at second interview and the
likelihood of that delusion being acted upon.
Belief maintenance factors
Data were available for 42 subjects. No association was
found between the responses to the first three items of
Section Two of Appendix 1, namely, the presence of internal
states or external events supporting the belief at any
point, the presence of such events or states in the past
week and the presence of internal states alone, on the one
hand, and acting on the delusion, on the other. The presence
of external events alone, however, was associated with
action as shown in Table 4.3.6.
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Table 4.3.6. Association between the ability (on second
interview) to identify external events supporting the
delusion and acting on that delusion.
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Events present 15 (71) 8 (38)
No events present 6 (29) 13 (62)
Total 21 (100) 21 (100)
chi square 4.71
p =0.03
Those who acted on their delusion were significantly more
likely to be able to identify external events lending
support to their belief. With regard to the final item of
Section 2 of Appendix 1, there was no relationship between a
subject's seeking evidence to confirm or refute a delusion
and acting on that delusion.
Affect
Data were available for 41 subjects. There was a non¬
significant trend towards those who felt happy as a
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consequence of the Principal Belief being more likely to act
upon that delusion (chi-square 2.73; p < 0.01). There was no
association between feeling unhappy or miserable,
frightened, anxious or angry and acting.
Systematisation
Data were available for 42 subjects. There was no
association between the level of systematisation of the
Principal Belief and acting on that delusion.
Pre-occupation
Data were available for 42 subjects. There was no
association between the level of pre-occupation with the
Principal Belief and acting on that delusion.
Insight
Data were available for 41 or 42 subjects. There was no
association between the first two items of Section 7 of
Appendix 1, relating to the subject's recognition of
illness, and action. Similarly, there was no association
between the third item in Section 7, relating to the
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perceived need for treatment, and acting on the delusion.
With regard to the final eight items in Section 7, relating
to the ability to label delusions and hallucinations as
abnormal, there was generally no association with the
proviso that for item 7.7, "What would have to happen to
make you think that you might be wrong about X?" there was a
non-significant trend towards those who were able to
identify evidence which would contradict their Principal
Belief being more likely to act on that delusion (Mann-
Whitney U test. Mean rank actors: 18.6. Mean rank non-actors
24.4. U = 159.5. Z = -1.74. 2-tailed p < 0.09).
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4.4. Do the phenomenological correlates of acting on
delusions simply reflect the content of those
delusions?
As noted in the Introduction, previous research has
suggested that persecutory delusions are particularly likely
to be associated with action. This is the case with regard
to grouped case reports (Green, 1981; Mawson, 1985; De Pauw
and Szulecka, 1988) and large scale series (Hafner and
Boker, 1973). In addition, in the present sample, when
delusions were analysed according to content, only
persecutory delusions and delusions of catastrophe were
associated with action (Wessely et al, 1993). It is possible
that the phenomenological correlates of delusional action,
described here, are simply reflections of the content of the
delusions. It may be that the associations with affect, for
instance, reflect only a tendency for persecutory delusions
to be both acted upon and affectively charged. In addition,
where subjects have more than one delusion, it is possible
that persecutory delusions affect the likelihood of other
delusions being acted upon. These two possibilities were
investigated separately, first by examining the
phenomenological correlates of persecutory Principal Beliefs
and then by examining independently those Principal Beliefs
where the subject described a persecutory delusion. For
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these analyses the measure of action used was that defined
by the patient.
The phenomenological correlates of persecutory Principal
Beliefs
Conviction
Phenomenological data relating to the degree of conviction
with which the Principal Belief was held were available for
79 subjects (95% of the sample). Of these 79, the Principal
Belief was a persecutory delusion in 23. When the whole
sample was examined for an association between the degree of
conviction with which a delusion was held and the likelihood
of acting on that delusion, none was found. Similarly, no
association was found for either the "persecutory Principal
Belief" or "non-persecutory Principal Belief" sub-samples.
Belief maintenance factors
Phenomenological data on the reasons offered by subjects in
support of the Principal Belief were available for 78
subjects (95% of the sample). Of these, the Principal Belief
was a persecutory delusion in 24 cases. When the whole
sample was analysed several items were associated with
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acting on a delusion when action was defined by the subjects
themselves: the ability to identify internal states or
external events supporting the belief since its inception,
the ability to identify such factors in the past week and a
positive response to the question, "Do you at present (or
have you in the past month) looked for any evidence or
information either to confirm your view or to test whether
it may be mistaken?" In addition, positive responses on the
two other items in this section, the ability to identify, in
isolation, internal states and external events, showed non¬
significant trends towards an association with action.
With regard to the first of these items, the ability to
identify internal states or external events, present since
the inception of that belief and lending support to that
belief, there was a non-significant trend towards those who
could identify such evidence being more likely to act (chi-
square 3.43; p < 0.07) when the Principal Belief was
persecutory. There was no association with action when the
Principal Belief was not persecutory. With regard to the
second, the ability to identify evidence within the last
week, there was an association between an ability to
identify such evidence, on the one hand, and action, on the
other, for both persecutory and non-persecutory Principal
Beliefs as shown in Tables 4.4.1 and 4.4.2.
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Table 4.4.1. Association between the ability to identify
evidence (internal or external) from the past week,
supporting the delusion, and acting on that delusion
(persecutory Principal Beliefs only).
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Evidence present 10 (100) 8 (57)
Evidence absent 0 (0) 6 (43)




Table 4.4.2. Association between the ability to identify
evidence (internal or external) from the past week,
supporting the delusion, and acting on that delusion
(non-persecutory Principal Beliefs only).
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Evidence present 12 (92) 26 (63)
Evidence absent 1 (8) 15 (37)
Total 13 (100) 41 (100)
chi square 3.95
p <0.05
With regard to the third item in Section 2 of Appendix 1,
the ability to identify internal states in isolation, there
was no association with action for either persecutory or
non-persecutory Principal Beliefs. With regard to the
fourth, the ability to identify in isolation external events
supporting the Principal Belief, there was a non-significant
trend towards such an ability being associated with action
when the Principal Belief was persecutory (chi-square 3.05;
p < 0.09). No such trend was evident for non-persecutory
Principal Beliefs.
With regard to the fifth item in Section 2 of Appendix 1,
the response to the question, "Do you at present (or have
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you in the past month) looked for any evidence or
information either to confirm your view or to test whether
it may be mistaken?" there was an association with action as
shown in Tables 4.4.3 and 4.4.4.
Table 4.4.3. Association between seeking information to
confirm or refute a delusion and acting on that
delusion (persecutory Principal Beliefs only).
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Search made 7 (70) 2 (14)
No search made 3 (30) 12 (86)




Table 4.4.4. Association between seeking information to
confirm or refute a delusion and acting on that
delusion (non-persecutory Principal Beliefs only).
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Search made 6 (46) 7 (17)
No search made 7 (54) 34 (83)




Phenomenological data relating to the affective aspects of
the Principal Belief were available for 79 subjects (95% of
the sample). Of these, the Principal Belief was a
persecutory delusion in 24 cases. When the whole sample was
analysed, feeling happy or elated as a consequence of the
delusion was not associated with action when action was
defined by the subjects themselves. Several items were
associated with acting on a delusion: feeling unhappy or
miserable, frightened or anxious as a consequence of that
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belief. There was a non-significant trend towards acting on
a delusion being more likely if that delusion made the
subject feel angry.
When the Principal Belief was persecutory it was impossible
to test for an association between feeling happy or elated
as a consequence of the delusion and acting on that
delusion: none of the twenty four subjects reported feeling
happy or elated. There was no association between happiness
and action for non-persecutory Principal Beliefs. With
regard to feeling sad as a consequence of the Principal
Belief, there was no association with action when the
delusion was persecutory. When the delusion was non-
persecutory, however, there was an association with action
as shown in Table 4.4.5.
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Table 4.4.5. Association between feeling unhappy or
miserable as a result of a delusion and acting on that
delusion (non-persecutory Principal Beliefs only).
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Feel unhappy 11 (85) 22 (52)
Don't feel unhappy 2 (15) 20 (48)
Total 13 (100) 42 (100)
chi square 4.30
p < 0.04
When subjects were asked whether they felt frightened as a
consequence of their Principal Belief, there was an
association, for persecutory Principal Beliefs, between a
positive response and action as shown in Table 4.4.6.
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Table 4.4.6. Association between feeling frightened as a
result of a delusion and acting on that delusion
(persecutory Principal Beliefs only).
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Feels frightened 10 (100) 7 (50)
Doesn't feel frightened 0 (0) 7 (50)
Total 10 (100) 14 (100)
chi square 7.06
p < 0.008
There was no association between feeling frightened as a
consequence of a delusion and acting on that delusion when
the analysis was conducted for non-persecutory Principal
Beliefs.
When subjects were asked whether they felt anxious as a
consequence of their delusion an association was found
between the response and action when the delusion was
persecutory (see Table 4.4.7).
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Table 4.4.7. Association between feeling anxious as a
result of a delusion and acting on that delusion
(persecutory Principal Beliefs only).
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Feels anxious 10 (100) 8 (57)
Doesn't feel anxious 0 (0) 6 (43)
Total 10 (100) 14 (100)
chi square 5.71
p <0.02
There was a non-significant trend towards an association
between feeling anxious and acting when the Principal Belief
was non-persecutory (chi-square 3.24; p < 0.08).
When subjects were asked whether they felt angry as a result
of their Principal Belief, there was no association between
a positive response and acting when the Principal Belief was
persecutory. When the delusion was non-persecutory there was
a non-significant trend towards an association between a
positive response and acting (chi-square 3.75; p < 0.06).
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Preoccupation
Phenomenological data relating to preoccupation were
available for 78 subjects (94% of the sample). Of these, the
Principal Beliefs of 23 were persecutory and the Principal
Belief of 55 was non-persecutory. There was no association
between the level of preoccupation, on the one hand, and the
likelihood of acting on the delusion, on the other, for
either the persecutory or the non-persecutory groups.
Systematisation
Phenomenological data relating to the level of
systematisation of the Principal Belief were available for
78 subjects (94% of the sample). Twenty three had
persecutory Principal Beliefs and 55 non-persecutory ones.
There was no association between the level of
systematisation and action for either group.
Insight
With regard to the first two elements of insight, the
ability to recognise that one is ill and the recognition of
a need for treatment, no association had been found with
action when the whole sample was examined. Similarly, no
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association with action was found when persecutory and non-
persecutory Principal Beliefs were analysed separately (data
available for 74-76 subjects, 21-22 with a Principal Belief
which was persecutory and 53-54 with a Principal Belief
which was not).
The final aspect of insight is the ability to label
delusions and hallucinations as abnormal. As described on
page 62 et seq, this was done in three ways. First, the
subject was presented with a hypothetical contradiction to
their Principal Belief. Data were available for 79 subjects,
for 24 of whom the Principal Belief was a persecutory
delusion and for 55 of whom it was non-persecutory. When the
whole sample was examined, the response to the hypothetical
contradiction was associated with action. Those who changed
the level of conviction with which they adhered to the
delusion were more likely to act. A non-significant trend
towards a similar association was found when the Principal
Belief was persecutory (chi-square 3.70; p < 0.06). When the
Principal Belief was non-persecutory, this trend was
statistically significant (Table 4.4.8).
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Table 4.4.8. Association between the reaction to the
hypothetical contradiction of a delusion and the
likelihood of a subject acting on that belief
(non-persecutory Principal Beliefs only).
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Ignores contradiction 5 (38) 34 (81)
Accommodates into system 1 (8) 0 (0)
Changes conviction 6 (46) 5 (12)
Dismisses delusion 1 (8) 3 (7)







The second way in which the ability to label delusions and
hallucinations as abnormal was measured was be asking three
questions which suggested that the belief might be false
(data available for 75-79 subjects, for 22-24 of whom the
Principal Belief was a persecutory delusion and for 53-55 of
whom it was non-persecutory). When the whole sample was
examined a positive response to the first of these questions
showed a non-significant trend towards an association with
action. When the sample was split a similar, non-
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significant, trend was found when the Principal Belief was
persecutory (chi-square 3.60; p < 0.06) but not when the
Principal Belief was non-persecutory.
When the whole sample was examined there was no association
between the responses to the second and third of these
questions, on the one hand, and action, on the other. When
the sample was split there was no association between the
response to the second question and action for either the
persecutory or non-persecutory Principal Beliefs. With
regard to the third question, however, although there was no
association between the response and action when the
Principal Belief was non-persecutory, persecutory Principal
Beliefs were more likely to be acted upon when the subject
was able to identify evidence (Mann-Whitney U test. Mean
rank actors: 8.60. Mean rank non-actors 13.9. U = 31.0. Z =
-2.15. 2-tailed p < 0.04).
The third way in which the ability to label delusions and
hallucinations as abnormal was investigated was by asking
subjects about the beliefs of others. The subjects were
asked four questions. Data were available for between 73 and
77 subjects. When the whole sample was analysed, no
association was found between the responses to any of the
four questions and acting on the Principal Belief. The
findings were the same when the sample was divided. No
association was found between the responses, on the one hand
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and acting, on the other, either for persecutory or non-
persecutory Principal Beliefs.
The phenomenological correlates of acting on a Principal
Belief in the presence of a persecutory delusion
Conviction
Phenomenological data relating to the degree of conviction
with which the Principal Belief was held were available for
79 subjects (95% of the sample). A persecutory delusion was
present in 49 cases and no persecutory delusion was present
in 30. When the whole sample was examined no association was
found between the degree of conviction with which a delusion
was held and the likelihood of acting on that delusion. The
same was true when the association was sought, firstly, in
the presence of a persecutory delusion and, secondly, in the
absence of such a delusion.
Belief maintenance factors
Phenomenological data on the evidence offered by subjects in
support of their Principal Belief were available for 78
subjects (95% of the sample). A persecutory delusion was
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present in 50 of these cases and absent in 28. When the
whole sample was analysed several items were associated with
acting on a delusion when action was defined by the subjects
themselves: the ability to identify internal states or
external events supporting the belief since its inception,
the ability to identify such factors in the past week and a
positive response to the question, "Do you at present (or
have you in the past month) looked for any evidence or
information either to confirm your view or to test whether
it may be mistaken?" In addition, positive responses on the
two other items in this section, the ability to identify, in
isolation, internal states and external events, showed non¬
significant trends towards an association with action.
With regard to the first of these items, the ability to
identify internal states or external events, present since
the inception of that belief and lending support to that
belief, there was a non-significant trend towards those who
could identify such evidence being more likely to act (chi-
square 3.21; p < 0.08) when a persecutory delusion was
present. No such association was present in the absence of a
persecutory delusion. With regard to the second, the ability
to identify evidence within the last week, there was an
association between an ability to identify such evidence, on
the one hand, and action, on the other, both when
persecutory delusions were present and when they were
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absent. These associations are shown in Tables 4.4.9 and
4.4.10.
Table 4.4.9. Association between the ability to identify
evidence (internal or external) from the past week,
supporting the delusion, and acting on that delusion
(persecutory delusions present).
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Evidence present 15 (94) 23 (68)
Evidence absent 1 (6) 11 (32)




Table 4.4.10. Association between the ability to identify
evidence (internal or external) from the past week,
supporting the delusion, and acting on that delusion
(persecutory delusion absent).
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Evidence present 7 (100) 11 (52)
Evidence absent 0 (0) 10 (48)
Total 7 (100) 21 (100)
chi square 5.19
p <0.03
With regard to the third item in Section 2 of Appendix 1,
the ability to identify internal states in isolation, there
was a non-significant trend towards those who could identify
such states being likely to act when delusions of
persecution were present (chi-square 7.55; p < 0.06), but
not when persecutory delusions were absent. The findings
with regard to the fourth, the ability to identify in
isolation external events supporting the Principal Belief,
followed a similar pattern. There was a non-significant
trend towards those who could identify such evidence being
likely to act, but only when persecutory delusions were
present (chi-square 3.04; p < 0.09).
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With regard top the fifth item in Section 2 of Appendix 1,
the response to the question, "Do you at present (or have
you in the past month) looked for any evidence or
information either to confirm your view or to test whether
it may be mistaken?" there was an association with action
when a persecutory delusion was present (Table 4.4.11).
Table 4.4.11. Association between seeking information to
confirm or refute a delusion and acting on that
delusion (persecutory delusion present).
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Search made 11 (69) 5 (15)
No search made 5 (31 ) 29 (85)
Total 16 (100) 34 (100)
chi square 14.6
p < 0.001




Phenomenological data relating to the affective aspects of
the Principal Belief were available for 79 subjects (95% of
the sample). A persecutory delusion was described by 50
subjects and not by the other 29. When the whole sample was
analysed, feeling happy or elated as a consequence of the
delusion was not associated with action when action was
defined by the subjects themselves. Several items were,
however, associated with acting on a delusion: feeling
unhappy or miserable, frightened or anxious as a consequence
of that belief. There was a non-significant trend towards
acting on a delusion being more likely if that delusion made
the subject feel angry.
There was no association between feeling happy or elated as
a result of the Principal Belief and acting on that belief
when the sample was split and the subjects who described
(and those who failed to describe) persecutory delusions
were analysed separately. With regard to feeling unhappy as
a consequence of the Principal Belief, there was an
association with action when persecutory delusions were
present, as shown in Table 4.4.12.
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Table 4.4.12. Association between feeling unhappy or
miserable as a result of a delusion and acting on that
delusion (persecutory delusion present).
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Feel unhappy 15 (94) 20 (59)
Don't feel unhappy 1 (6) 14 (41)
Total 16 (100) 34 (100)
chi square 6.32
p <0.02
No such association was found in the absence of persecutory
delusions.
A similar pattern emerged when subjects were asked whether
they felt frightened as a consequence of their Principal
Belief and when they were asked whether they felt anxious,
as shown in Tables 4.4.13 and 4.4.14.
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Table 4.4.13. Association between feeling frightened as a
result of a delusion and acting on that delusion
(persecutory delusion present).
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Feels frightened 15 (94) 16 (47)
Doesn't feel frightened 1 (6) 18 (53)




Table 4.4.14. Association between feeling anxious as a
result of a delusion and acting on that delusion
(persecutory delusion present).
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Feels anxious 16 (100) 19 (56)
Doesn't feel anxious 0 (0) 15 (44)
Total 16 (100) 34 (100)
chi square 10.1
p < 0.002
In both instances the association between affect and acting
on the delusion only occurred in the presence of persecutory
delusions. No such association was found when the group of
29 subjects who did not describe persecutory beliefs was
examined. Finally, the non-significant trend, noted on
examination of the whole sample, towards delusions being
acted upon when the subject said that the belief made him
feel angry, was again found in those subjects who described
persecutory delusions (chi-square 3.43; p < 0.07). No such
trend was found when persecutory delusions were absent.
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Preoccupation
Phenomenological data relating to preoccupation were
available for 78 subjects (94% of the sample). Of these, 49
described persecutory delusions and 29 did not. There was no
association between the level of preoccupation, on the one
hand, and the likelihood of acting on the delusion, on the
other, for either group.
Systematisation
Phenomenological data relating to the level of
systematisation of the Principal Belief were available for
78 subjects (94% of the sample). Forty nine described
persecutory delusions and 29 did not. There was no
association between the level of systematisation, on the one
hand, and action, on the other, for either group.
Insight
With regard to the responses to two questions relating to
the ability to recognise that one is ill, data were
available for 76 subjects, 47 of whom described persecutory
delusions, and no association with action was found when the
whole sample was examined. When the sample was split,
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similarly, no association was found between the responses on
these items, on the one hand, and action, on the other,
either in the presence or the absence of persecutory
delusions. With regard to a willingness to accept treatment,
data were available for 74 subjects (89% of the sample), 45
of whom described persecutory delusions. There was no
association between responses on this item and acting on the
Principal Belief when the whole sample was analysed. When
the two sub-groups were examined, however, a non-significant
trend was found, in subjects with persecutory delusions,
whereby those who accepted the need for drug treatment were
more likely to act (Mann-Whitney U test. Mean rank actors:
19.0. Mean rank non-actors 25.0. U = 164.5. Z = -1.66. 2-
tailed p < 0.1). No such trend was evident for subjects who
did not describe persecutory delusions.
The final aspect of insight to be examined was the ability
to label delusions and hallucinations as abnormal. With
regard to the first test of this ability, the response to a
hypothetical contradiction, data were available for 79
subjects, 50 of whom described persecutory delusions. The
association between action and changing one's level of
conviction, noted for the whole sample, was maintained when
the analysis was restricted to those subjects who described
persecutory delusions (Table 4.4.15).
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Table 4.4.15. Association between the reaction to the
hypothetical contradiction of a delusion and the
likelihood of a subject acting on that belief
(persecutory delusion present).
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Ignores contradiction 7 (44) 28 (82)
Changes conviction 9 (56) 5 (15)
Dismisses delusion 0 (0) 1 (3)




A similar but non-significant trend was noted for those
subjects who did not describe persecutory delusions.
The second way in which the ability to label delusions and
hallucinations as abnormal was measured was be asking three
questions which suggested that the belief might be false.
Data were available for 75 or 79 subjects, between 46 and 50
of whom described persecutory delusions. In response to the
question "Asking you to think about it now, can you think of
anything at all that has happened that goes against your
1 27
belief?", the responses of the whole sample showed a non¬
significant trend in the direction of those who could think
of evidence being more likely to act. When data from those
subjects who described persecutory delusions was examined,
this trend was significant (Table 4.4.16).
Table 4.4.16. Association a positive response to the
question "Asking you to think about it now, can you
think of anything at all that has happened that goes
against your belief?" and acting on that belief
(persecutory delusion present).
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Think of anything 7 (44) 5 (15)
Think of nothing 9 (56) 29 (85)
Total 16 (100) 34 (100)
chi square 5.03
p <0.03
By contrast, no such association was found in subjects who
did not describe persecutory delusions. With regard to the
other questions addressing the possible falsity of the
delusion and with regard to the questions regarding the
beliefs of others (data available for between 73 and 77
subjects, between 45 and 48 of whom described persecutory
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delusions), no association with action was found either for
those subjects with, or without, persecutory delusions.
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4.5. Do the phenomenological correlates of action differ
according to whether the subject acts in an aggressive
or a defensive manner?
As described on page 58, a latent class analysis of the
subjects' responses to the items of Section 4 of Appendix 1
allowed the division of the sample into three groups. One
group consisted of 60 subjects (72% of the sample) who did
little. The other two were associated with higher levels of
delusion-based action, one characterised by aggressive acts
such as hitting people or breaking things (9 subjects, 11%
of the sample) and the other by defensive acts such as
taking steps to protect themselves (14 subjects, 17%). The
data from these two groups was examined in order to
establish whether the phenomenological correlates of action
were the same for aggressive and defensive actors.
Unsurprisingly, in view of the small numbers involved, no
statistically significant differences emerged.
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4.6. Further statistical analyses
The phenomenology of a delusion is not the only factor which
could lead to that delusion being acted upon. Firstly, it
was argued by Aubrey Lewis (1941) that patients are more
likely to act on their delusions in the early stages of
their illness. Lewis was writing before the widespread use
of neuroleptic medication but it seems reasonable to suppose
that the same inverse association, between duration and
action, would apply today. While neuroleptics reduce the
prevalence of delusions, it is not clear why they should
alter the behavioural consequences of those delusions. After
all, they do not seem to influence the likelihood of other
beliefs being acted upon. Secondly, it may be that the
cognitive function of the subject affects the likelihood of
his acting. This could occur because the ability to act in
response to any belief requires a certain rational capacity
or because an ability to work out the advantages and
disadvantages of acting might inhibit some delusional
action. Thirdly, acting on delusions, like other forms of
behaviour such as criminal activity or engaging in violence,
is likely to be age dependent and more common in young
people. Finally, it might be argued, the phenomenological
correlates of action may vary according to diagnosis.
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All four of these possibilities, duration of illness,
cognitive function, age and diagnosis were examined using
the definition of acting on delusions derived from the
subjects' own descriptions of their behaviour. The mean
duration of illness of those who acted on their Principal
Belief was 7.1 years (standard deviation 7.3 years) and that
of non-actors was 7.5 years (standard deviation 8.5 years).
The difference between the two groups was not statistically
significant. The mean pre-morbid IQ was calculated using the
N.A.R.T.. The mean score for actors was 108 (standard
deviation 16) and that for non-actors was 100 (standard
deviation 17). The difference was not statistically
significant. Similarly, there was no significant difference
between actors and non-actors with respect to their
performance on the Digit Symbol Sub-Test of the W.A.I.S.-R..
The mean score for actors was 35 (standard deviation 12) and
for non-actors 33 (standard deviation 13). The mean age of
actors was 31.8 years (standard deviation 9.6 years) and the
mean age of non-actors 32.9 years (standard deviation 9.6
years). This difference in the ages of the two groups was
not statistically significant.
The classification generated by the CATEGO programme was
used as an indicator of each subject's likely diagnosis. The
forty seven subjects in CATEGO classes S, P and 0 were
examined separately. The phenomenological correlates of
action were broadly similar to those which had been
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identified for the sample as a whole. For three variables,
those corresponding to items 2.1, 2.5 and 3.2 of Appendix 1,
what had been a statistically significant association when
the whole sample had been examined was reduced to a non¬
significant trend.
For item 2.1 of Appendix 1, for instance, which asked each
subject whether or not he had sought information to confirm
or deny his belief, data were available for 46 subjects. The
non-significant trend is shown in Table 4.6.1.
Table 4.6.1. Association between the ability to identify
evidence (internal or external) supporting the delusion
and acting on that delusion (CATEGO classes S, P and 0
only)
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Evidence present 15 (100) 25 (81)
Evidence absent 0 (0) 6 (19)
Total 15 (100) 31 (100)
chi square 3.34
p < 0.07
The figures can be compared with those for the whole sample
which are shown in Table 4.1.1 on page 72. Although the
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level of statistical significance is reduced for the data in
Table 4.6.1, the percentages in each cell are similar. The
loss of statistical significance is a product of the
reduction in the sample size. The situation was similar when
the data for items 2.5 and 3.2 were examined in this way. It
appears, therefore, that the phenomenological correlates of
action for subjects in CATEGO classes S, P and 0 were




If the methodology of a study is inadequate, conclusions
cannot be drawn from the results. This, first, part of the
Discussion will examine the methodology employed here. The
possible shortcomings are several. Firstly, the procedure
which has been adopted may be inadequate. Secondly, the
sample may be so atypical as to make it impossible to
generalise from the findings. Thirdly, the variables
employed may be unreliable or invalid.
Procedure
There are several drawbacks to the procedure employed here.
One concerns the degree to which it is appropriate to regard
action as generated by a single belief. Another relates to
the fact that the sample were being treated while the study
was in progress. A third concerns the degree to which it is
appropriate to describe phenomenology measured at one point
in time as a correlate of action which occurred at another.
These will be discussed in turn.
135
To what extent can action be regarded as the product of a
single belief? The short answer must be that it depends upon
the belief. If I believe that by arming myself I can save my
own life and the lives of those around me then my subsequent
purchase of a weapon would seem to be explained by the
belief. But the belief, in turn, seems to combine several
other, "contributory", beliefs. I consider myself to be in
mortal danger, for one thing, and believe that unarmed self-
defence would be ineffective, for another. None of these,
"contributory", beliefs could be regarded as independently
sufficient to generate action. The degree to which a belief
can be said to influence behaviour depends, in part, on the
terms in which that belief is couched and, in particular, on
the degree to which the belief incorporates the actor's view
of the circumstances in which he finds himself.
A considerable philosophical literature, referred to in the
Introduction, pertains to the genesis of action. In this
literature action is seen as the product of a combination of
desires and beliefs. Some philosophers have divided these
desires and beliefs into "first order" and "second order"
phenomena. First order desires correspond to "wants" (see,
for instance, Frankfurt, 1971; Frankfurt, 1987). Second
order desires, such as a wish to be respected or to have a
clear conscience, involve a degree of self-monitoring.
Frankfurt is no psychoanalyst but his model has echoes of
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the id and the superego. Action, to Frankfurt, is the
product of a complicated hierarchy of desires and beliefs,
many of which are incapable, independently, of influencing
behaviour. McGinn (1979) draws a similar distinction,
between first and second order phenomena, with regard to
beliefs. Second order beliefs involve a degree of self
monitoring and are incapable, independently, of generating
action. Our beliefs concerning right and wrong, for
instance, do not, on their own, lead us to do anything in
particular but do influence our behaviour.
Most writers on the philosophy of action, while attributing
a crucial role to desires, regard an actor's beliefs as
important contributors to what he does (see, in addition to
the work of Frankfurt and McGinn, Feinberg, 1970; McGinn,
1979; Moore, 1984). There is good reason to assume that
delusions, which are beliefs of a kind, will be similarly
implicated. With regard to the issues of "contributory"
beliefs and of beliefs of different orders, these were
partly dealt with by the methodology. One of the groups
defined here as "actors" were themselves identifying
instances where a particular belief, the Principal Belief,
was a substantial contributor to the behaviour in question.
If a belief was merely a minor contributor to a subject's
behaviour it is unlikely that he would think of that
behaviour when asked the questions relating to the
behavioural consequences of his delusion.
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A second drawback to the methodology employed here is that
the cases could not be regarded as unmodified examples of
mental illness. The methodology allowed a four week interval
between admission and the research interview. During this
time most of the subjects would have received drug
treatment. The objection is only partly answered by the
observation that most subjects were seen sooner than this,
the mean interval between admission and interview being ten
days. Sixty five percent of the sample had been admitted
previously and it is likely that the majority of subjects
were receiving medication before they were admitted. It must
be acknowledged that the findings reported here largely
refer to the phenomenological correlates of acting on
delusions in subjects receiving medication. It is difficult
to see how this difficulty could be avoided, however, and,
in any case, the result is that the research subjects
resemble more closely than they would otherwise the patients
whom psychiatrists see in their daily practice.
The third drawback to the procedure employed here is that
time passed between the actions on the basis of the delusion
taking place and the phenomenology of that delusion being
measured. Subjects were asked about their behaviour during
the previous month. Many of the phenomenological variables,
however, related to the subject's condition at the time of
the interview. Two problems arise. Firstly, the subjects may
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have forgotten about some of their behaviour consequent upon
the delusion. Secondly the phenomenology of delusions may
change so rapidly that the correlates of action, described
here, correlates such as belief maintenance factors and
affect, may bear no relation to the phenomenology of the
delusion at the time it was acted upon.
With regard to the first of these problems, the possibility
that some behaviour may have been forgotten, several points
can be made. Eighty eight percent of subjects who completed
the P.S.E. fulfilled the CATEGO criteria for affective
psychosis or schizophrenia. There is a known association
between affective psychosis and memory impairment in that
depressed people may develop a pseudodementia. Ten subjects
showed evidence of motor retardation (defined as a score of
1 or 2 on item 110 of the P.S.E.) in association with low
mood (defined as a score of 1 or 2 on item 23 of the P.S.E.)
and in these instances there is clearly a possibility that
some instances of delusional action may have been forgotten
or remembered incorrectly.
In schizophrenia, it has been suggested, memory for items
with emotional content (Koh et al, 1981) and verbal recall
(Lawson et al, 1964; Yu and Johnson, 1979) are selectively
impaired, perhaps through poor use of mnemonic strategies
(Lawson et al, 1964; Yu and Johnson, 1979). The usual
conclusion, however, is that no memory deficit exists in
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acute schizophrenia (see Cutting, 1985 for a review). In the
chronic form of the condition there is more agreement that
memory impairment may be present. Would one expect to find
such an impairment in the present sample? Although the mean
duration of illness was 7.4 years the median was only five.
The mean age was 33, the mean number of admissions was 2.8
and for 35% of the sample this was their first admission.
The picture is not one of a sample of whom the majority
suffer from the chronic forms of schizophrenia.
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that, as with
affective psychosis, a proportion of subjects will be
failing accurately to remember the details of their actions
consequent upon their delusions.
The second point to be made, however, in relation to the
possibility that subjects are failing accurately to recall
some of their actions, relates to the extent to which the
memory impairment of some of the sample can be expected to
have influenced the results described here. The most common
consequence of memory impairment is that the subject will
simply forget certain instances of acting on a delusion. In
other words, memory impairment will reduce the apparent
prevalence of delusional action. It is conceivable that this
will in turn affect the phenomenological correlates of
action if the phenomenology of subjects who act and whose
memory is poor is substantially different from the
phenomenology of those who act and whose memory is
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unimpaired. One cannot exclude this possibility but there is
no evidence that such a differential effect does, in fact,
exist. And, in view of the finding that acting on delusions
is not related to cognitive function (see page 130), there
is reason to suspect that it does not. Certainly, since it
is likely that only a minority of the sample suffered from
memory impairment, it seems reasonable to assume that the
results reported here are not invalidated by such an effect.
The third point is that the subjects were asked again about
their actions consequent upon the delusion when they were
re-interviewed three to five days later. Numerous problems
attend the use of the responses at the time of this, second,
interview, to draw inferences regarding the accuracy of a
subject's recall. For one thing, the object of recall, in
this case certain forms of behaviour, may have changed. The
subject may have acted on the delusion between the first and
second interview. For another, part of any discrepancy
between the responses at the time of the two interviews will
be attributable to deficiencies in the test-retest
reliability of the individual items. The issue is discussed
further below. Nevertheless, as can be seen from Appendix 4
(see page 224), people who say they acted in a certain way
the first time they are interviewed tend to say the same
thing the next. This is particularly the case with regard to
breaking things (Kappa co-efficient 0.73) and hitting people
(Kappa co-efficient 0.69).
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The second problem, consequent upon the interval between the
delusional action and the measurement of the phenomenology
of that delusion, is that the phenomenology itself may
change so rapidly that by the time it is measured it bears
no relationship to that which was present at the time of the
act. There are two approaches to answering this point. The
first is to point out that other aspects of phenomenology do
not come and go with this rapidity. Thought disorder, mood
states and hallucinations, when observed in in-patient
populations, may be fleeting but are more likely to be
present for days, weeks or months. Delusions, however, may
be different in this respect. The definition of primary or
autocthonous delusions, for example, requires them to be
sudden events.
The second approach is to use the data which was generated
as part of the study. A second interview was conducted with
58 subjects, or 70% of the sample, three to five days after
the first interview. During this second interview the
subject was presented with the same series of questions
designed to outline the phenomenology of the Principal
Belief. It should be possible, by comparing the responses of
the subject during the first and second interviews, to
obtain some estimate of the stability of the delusional
phenomenology of the sample. The difficulty is that there
are two possible sources of measured instability. The first
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is low test-retest reliability of the instrument and the
second a change in the phenomenology of the delusion. It is
not possible, using the data obtained here, to distinguish
one from the other. All that can be said is that the inter-
rater reliabilities of the items, as shown in Appendix 1,
were satisfactory; it seems unlikely that the test-retest
reliability will be extremely low.
The degree of agreement between the responses to each item
at the first interview and the responses to the same item at
the second are shown as Appendix 4. The Kappa co-efficients
listed in the Appendix are affected, however, by the number
of responses available. A better description of the level of
persistence of the phenomenology may be provided by
describing the proportions of subjects responding in each
way. Thus, with regard to the degree of conviction with
which the Principle Belief was held, of those who described
themselves as "almost certain" or "absolutely certain" at
the time of the first interview, 85% did so again at the
time of the second. With regard to belief maintenance
factors, of those who could identify external events or
internal states at the time of the first interview, 88%
could do so again at the time of the second.
A positive response, on first interview, to the first of the
questions relating to affect was repeated, at the time of
the second, in 73% of cases. For preoccupation, of those
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whose delusions were rated as taking up most of their
attention at the time of the first interview, 61% were so
rated again at the time of the second. Of those who were
rated as demonstrating some systematic elaboration, this
persisted in 93% of cases. Finally, with regard to insight,
those who were rated as failing fully to acknowledge that
they were unwell were rated similarly 93% of the time.
It would seem, therefore, with the reservations expressed
here, that the associations, described earlier, between
acting on a delusion and certain aspects of the
phenomenology of that delusion, cannot be dismissed as
chance associations between action and continuously changing
phenomenology. With the possible exception of pre¬
occupation, where the inter-rater reliability was also low
(see Appendix 1), the phenomenology of the Principal Belief
was relatively consistent between the first interview and
the second, three to five days later. Three to five days, of
course, is not long in terms of the usual time course of a
psychotic illness. It would have been preferable to conduct
further interviews with the subjects in order to examine in
more detail the stability of the various elements of
phenomenology and the relationship of these elements to
delusional action. This was not done partly because of the
amount of time required and partly because it was
anticipated that the number of patients lost to follow up,
due to their becoming disenchanted with the demands made on
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them or loosing their Principal Belief, would be
unacceptably high. In support of this assessment is the fact
that 30% of the sample were unavailable, for various
reasons, three to five days after the first interview.
In summary, this section of the Discussion has examined
three drawbacks to the procedure adopted in this study. The
first relates to the extent to which it is appropriate to
regard behaviour as the product of a single belief. In
response it has been suggested that, while the issue is a
complicated one, some beliefs clearly do have a substantial
influence on behaviour and that, at least where action was
defined by the subjects themselves, the present methodology
went some way towards distinguishing them from other beliefs
which have less such influence. The second drawback is that
the methodology allowed most of the subjects to receive drug
treatment, possibly before the behaviour occurred and in
most cases before the research interview. This seems
unavoidable.
The third drawback concerned the interval of up to one
month, which the methodology permitted to pass, between the
behaviour in question and the measurement of the
phenomenology. In relation to this third drawback, two
particular concerns have been described. The first is that
subjects will not be able to remember what they have done
over the past month and the second is that the phenomenology
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of delusions is, in any case, likely to be unstable. In
response to the first concern, that which relates to each
subject's memory, three points have been made. The first is
that there is little reason to suppose, from the
phenomenology of affective illness and schizophrenia in
general, or the nature of this sample in particular, that a
large number of subjects suffered from memory impairment.
The second is that such memory impairment as was present,
while reducing the amount of delusional action which the
subject was able to report, would not necessarily alter the
phenomenological correlates of that action which was
recalled. The third point which has been made is that
subjects tended to describe their behaviour similarly when
they were interviewed again, three to five days later. In
response to the second concern, that which related to the
possibility that delusional phenomenology is too fleeting
for the term "phenomenological correlates of action" to have
any meaning, it has been suggested that other aspects of
psychotic phenomenology are not transitory in this way and
that, three to five days later at least, and with the
exception of the level of pre-occupation with which the




The sample consisted of 83 subjects, self selected from 98
patients at the Bethlem and Maudsley Hospital and Dulwich
Hospital who fulfilled the entry criteria. The proportion of
all patients fulfilling these criteria who entered the study
was therefore 84%. It seems likely that the sample is
representative of all patients who met the entry criteria.
To what extent are those patients who fulfil the entry
criteria representative of people with schizophrenia? There
are two aspects to this question. The first concerns the
general characteristics of the patients and the second the
nature of their psychotic phenomenology.
With regard to the general characteristics of the patients,
they at least seem to be similar to others classified as
psychotic in south London. Jones et al (1993) surveyed all
admissions to three South London hospitals and selected
subjects who had delusions, hallucinations or thought
disorder in clear consciousness. The mean age of the sample
was 28, five years younger than the sample described here.
The authors excluded subjects over 50, however, who
represented roughly one sixth of those originally assessed
for inclusion. It seems reasonable to assume that the mean
age would have been closer to that of this sample had these
subjects not been excluded. As was the case here, the sample
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contained rather more men than women and most were
unemployed.
The mean number of years since first contact with
psychiatric services, in the group described by Jones et al,
was 4.5 as compared with a mean interval between the onset
of the subject's illness and the current admission, in this
sample, of 7.4 years. By excluding subjects over 50,
however, Jones et al have omitted those patients for whom
the interval between the onset of illness and admission is
longest. With regard to diagnosis, schizophrenia was the
commonest condition in both samples. Jones et al diagnosed
34% of their sample as suffering from various forms of
affective psychosis as compared with only 26% who fulfilled
the CATEGO criteria here. This difference presumably
reflects the fact that subjects who described only mood
congruent delusions were excluded from the present study.
The estimated pre-morbid IQ for the two samples was very
similar: 106 in that of Jones et al and 102 here. No attempt
was made by Jones et al to measure the intellectual
functioning of their subjects at the time of admission and
it is not possible, therefore, to establish whether this
aspect of the cognitive performance of the two groups
varied. It would seem, in summary, that the psychotic sample
described here is representative of psychotic patients in
the same geographical area.
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Is it representative of psychotic subjects further afield?
Brown et al (1966) followed up 339 patients diagnosed as
schizophrenic and discharged from three hospitals in the
South of England. The mean age was slightly higher than that
of the subjects described here (36 for first admissions and
38 for second or subsequent ones). In other respects,
however, the sample used by Brown et al was similar to this
one. As here, men slightly outnumbered women. The majority
had never married. Sixty percent had been unemployed for
more than half of the two years which preceded admission and
for one third of subjects the index admission was their
first.
Another large sample was assembled by Johnstone et al
(1991). The authors followed up 532 patients with
schizophrenia discharged from in-patient and day-patient
psychiatric services in north London between 1975 and 1985.
The mean age of subjects in the middle of this period was 37
and men slightly outnumbered women. The mean number of
admissions (up to 1985) was five. Thirty nine percent of the
sample were unemployed at the time of their entry into the
study and the majority had never been married (Johnstone et
al, 1991). The mean pre-morbid IQ was 109 and IQ at the time
of entry into the study was estimated at 92 (Frith et al,
1991). In general, therefore, the sample described here is
similar to the group of patients with schizophrenia
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described by Johnstone et al. Only with respect to the mean
number of previous admissions do the subjects differ
substantially. At just under three, this was lower in this
sample. At the time Johnstone et al measured this, however,
the mean age of their subjects would have been 42. The
subjects described here were nine years younger and it is
not surprising that they had been admitted less.
With regard to the details of psychotic phenomenology,
comparison groups are harder to find. The International
Pilot Study of Schizophrenia (World Health Organisation,
1973) found delusions of persecution and of reference to be
the commonest forms of pathological belief. This is
consistent with the findings described here. The World
Health Organisation study further describes loss of insight
in 37% of subjects. This is roughly the same as the rates
reported here for some measures of insight (39% of this
sample did not think that they needed to see a psychiatrist)
and rather lower than those reported here for others (51% of
this sample did not regard themselves as ill). Other
investigators, however, have reported higher rates of loss
of insight. McEvoy et al found that 70% of their sample did
not think that they were in need of treatment that over 80%
did not think that they were ill. It seems likely that
these, extremely high, figures are related to the fact that
non-compliance was the reason for admission. Another finding
from the U.S.A., that of Appelbaum et al (1981), is more in
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line with the rates reported here. The authors found that
50% of psychotic patients did not think they needed to be in
hospital.
In summary, this section of the Discussion has reviewed the
degree to which the present sample is representative of
people suffering from delusions. With regard to socio-
demographic factors, it seems that the group of 83 subjects
described here is typical of a group of psychotic patients
admitted to a general adult psychiatry unit in London.
Although it is not possible to be certain, it seems unlikely
that it is very different from groups of psychotic patients
admitted in other parts of Britain. With regard to
phenomenology, there are less studies with which to compare.
Nevertheless, with regard to the content of the subjects'
delusions and their levels of insight, the findings are
similar to those which have been reported by other authors.
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The reliability and validity of the variables
The terms reliability and validity are used in two ways.
Firstly, they are employed to describe instruments and
rating scales. Secondly, they are used to describe the
individual items of such instruments and scales. When an
instrument is designed to measure only one aspect of
phenomenology it is possible to describe the reliability and
validity of that instrument as a whole. Such descriptions
are available, for instance, for the Beck Depression
Inventory (Beck et al, 1961) and the Wakefield Depression
Scale (Snaith et al, 1971). The Present State Examination
and the Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Schedule, however,
each describe several, different, aspects of phenomenology.
One might refer to the overall reliability and validity of
such instruments by combining the reliabilities and
validities of individual items but there is no generally
accepted way of doing this. For this reason this section
will discuss the reliability and validity of each item in
turn.
The inter-rater reliabilities of the items are described in
Appendix 1. In general, the inter-rater reliabilities of the
items are high. This is what one would expect since the
rater is required only to choose between a "yes" and a "no"
or to allocate a response into a number of relatively
straightforward categories. Only with regard to pre-
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occupation and systematisation was the inter-rater
reliability other than high. One reason may be that, in
order to complete these items, the rater is required, not
simply to record a subject's response, but to make a
judgement. In addition, the rating of pre-occupation offered
the rater four choices and there was, therefore, more
opportunity for inconsistency. With respect to
systematisation, it may be that the questionable validity of
the item placed a ceiling on the reliability which could be
achieved. Different raters may have assessed the responses
according to different criteria. The issue is discussed
further below.
In broad terms, validity refers to the extent to which a
test or item measures what it purports to measure. "Face"
validity refers to whether or not a variable looks as if it
will do so. "Content" validity has a similar meaning but, in
addition, in order for it to be said to be present the
variable, or instrument, must cover all aspects of the
phenomenon. A school test of arithmetic skills should cover
subtraction, division and multiplication as well as
addition.
"Construct" validity is said to be present when one can
identify a series of theoretical correlations between the
variable under study and other measures and show that such
correlations do, in fact, exist. When one would expect a
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correlation and one does, in fact, exist, this is known as
"convergent validity". When one would expect no correlation
and this, in turn, is what is found, this is known as
"discriminant validity". Thus the results of the school test
of arithmetic skills, if the test is to be described as
showing "convergent validity", should correlate with scores
on other tests of such skills but, if it is to have
"discriminant validity", should not correlate with other
tests of intellectual function. The variables examined here
will be discussed in terms of their content and construct
validities.
Two forms of validity which will not be discussed will be
mentioned briefly. "Predictive" validity is said to exist
where a subject's score on one variable correlates with that
subject's score, on a variable believed to be related to the
previous one, at some point in the future. To use the
example of the school test again, it would be said to have
predictive validity if the scores achieved by a group of
children correlated with their subsequent performance on
similar tests. "Criterion" validity has a similar meaning.
With regard to the present study, the problem with both is
that there is no outcome of which one would expect measures
of delusional phenomenology to be predictive. The area has
been so little studied in a quantitative fashion that it is
not even clear, for instance, whether delusions which are
held with greater levels of conviction will be held for
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longer. Only with regard to the behavioural variables might
one expect a measurable outcome. In particular, delusions
which are acted upon might be expected to result in police
contact. The difficulty here is that violent conduct in
psychotic populations is relatively uncommon. Only two of
this sample had engaged in acts of serious violence (see
Wessely et al, 1 993) : one drove his wife along a road at
dangerously high speed in order to extract a confession of
infidelity. Both subjects were rated as "actors", by self-
report and informant-based criteria, and both instances
resulted in police contact. Such contact is not a
sufficiently frequent occurrence, however, for it to allow
conclusions to be drawn regarding the predictive validity of
the behavioural variables.
With regard to the phenomenological variables pertaining to
conviction, belief maintenance and affect (see Appendix 1),
all would seem to have content validity. It is difficult to
imagine, for instance, an aspect of conviction which is not
addressed by the question, "How sure are you about X?"
Similarly, most aspects of the ability to identify factors
maintaining a belief will be addressed by the question, "Can
you now explain why you continue to think that X is so?" It
should be noted, however, that the questions regarding
affect address only mood states which are consequent upon
the delusion. No attempt was made to identify the reverse
phenomenon, beliefs which are the consequence of mood
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states. Indeed, such beliefs were specifically excluded by
the methodology. When the affective component of the
Principal Belief is discussed here, therefore, it refers to
that aspect of the affect which the subject regarded as
consequent upon his or her belief. The construct validities
of the variables relating to conviction, belief maintenance
and affect are difficult to assess in view of the lack of
theoretical correlates of these variables.
The variables relating to pre-occupation and systematisation
are derived from the P.S.E.. With regard to pre-occupation,
this requires that the phenomenon be rated according to the
degree to which the subject is able to divert his or her
attention from the delusion and onto other matters. This
would seem adequately to reflect the usual meaning of pre¬
occupation. With regard to systematisation, the situation is
more complicated and the content validity of the variable is
doubtful. The P.S.E uses a five point rating scale, the
first two points on which are to be used if the subject is
not deluded. The M.A.D.S. uses the other three points.
The first point on the three point rating scale is employed
where the delusion is, "not elaborated into a general system
affecting much of the subject's experience". The difficulty
is that elaboration into a general system need not go
together with affecting much of someone's experience. The
frequently persecutory delusions of older subjects were
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often highly systematised in the sense that numerous
different beliefs existed in a relatively stable network.
Nevertheless such subjects often spent much less time
interpreting their surroundings in delusional terms than did
their juniors whose beliefs were less organised. The second
point on the P.S.E. rating of systematisation, "Some
systematic elaboration, but substantial areas of the
subject's experiences are unaffected," invokes the same two
criteria, one relating to the degree of elaboration and the
other to the proportion of the subject's life which is
affected. The third point on the P.S.E. rating, "Subject
interprets practically all his experience in delusional
terms", makes no reference to the degree to which the belief
is elaborated into a general system.
Finally, with regard to systematisation, the definition
employed by the P.S.E. is at variance with that of other
authors. Hamilton, for instance, places his emphasis on the
degree to which the a subject's abnormal beliefs are built
on one logical error (see Hamilton, 1985). The issue of
which definition of systematisation should be used is of
particular importance with regard to delusions, such as
those of infidelity and persecution, where the possibility
exists, at least in theory, for a subject's delusions to be
the result of one mistake. Where this is the case, one might
expect the relative integrity of the remainder of the
subject's cognitive function to affect the likelihood of his
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abnormal beliefs being acted upon. Some suggestions as to
how this could happen were made on page 130. It has not been
possible to investigate this issue with the definition of
systematisation derived from the P.S.E. and employed here.
The simultaneous use of two sets of criteria in the rating
of systematisation employed by the P.S.E. and by this study
makes the rating difficult to score. In addition, the
criteria are inconsistent. The first two points on the
rating require an assessment of the degree of elaboration
while the third does not. Finally, the definition of
systematisation employed is different from that suggested by
other authors. For these reasons the content validity of the
variable is questionable. The construct validities of the
variables measuring both pre-occupation and systematisation
are difficult to assess in view of the lack of theoretical
correlates.
The confusion surrounding the meaning, in psychiatric
phenomenology, of the term insight was described in the
introduction. Also described was Aubrey Lewis' description
of insight as, "A correct attitude to morbid change in
oneself" (Lewis, 1934). The P.S.E., the instrument used here
to identify delusions, employs several definitions of
insight simultaneously. Raters are required to ask the
subject whether there is anything the matter with them and
also whether their delusions are part of their condition.
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Insight seems to be regarded as a two stage phenomenon:
first, one recognises that one is ill and second, one gains
an appreciation that certain phenomena are part of that
illness.
Questions surround the content validity of this definition:
no mention is made of seeking treatment, a behaviour which
many would regard as demonstrating Lewis1 correct attitude
to morbid change in oneself. With regard to construct
validity, until the term is defined in more detail it is
impossible to test any theoretically derived correlations
between elements of insight and other phenomena. There are
reasons to doubt that any such correlations will be
consistent unless insight is divided into several elements.
Twenty seven percent of the psychotic patients studied by
McEvoy et al (1989) thought that they needed medication
although only 13% of them regarded themselves as ill.
The approach to the measurement of insight adopted here
avoids some of these difficulties. Three elements of insight
were described in the introduction: the ability to recognise
that one is ill, a willingness to seek treatment and an
ability correctly to label certain phenomena as abnormal. A
scale which distinguishes these elements has been tested and
the results suggest that the three elements do not co-vary
(David et al, 1991). In other words, they exhibit a variety
of construct validity, namely, discriminant validity.
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Do the variables demonstrate content validity? As described
above, this is present to the extent that the full range of
attitudes and behaviour under investigation is covered. The
variables seem to do this. The first element of insight, the
subject's recognition of illness, is addressed by the
questions, "Are you psychologically unwell in any way ... is
there anything wrong with your nerves?" and, "Do you think
that seeing a psychiatrist might help you (has helped you)
in any way?" More doubt must surround the assessment of the
subject's willingness to take treatment using the question,
"Do you think that medication might help you (has helped you
in any way) ... how?" It could be argued that this item,
concerning, as it does, the past, does not directly address
the subject's intentions regarding the future. In
particular, it is possible for someone to have received no
benefit from medication previously and yet to be willing to
try something else. In addition, the question does not
distinguish different kinds of benefit. Someone might
recognise that their delusions are less troubling when they
take medication and yet be so incapacitated by side-effects
that, on balance, they do not regard drug treatment as being
of benefit. The validity of this item as a measure of a
willingness to take treatment is open to question.
The third element of insight identified above, the ability
correctly to label certain phenomena as abnormal, has been
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addressed using a total of eight items including presenting
the subject with a "hypothetical contradiction" to their
delusion (see David, 1990) and asking them about the beliefs
of others and the possibility that they, themselves, might
be mistaken. This area has been little studied and it seems
possible to say only that the items employed seem adequately
to address the issues at hand. Thus, "How far do you think
others share your beliefs?" and, "Earlier I asked you
whether or not you felt others shared your belief about X.
I'd like to clarify whether you feel that other people also
believe X- either openly, or perhaps without talking about
it?" seem to address the subject's view of the opinion of
others while "Asking you to think about it now, can you
think of anything at all that has happened that goes against
your belief?" and, "When you think about it now is it at all
possible that you are mistaken about X?" seem to address the
possibility that the subject is mistaken.
With regard to the behavioural variables, these were two.
The first was generated using a latent class analysis of
subjects' responses to the questions which form Section 4 of
Appendix 1. The second was derived by presenting the
Principal Belief of a subject and that subject's behaviour,
as described by informants, to a panel and requiring that
panel to establish whether or not a link existed between
belief and behaviour. The two variables were clearly not
reliable and valid measures of the same thing. Firstly, as
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described on page 58 et seq, the two measures gave very-
different estimates of the prevalence of delusional action.
Secondly, as shown in Table 5.1.1, a positive rating on one
did not make a positive rating on the other any more likely.
The two variables seem to be randomly distributed with
respect to each other. Which provides the more reliable and
valid measure of delusional action?
Table 5.1.1. Cross-tabulation of acting on delusions as
defined by the subjects themselves ("Subject action")
and acting on delusions as defined using information






present 7 (47) 23 (52)
Informant action
absent 8 (53) 21 (48)
Total 15 (100) 44 (100)
The first was a measure of action derived from the responses
of the subjects themselves to questions about their
behaviour. As such, this variable has a certain content
validity. The items in Section 4 seem to cover a reasonable
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range of behaviours which could conceivably be the
consequence of a delusion. The questions address both what
the subject has done and what he or she has been stopped
from doing. As to whether more can be said with regard to
construct and predictive validity, this must await the
establishment of some theoretical correlations. This, of
course, is what this study has attempted to do but the work
has not been undertaken previously.
With regard to the variable which represented delusional
action as defined by a panel using information provided by
informants, however, it is necessary to be much more
guarded. For one thing, the creation of the variable
required two assessments to be made, the first by the
informant describing the subject's behaviour and the second
by the panel deciding whether the behaviour and the belief
were linked. In principle it would seem that information
from informants should be more reliable than that provided
by subjects. Informants are not psychotic, for one thing,
and they are less likely to avoid reporting actions which
might be embarrassing to the subject.
In practice, the amount of information available to
informants was usually very limited. Additionally,
establishing a link between a belief and a behaviour, when
the two are presented in isolation from other aspects of the
subject's mental state, is extremely difficult. Numerous
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instances are encountered where a belief could have resulted
in an action but this is not to say that it did. One way,
perhaps the obvious way, round the problem is to ask the
actor. This is what was done in order to generate the first
behavioural variable, that which measured action as defined
by the subject. When his or her view is not available the
validity of a variable which purports to measure the




Internal inconsistencies in the results
Even if the methodological objections can adequately be
answered, however, there are several issues which call into
question the general applicability of the findings reported
here. Firstly, there are inconsistencies in the results. One
of the entry criteria was that subjects should describe at
least one full delusion according to P.S.E. criteria. These
criteria were discussed earlier: they require that the
subject be fully convinced as to the truth of the belief and
possess no insight. How, then, can one explain the responses
of the subjects when they were asked how sure they were that
the Principal Belief was true? Fifty two (66%) reported that
they were "absolutely certain" and thirteen (16%) that they
were "almost certain". But six (8%) said that they were only
"quite certain", another six (8%) that they "had some
doubts" and two (3%) that they doubted whether the belief
was true.
There are three points to be made in reply. Firstly,
although the P.S.E. requires that the subject be "fully
convinced" (Wing et al, 1974, p.215) for a full delusion to
be said to be present, a partial delusion can only be said
to exist where the belief is expressed as a possibility,
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"which the subject entertains but is not certain about"
(Wing et al, 1974, p.215). Clearly, there is a middle ground
between these two and some delusions will be rated as full,
even in the absence of total conviction, because they come
closer to the definition of "full" than to the definition of
"partial". Secondly, the P.S.E. is frankly contradictory in
this area. Thus delusions are not to be rated as partial if,
"it is clear that full delusions have been present during
the month, or if the subject has acted as if fully deluded"
(Wing et al, 1974, p.215). Thus delusions will be rated as
"full" even if the subject is not fully convinced at the
time of interview, provided that subject seems to have been
fully convinced at some time during the past month.
Interestingly, the P.S.E. seems to equate a tendency to act
on a delusion with full conviction. This assumption has been
shown here to be incorrect.
Thirdly, whatever the strengths and weaknesses of the
P.S.E., the fact that a sample of recently admitted
psychotic subjects reply inconsistently to questions
relating to the conviction with which their beliefs are held
should come as no surprise. In the related field of insight
in psychosis other authors have reported similar
inconsistencies, inconsistencies which have been replicated
here. Thus 27% of the psychotic patients studied by McEvoy
et al (1989) thought that they needed medication although
only 13% of them regarded themselves as ill. In this study,
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with regard to insight, subjects were asked two, very
similar, questions at different points in the interview.
These were, firstly, "Asking you to think about it now, can
you think of anything at all that has happened that goes
against your belief?" (item 7.5 from Appendix 1; see page
208) and, secondly, "When you think about it now is it at
all possible that you are mistaken about X?" (item 7.6 from
Appendix 1). The responses to these questions are cross-
tabulated in Table 5.2.1.
Table 5.2.1. Relationship between the responses, at
first interview, to two questions, "Asking you to think
about it now, can you think of anything at all that has
happened that goes against your belief?" (Q 1) and,
"When you think about it now is it at all possible that
you are mistaken about X?" (Q 2).
Q 2 "Yes" (%) Q 2 "No" (%)
Q 1 "Yes" 16 (52) CO
Q 1 "No" 15 (48) 44 (92)
Total 31 (100) 48 (100)
Fifteen subjects said that they could think of nothing which
went against their belief but later in the same interview
admitted that it was possible that the belief was wrong.
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In summary, the apparent contradiction between, on the one
hand, the P.S.E. requirement that full delusions be held
with absolute conviction and, on the other, that several
subjects in the study described having some doubts as to the
veracity of the Principal Belief, does not indicate, of
itself, that the methodology of the study is faulty. In part
it is a likely consequence of the wording of the P.S.E.
which permits two, non-identical, sets of criteria to define
a full delusion. In part, however, it is the consequence of
interviewing a psychotic sample. Even in response to
reliable interview items, addressing similar issues, the
subjects in the study gave inconsistent answers.
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The findings
The first prediction was that certain aspects of the
phenomenology of a delusion would be associated with an
increased likelihood of the subject acting on that delusion.
This was confirmed, although the particular aspects of
phenomenology which showed such an association were not as
expected. Also unexpected was the finding that particular
aspects of phenomenology were only correlated with acting
when action was defined by the subject him or herself. When
acting on a delusion was defined using information provided
by informants there was little difference between the
phenomenology of actors and non-actors.
When action was defined by the subject him or herself, the
level of conviction with which the belief was held did not
affect the likelihood of that belief being acted upon. The
likelihood of acting was correlated, however, with the
ability to identify evidence supporting that delusion. In
particular, positive answers to the questions, "Can you now
explain why you continue to think that X is so?", and, "Do
you at present (or have you in the past month) looked for
any evidence or information either to confirm your view or
to test whether it may be mistaken?", were associated with
action.
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Affective features, in particular, feeling unhappy,
frightened or anxious as a consequence of the Principal
Belief, were also correlated with acting. Surprisingly,
perhaps, feeling angry was not. Preoccupation and
systematisation showed no association with acting, nor did
most aspects of insight. It made no difference, for
instance, whether the subject regarded him or herself as ill
or whether he or she felt in need of treatment. Similarly,
most of the items designed to examine that aspect of insight
which involves correctly labelling delusions as abnormal
showed no association with acting. Only when presented with
a hypothetical contradiction did those who acted on their
delusions respond differently from those who did not. In
response to this challenge, actors were significantly more
likely to alter their degree of conviction.
The results are different for the two behavioural variables.
There are two possible explanations. The first is that the
validity of the variable derived from information from
informants is poor. The reasons to suspect that this is the
case have already been discussed. If it is not a measure of
delusional action and is, instead, simply the product of a
panel's ill-fated attempts to make sense of fragmentary
information provided by informants, one would not expect it
to show any consistent correlation with phenomenological
variables. This seems the most likely explanation.
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There is another, less likely, possibility. This is that two
types of delusional action co-exist. For one type the actor
is aware of his or her motivation and for the other he or
she is not. The delusional motivation for this second type
of action can, however, be discerned by an observer. In
favour of this, seemingly remote, possibility is that we are
frequently unaware of the reasons for our actions. When this
is the case, however, others tend to be equally in the dark,
even when they know us well. It seems unlikely that a panel,
acting on information provided by informants, could do
better. The rest of this discussion will concentrate on
action as it is defined by subjects themselves.
It is contrary to what was suggested in the review of the
literature that the level of conviction with which the
Principal Belief was held was not related to the likelihood
of that belief being acted upon. The finding is consistent,
however, with another reported here. Most aspects of
insight, and, in particular, the capacity to recognise that
one is ill and that one's beliefs are abnormal, also failed
to show such an association. Acting on a delusion is not
simply a product of the strength of a belief and can occur
even when one thinks one is ill and acknowledges that one's
beliefs may be mistaken. Indeed, the correlations with the
responses to the hypothetical contradiction suggest that
those who can be argued into altering their level of
conviction are more likely to act, not less.
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There is another possible explanation, however, for the
apparent lack of association between the level of conviction
with which a delusion is held and the likelihood of that
delusion being acted upon. As described on page 165, the
P.S.E. requires the rating of a "full delusion", in the
absence of complete conviction on the subject's part, if the
subject has acted as if the delusion were true. The presence
of a "full delusion" was one of the criteria for inclusion
in this study. A form of ascertainment bias is present,
therefore, whereby subjects who held their beliefs with less
than total conviction (and who would not, therefore, usually
be regarded as deluded) were included if their beliefs had
affected their behaviour.
It is possible, therefore, that beliefs held with complete
conviction are more likely to be acted upon but that this
effect has been masked in this study by an ascertainment
bias. This bias favoured the inclusion of subjects who were
less than convinced as to the truth of their beliefs and who
nevertheless had acted upon them. It is not possible to be
certain whether such a masking effect did, in fact, occur.
The experience of interviewing subjects, however, was that
the P.S.E. requirement whereby a "full delusion" is rated
where action has occurred was rarely, if ever, invoked. This
was in part because the P.S.E. fails to describe how action
in this context is to be assessed. Ascertainment bias
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probably does not explain the lack of an association between
the level of conviction with which a delusion was held and
action consequent upon that delusion.
It is not altogether surprising that the level of
preoccupation with which a belief was held showed no
association with the likelihood of that belief being acted
upon. Preoccupation may indicate concern but also implies a
degree of inertia: the P.S.E. definition makes reference to
the subject being preoccupied, "to the exclusion of many
other matters" (Wing et al, 1974, p.221). It may be that one
of the excluded other matters is the possibility of doing
something in response to one's belief. It is more surprising
that the level of systematisation showed no association with
action. This finding is at variance with those of other
authors (Hafner and Boker, 1973; Krakowski et al, 1986). It
has been argued here, however, that the definition of
systematisation adopted by the P.S.E., by the M.A.D.S. and
by this study is of questionable validity (see page 155). In
these circumstances it is not possible to regard the
findings reported here as contradicting those reported
elsewhere.
What of the associations which were found? To an extent, it
can be argued, the genesis of delusional action follows the
scheme suggested by McGinn (1979) for action based on normal
beliefs. McGinn suggested that for action to occur, a belief
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must be associated with a desire. This explains the
association between action and affect, an association which
is also consistent with suggestions made by other authors
(Bleuler, 1924; see the discussion on pages 33 et seq). In
addition, in McGinn's view, action is precipitated by
"noticings", occurrences in the world around us which act as
triggers. That delusional action is generated similarly is
suggested by the correlations between action and the ability
to identify evidence, from one's surroundings or from one's
internal state, in support of that delusion.
This still does not explain why subjects who act are not
only able to identify information supporting their belief
but actively seek it. It is possible that the explanation
relates to the finding, commented upon above, that subjects
who question the truth of their delusions are no less likely
to act on those delusions than subjects who are fully
convinced. If someone doubts the truth of their belief they
may well seek evidence to confirm it. And if they find such
evidence, albeit evidence which would not convince a non-
psychotic person, they may then be more likely to act.
It should be acknowledged, however, that, with a sample size
of 83, relatively small effects will produce statistically
significant differences. Few of the tables in the Results
section allow statements to be made along the lines of,
"People who act on their delusions do this," or, "People who
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don't act on their delusions do that." All that can be said
is that one group is more likely than the other to do this
or that. Even if McGinn's model can be used to describe the
genesis of delusional action, only probabilistic statements
can be made on the basis of the results reported here.
The other caveat to be inserted is that the phenomenological
correlates of action, belief maintenance factors, affect and
a willingness to alter one's degree of conviction in
response to contradiction, may be unrelated to the delusion.
They may have their origins in the personality of the
subject. Experience would suggest that the opinions,
positions and beliefs of some people are more affectively
charged than those of others. It is possible, although the
issue has not been investigated, that they act on their
beliefs more often than do their more easy-going peers. If
such a person becomes psychotic their delusions may adopt
similar characteristics to their normal beliefs, that is,
they will be affectively charged and acted upon.
The same could apply with regard to the ability to identify
information supporting a belief. Someone who regularly
assumes the worst in people's motives, who perhaps fulfils
the criteria for paranoid personality disorder, may be more
likely than others to identify evidence in support of their
beliefs and more likely to act. These characteristics, an
ability to identify evidence supporting one's beliefs and a
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proclivity to act on those beliefs, may then be reflected in
the phenomenology of that person's psychosis. Delusional
phenomenology, including the tendency to act on delusions,
may simply reflect the subject's previous personality.
The second prediction was that the phenomenological
correlates of action would be stable over time. This was
partly confirmed. When the subjects were interviewed for a
second time those correlates of action which related to the
ability to identify evidence were largely lost. With regard
to the affective components of the Principal Belief,
however, in addition to the correlations with feeling
unhappy, frightened and anxious which were noted on the
first interview, subjects who acted on their Principal
Belief were more likely to report feeling angry as a
consequence of that belief.
These results do not contradict the suggestion that
delusional action can be seen as driven by a belief and an
affect and triggered by things which the deluded person
notices in his or her environment. These triggers are likely
to be transitory phenomena: there is no reason to suppose
that they will persist for long after the action has taken
place. The interval between the action and the eliciting of
the phenomenology was longer in the case of the second
interview and the passage of time may have altered this
element of the phenomenology. Interestingly, in relation to
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the argument put forward above relating to the reasons for
seeking information, the association with changing one's
level of conviction in response to a challenge is also lost.
As the belief generates less doubt, so information may be
sought less keenly and the urge to act felt less acutely.
The findings in relation to the second interview do suggest,
however, that not all of the results reported here can be
attributed to the subject's personality. If such was the
case, one might have expected all of the phenomenological
correlates of action to remain stable. With regard to the
ability to identify evidence in support of one's belief,
this did not happen. This aspect of acting on delusions
would seem to be dependent on the subject's mental state.
The possibility remains, however, that those correlates of
delusional action which show more temporal stability,
correlates such as the affective component of the belief,
are correlated not with the presence of delusions but with
aspects of personality.
The third prediction was that the phenomenology of acting on
delusions would be independent of the content of those
delusions. This was tested in two ways, first, by
identifying the phenomenological correlates of persecutory
Principal Beliefs independently and then by examining the
correlates of action in the presence of persecutory
delusions. The phenomenological correlates of action were
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generally similar whether or not the Principal Belief was
persecutory. When the effect of the presence of persecutory
delusions was examined, however, the phenomenological
correlates of action, noted above, were maintained when
persecutory delusions were present and lost when they were
not.
One possibility is that this is due to the numbers in the
various groups. Of those subjects for whom interview data
were available relating to belief maintenance factors, 50
described persecutory delusions while only 28 failed to do
so. Even if the effect of, say, a positive response to the
question, "Do you at present (or have you in the past month)
looked for any evidence or information either to confirm
your view or to test whether it may be mistaken?" was the
same whether or not a persecutory delusion was present, the
smaller sample size for the group with no persecutory
delusions might be preventing the effect of a positive
response from reaching statistical significance.
This appears not to be the case. Table 5.2.2. shows the
responses of subjects to item 2.5 of Appendix 1. The figures
for subjects who described persecutory delusions are shown
in bold and those for subjects with no such delusions are in
normal type.
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Table 5.2.2. Association between seeking information to
confirm or refute a delusion and acting on that
delusion (P+ = persecutory delusion present, P- =
persecutory delusion absent).
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Search made (P+) 11 (69) 5 (15)
Search made (P-) 2 (29) 4 (19)
No search made (P+) 5 (31) 29 (85)
No search made (P-) 5 (71 ) 1 7 (81 )
Total (P+) 16 (100) 34 (100)
Total (P-) 7 (100) 21 (100)
The lack of statistical significance in the absence of
persecutory delusions is not simply the product of small
numbers. Not only is the proportion of actors searching for
information reduced, the effect of seeking information is
reversed. Whereas in the presence of persecutory delusions
most actors seek information, in the absence of such
delusions most fail to do so.
The situation is similar with regard to affective content.
Here, again, the phenomenological correlates, noted on
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examination of the whole sample, were present only for those
subjects who described persecutory delusions. Is the lack of
such an association for those subjects who failed to
describe persecutory delusions due to small numbers? It
would appear not. In Table 5.2.3, the affective content of
the Principal Belief is shown in bold for subjects with a
persecutory delusion (P+) and in normal type for those
without (P-).
Table 5.2.3. Association between feeling frightened as a
result of a delusion and acting on that delusion (P+ =
persecutory delusion present, P- = persecutory delusion
absent).



















When persecutory delusions are present, subjects who act on
their delusions are almost always frightened by them. When
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persecutory delusions are absent, actors are only slightly
more likely than non-actors to feel afraid.
The final area in which the phenomenology of delusions was
associated with action in the presence of persecutory
delusions but not in their absence was insight. In response
to the question, "Asking you to think about it now, can you
think of anything at all that has happened that goes against
your belief?" subjects with persecutory delusions were
significantly more likely to think of evidence if they were
actors and not to think of evidence if they were not (see
Table 4.4.16). The same did not apply in the absence of
persecutory delusions. Is the lack of a statistically
significant association in the group without persecutory
delusions simply due to the smaller numbers in that group?
Again, in Table 5.2.4, the two groups are tabulated
together, with the data from those subjects with persecutory
delusions shown in bold.
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Table 5.2.4. Association a positive response to the
question "Asking you to think about it now, can you
think of anything at all that has happened that goes
against your belief?" and acting on that belief (P+ =
persecutory delusion present, P- = persecutory delusion
absent).
Actors (%) Non-actors (%)
Think of anything (P+)





Think of nothing (P+)











The lack of a statistically significant association between
being able to think of evidence contradicting the Principal
Belief, on the one hand, and acting on that belief, on the
other, in subjects without persecutory delusions does not
appear to be a product of small numbers. In the presence of
persecutory delusions almost half (44%) of the actors were
able to think of evidence whereas it was rare for non-actors
to be able to do so (only 15% could). In the absence of
persecutory delusions the proportion of actors who were able
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to think of such evidence (29%) was almost identical to the
proportion of non-actors who were able to do so (27%).
The phenomenological correlates of delusional action appear
to be different according to whether or not persecutory
delusions are present. This effect does not seem to be
accounted for by the fact that, in this study, the great
majority of subjects demonstrated persecutory beliefs and
the numbers in the persecution-free group were small. Nor is
the effect due to persecutory beliefs themselves being acted
upon differently: it has been shown here that the
phenomenological correlates of action are similar for
persecutory and non-persecutory Principal Beliefs. Somehow
the presence of persecutory delusions alters the way in
which other beliefs are acted upon. How could this be?
It is easiest to suggest an explanation for the finding
that, in the presence of persecutory delusions, the effect
of being able to identify evidence is more pronounced. After
all, the significance of any evidence which is observed is
likely to appear greater when one feels under threat. It is
less easy to explain why the affective components of a
belief should cease to be associated with action in the
absence of persecutory delusions although, again, it could
be argued that the effect of any change in mood will be more
pronounced when someone feels persecuted and, perhaps,
aroused. Finally, with regard to insight, it may be that the
1 83
effect, suggested above, whereby those who doubt the
veracity of their delusions are more likely to notice
evidence in support of those delusions and act when such
evidence appears, may be more pronounced in the presence of
persecutory beliefs.
The fourth prediction was that the phenomenology of action
would be independent of the nature of that action. The
latent class analysis of self-reported action suggested that
the subjects could be divided into three groups. One of
these contained subjects who had acted aggressively and
another contained those who defended themselves. It was
hoped to compare the phenomenological correlates of
aggressive and defensive action. This was not possible
because of the small numbers in each group.
McGinn (1979) has proposed a model, described here, to
explain actions consequent upon normal beliefs. The findings
of this study suggest that action consequent upon delusions
may be generated in the same way. Firstly, it is McGinn's
view that actions are the product of desires and beliefs.
This study shows that action consequent upon a delusion is
more likely when that delusion is affectively charged and
that this is a relatively stable phenomenon. Secondly,
McGinn holds that actions are triggered by "noticings". This
study showed that delusional action is more likely when the
subject can identify evidence supporting his or her belief
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and that this is a relatively transitory phenomenon.
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6. Summary
The study consisted of the examination of the
phenomenological correlates of acting on delusions in a
sample of 83 newly admitted psychotic subjects who
demonstrated at least one non-mood congruent delusion.
Subjects were screened to identify such beliefs using the
P.S.E. and where several delusions were present one belief
was selected for further study. This was termed the
Principal Belief. Each subject was then interviewed using a
newly designed instrument, the Maudsley Assessment of
Delusions Schedule, in order to describe the phenomenology
of the Principal Belief. Several areas of phenomenology were
examined, namely, the degree of conviction with which the
belief was held, the presence or absence of evidence
supporting the belief, the affective content of that belief,
its systematisation, the level of pre-occupation present and
the level of insight demonstrated by the subject. In
addition, information was obtained relating to two
behavioural variables, one derived from the subject's own
description and the other generated from information
provided by informants.
The phenomenological correlates of action defined in these
two ways were then examined. When action was defined on the
basis of information provided by informants, no such
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correlates were identified. It seems most likely that this
reflects the lack of validity of the behavioural variable.
When action was defined on the basis of information provided
by the subjects themselves, several aspects of phenomenology
were associated with such action. In particular, the ability
to identify evidence supporting the belief, the presence of
an affective component to that belief and the presence of a
form of insight (a willingness, when challenged, to change
the degree of conviction with which the belief was held)
showed such an association.
Further investigation showed that some of these associations
were stable over time. When the subjects were interviewed
again, three to five days later, the presence of an
affective component to the delusion was again correlated
with that delusion being acted upon; the associations with
the ability to identify evidence and with insight were lost.
Further investigation also suggested that the correlates of
action identified here are independent of the usual
categorisation of delusions according to their content: the
findings were applicable both to persecutory and to non-
persecutory delusions. It does seem, however, that content
is important in another sense. The phenomenological
correlates of action, described here, were largely lost when
a full examination of the subject's mental state revealed no
evidence of persecutory delusions.
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Items from the Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Schedule
employed in this study: measures of inter-rater reliability
The complete instrument takes the form of a semi-structured
interview and associated instructions. Inter-rater
reliability was measured as part of the testing of the
instrument. Where more than two ratings were available for
an item the inter-rater reliability is described as a
weighted Kappa co-efficient; where only two ratings were







1.1 How sure are you about X? 0.84
2. Belief maintenance factors
Can you now explain why you
continue to think that X is so?
209
Has anything happened since the
idea first came to you?
2.1 Events/States since formation 2 1.0
2.2 Events/states in last week 2 0.78
2.3 Internal state maintaining belief
(e.g. mood, abnormal experience) 2 0.59
2.4 External events maintaining
beliefs 2 0.75
2.5 Do you at present (or have you in
the past month) looked for any
evidence or information either
to confirm your view or to test
whether it may be mistaken? 2 0.73
3. Affect relating to chosen belief
How does the belief make you
feel? Does it make you feel:
3.1 Happy or elated? 2 0.71
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Does X make you do anything in
particular?
4.1 Have you talked to anyone about X? 3 0.77
4.2 Have you written to anyone? 1 .0
4.3 Have you tried to stop X
happening? 0.91
4.4 Have you tried to protect yourself
in any way? 3 0.75
4.5 Does X make you lose your temper? 0.79
21 1
4.6 Have you ever broken anything
because of this?
4.7 Have you felt like hitting someone
because of it?
4.8 Have you hit anyone because of it?
4.9 Do you know the person/people you
have/may have harm(ed)?
4.10 Have you tried to harm yourself or
harmed yourself accidentally
because of X?
4.11 Have you tried to move or leave
your house because of X?
4.12 Have other changes resulted?
For those hearing voices only:
4.13 Do the voice(s) tell you to do
anything?
4.14 Do you have to obey?
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4.15 Do you do anything to escape them? 3 1.0
Has X stopped you from doing
things you would normally have
done?
4.16 Has X stopped you from meeting
friends? 3 0.72
4.17 Has X stopped you from watching
T.V.? 3 0.91
4.18 Has X stopped you from eating or
drinking anything? 3 0.82
4.19 Has X stopped you from using
transport? 3 0.78
4.20 Has X stopped you from going to
work? 3 0.70
4.21 Has X stopped you from taking
medication? 3 0.65
4.22 Has X stopped you from going to
hospital/your doctor on an out
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patient basis? 3 0.79
4.23 Is there anything else which X has
stopped you from doing? 3 1.0
5. Preoccupation 4 0.62
6. Systematization 3 0.58
7. Insight
7.1 Are you psychologically unwell in
any way ... is there anything
wrong with your nerves? 3 0.84
7.2 Do you think that seeing a
psychiatrist might help you
(has helped you) in any way? 3 0.79
7.3 Do you think that medication might
help you (has helped you) in
any way ... how? 4 0.90
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7.4 Let me suggest something
hypothetical to you- something
that does not fit with your
view and you could tell me how
you think you would react. 4 0.90
7.5 Asking you to think about it now
- can you think of anything at
all that has happened that goes
against your belief? 2 0.75
7.6 When you think about it now is it
at all possible that you are
mistaken about X? 2 0.91
7.7 What would have to happen to make
you think that you might be
wrong about X? 3 0.62
7.8 How far do you think others share
your beliefs? 5 0.88
7.9 Do you ever discuss your ideas
with others? 2 0.83
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7.10 Do you ever have arguments about
your beliefs? 5 0.89
7.11 Earlier I asked you whether or not
you felt others shared your
belief about X. I'd like to
clarify whether you feel that
other people also believe X-
either openly, or perhaps




"We are interested to know whether X behaved in ways that seemed to
you either odd, unusual, disturbing or in any way out of the
ordinary during the past month. We are interested in what X
actually did, as well as the possible reasons for it."
1. Behaviour in the home
1.1 Has anything he/she heard on television, radio or in
the newspapers, during the past month, seemed to give
rise to any odd or unusual behaviour or distress?
(Can you give me an example ?)
(How often has that sort of thing occurred ?)
(What do you think was the reason for the behaviour?)
1.2 Has X been writing letters or making phone calls to
unusual people ?
1.3 Has X been feeling unsafe, frightened or scared at
home?
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If so, has X been taking extra precautions, such as
locking the door or putting a chain on the door ?
1.4 Has there been any change in X's eating and drinking
habits?
Has he been refusing food or drink ?
1.5 Has X been dressing in an unusual, inappropriate or
different way?
1.6 Has X been behaving in the house in any other different
or unusual ways?
2. Behaviour to others
2.1 Has X been suspicious of people recently ? If so, how
has this been shown? Has X been checking on anyone, or
jealous of anyone?
3. Violent behaviour (against people). Do not rate verbal threats.
3.1 Has X been violent to anyone? Who? In what way was he
violent? Did he use a weapon? Was there any injury?
21 8
4. Antisocial behaviour (against property)
4.1 Has X damaged anything, either inside or outside the
home? What has been damaged?
4.2 Has X been doing anything else likely to get him/her
into trouble?
5. Behaviour towards self
5.1 Has X tried to harm himself/herself ?
6. Behaviour outside the home
6.1 Has X contacted the police? Has X contacted anyone else
in authority, such as lawyers, M.P.s?
6.2 Has X been worried about his health? Has he visited
his doctor or a hospital?
6.3 Has X attended any new meetings or joined any new
organisations?
21 9
6.4 Has X been spending money in an extravagant or unusual
way?
If so, what on?
7. Behaviour at work
7.1 Has X been working during the last month? Do you know
if X behaved in any new, unusual or odd ways whilst at
work?
8. Religious behaviour
8.1 Does X have any strong religious views ? Has he
attended church recently?
Has X developed any new religious beliefs?
Has he done anything because of his beliefs?
9. Other
9.1 Has X done anything else unusual, odd or new in the
last month that you haven't already mentioned?
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Any positive answers were probed further, and a full description of
the behaviour, its frequency and any possible motives obtained.
Frequency was rated as follows.
0= did not occur
1= one of these behaviours definitely occurred on at least
one occasion, but no evidence anything but rare.
2- occurred more than once but not frequently (i.e. not more
than five or more times).
3= occurred frequently (e.g. at least five times)./





Item Item from Appendix 1. See page 208.
A Correlates of acting on delusions when action is
defined by subjects themselves. See page 69.
B Correlates of acting on delusions when action is
defined on the basis of information provided by
informants. See page 84.
C Correlates of acting on delusions (subject defined) at
second interview. See page 89.
D Correlates of acting on delusions (informant defined)
at second interview. See page 96
E Correlates, at first interview, of subject-defined
action when the Principal Belief is a delusion of
persecution. See page 101.
F Correlates, at first interview, of subject-defined
action when the Principal Belief is not a delusion of
persecution. See page 101.
G Correlates, at first interview, of subject-defined
action when subject describes a delusion of
persecution. See page 115.
H Correlates, at first interview, of subject-defined
action when subject does not describe a delusion of
persecution. See page 115.
No statistically significant association.
1 Non-significant trend (0.05 < p < 0.1).
2 Statistically significant association (p < 0.05).
* No test of association possible.
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Item A B C D E F G H
1 .1 - - - - - - - -
2.1 2 - - - 1 - 1 -
2.2 2 - - - 2 2 2 2
2.3 1 - 2 - - - 1 -
2.4 1 2 - 2 1 - 1 -
2.5 2 - - - 2 2 2 -
3.1 - 1 1 1 * - - -
3.2 2 - 2 - - 2 2 -
3.3 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 -
3.4 2 - 2 - 2 1 2 -
3.5 1 - 2 - - 1 1 -
5.1 - - 1 - - - - -
6.1 - - - - - - - -
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Item A B C D E F G H
7.1 - - - - - - - -
7.2 - - - - - - - -
7.3 1 - - - - - 1 -
7.4 2 - - - 1 2 2 1
7.5 1 - 1 - 1 - 2 -
7.6 - - - - - - - -
7.7 - - - 1 2 - - -
7.8 - - - - - - - -
7.9 - - - - - - - -
7.10 - - - - - - - -
7.11 - - - - - - - -
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Appendix 4
Items from the Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Schedule
employed in this study: measures of agreement between
responses at first and second interview.
Where more than two ratings were available for an item the
level of agreement is described as a weighted Kappa co¬
efficient; where only two ratings were available it is
described as an unweighted Kappa.




1.1 How sure are you about X? 5 0.56
2. Belief maintenance factors
Can you now explain why you
continue to think that X is so?
Has anything happened since the
idea first came to you?
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2.1 Events/States since formation 2 0.86
2.2 Events/states in last week 2 0.72
2.3 Internal state maintaining belief
(e.g. mood, abnormal experience) 2 0.48
2.4 External events maintaining
beliefs 2 0.83
2.5 Do you at present (or have you in
the past month) looked for any
evidence or information either
to confirm your view or to test
whether it may be mistaken? 2 0.81
3. Affect relating to chosen belief
How does the belief make you
feel? Does it make you feel:
3.1 Happy or elated? 2 0.91
3.2 Unhappy or miserable? 2 0.89
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3.3 Frightened? 2 0.77
3.4 Anxious? 2 0.84
3.5 Angry? 2 0.79
4. Action
Does X make you do anything in
particular?
4.1 Have you talked to anyone about X? 3 0.55
4.2 Have you written to anyone? 3 0.45
4.3 Have you tried to stop X
happening? 3 0.62
4.4 Have you tried to protect yourself
in any way? 3 0.73
4.5 Does X make you lose your temper? 3 0.51
4.6 Have you ever broken anything
because of this? 3 0.73
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4.7 Have you felt like hitting someone
because of it? 3 0.65
4.8 Have you hit anyone because of it? 3 0.69
4.9 Do you know the person/people you
have/may have harm(ed)? 3 0.73
4.10 Have you tried to harm yourself or
harmed yourself accidentally
because of X? 3 0.36
4.11 Have you tried to move or leave
your house because of X? 3 0.43
4.12 Have other changes resulted? 3 0.42
For those hearing voices only:
4.13 Do the voice(s) tell you to do
anything? 3 0.59
4.14 Do you have to obey? 3 0.70
4.15 Do you do anything to escape them? 3 0.48
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Has X stopped you from doing
things you would normally have
done?
4.16 Has X stopped you from meeting
friends? 3 0.61
4.17 Has X stopped you from watching
T.V.? 3 0.50
4.18 Has X stopped you from eating or
drinking anything? 3 0.51
4.19 Has X stopped you from using
transport? 3 0.57
4.20 Has X stopped you from going to
work? 3 0.57
4.21 Has X stopped you from taking
medication? 3 0.73
4.22 Has X stopped you from going to
hospital/your doctor on an out
patient basis? 3 0.68
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4.23 Is there anything else which X has
stopped you from doing? 3 0.73
5. Preoccupation 4 0.55
6. Systematization 3 0.72
7. Insight
7.1 Are you psychologically unwell in
any way ... is there anything
wrong with your nerves? 3 0.56
7.2 Do you think that seeing a
psychiatrist might help you
(has helped you) in any way? 3 0.57
7.3 Do you think that medication might
help you (has helped you) in
any way ... how? 4
0.56
7.4 Let me suggest something
hypothetical to you- something
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that does not fit with your
view and you could tell me how
you think you would react. 4 0.42
7.5 Asking you to think about it now
- can you think of anything at
all that has happened that goes
against your belief? 2 0.84
7.6 When you think about it now is it
at all possible that you are
mistaken about X? 2 0.81
7.7 What would have to happen to make
you think that you might be
wrong about X? 3 0.47
7.8 How far do you think others share
your beliefs? 5 0.55
7.9 Do you ever discuss your ideas
with others? 2 0.46
7.10 Do you ever have arguments about
your beliefs? 5 0.67
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7.11 Earlier I asked you whether or not
you felt others shared your
belief about X. I'd like to
clarify whether you feel that
other people also believe X-
either openly, or perhaps
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Acting on Delusions. II: The Phenomenological Correlates
of Acting on Delusions
ALEC BUCHANAN, ALISON REED, SIMON WESSELY, PHILIPPA GARETY, PAMELA TAYLOR,
DON GRUBIN and GRAHAM DUNN
The aim of the study was to identify the phenomenological characteristics of those delusions
which are associated with action. The sample consisted of 79 patients admitted to a general
psychiatric ward, each of whom described at least one delusional belief. The variables studied
included the phenomenology of the delusions, and behaviour. Two behavioural ratings were used,
one derived from the subjects' own description of their behaviour and the other from information
provided by informants. There was no association between delusional phenomenology and
acting on a delusion when the subjects' behaviour was described by informants. When action
was described by the subjects themselves, acting was associated with: being aware of evidence
which supported the belief and with having actively sought out such evidence; a tendency to
reduce the conviction with which a belief was held when that belief was challenged; and
with feeling sad, frightened or anxious as a consequence of the delusion.
The previous paper (this issue) reported some
of the links between delusional beliefs and behaviour.
That consistent associations are difficult to find
between behaviour and different types of delusions
is not surprising. Categories such as 'persecutory'
and 'religious' are not mutually exclusive and
provide little information with regard to the overall
significance of the belief for the patient.
Little has been written on the phenomenological
correlates of delusions which are associated with
action, and such literature as does exist pertains
mostly to violence. Thus Hafner & Boker (1973)
found a correlation between the degree of system-
atisation of a delusional belief and the likelihood
of its being acted upon in a violent manner. The
importance of affect in determining behaviour in
the context of psychosis was recorded by Bleuler
(1924); more recently Shore (1979) has argued that
flattening of affect allows schizophrenic people
to injure themselves as a consequence of their
delusions. Roback & Abramowitz (1979) found
behavioural adjustment to correlate with insight
in psychosis but the measures of behaviour were
general, the delusions unrecorded, and the implica¬
tions for delusional action unclear.
The present study is an attempt to investigate the
links between delusional beliefs and action through
a more detailed phenomenological assessment of the
beliefs than has previously been described.
Method
The sample was based on that described in the previous
paper, which consisted of 83 psychotic in-patients with at
least one delusion according to PSE criteria.
The variables studied consisted of aspects of the
phenomenology of delusions and measures of behaviour.
Delusions were identified using the PSE; where more than
one delusion was present, the subject was asked to state
which was most important to him/her, and this was termed
the 'principal' belief. The subject was then asked a series
of questions relating to the phenomenology of this belief.
These questions are contained in the Maudsley Assessment
of Delusions Schedule (MADS) (see previous paper,
Appendix 1). The subject was questioned regarding
behaviour consequent on the principal belief in the
past month, and further information was obtained from
informants.
Subjects were asked how sure they were about the truth
of their delusional belief, and their responses were rated
from zero ('doubt it') to four ('absolutely certain').
Subjects were asked why they continued to believe their
delusional beliefs. They were asked whether internal events
(such as mood changes) or external events had occurred
at any time since the idea first came to them, or in the last
week. Finally, they were asked whether they actively sought
information to confirm or refute their belief.
Subjects were asked whether the delusional belief in
question made them feel elated, unhappy, frightened,
anxious or angry.
Preoccupation was rated on a scale of 0 to 4 according
to the criteria used in the PSE.
Systematisation was rated on a scale from 0 to 3
according to the criteria used in the PSE.
Subjects were also asked whether they felt that others
shared their belief, what would have to happen to make
them think that they were wrong, whether they regarded
themselves as unwell, and whether taking medication or
seeing a psychiatrist had helped in any way. Finally, subjects
were presented with a 'hypothetical contradiction' to their
delusional belief. Thus a patient who believed that other
people controlled his actions using radio waves was told
by the interviewer that there was no mechanism whereby
77
78 BUCHANAN ET AL
this could happen. The subject's responses were scored
according to whether he ignored the contradiction or denied
its relevance, accommodated it into his delusional system
("But you're only saying that because they want you to"),
lessened his conviction in his belief, or abandoned his belief
completely.
As reported in Paper I, a latent class analysis of subjects'
responses had generated three groups of patients: those who
acted not at all or very little on their delusions; those who acted
aggressively, and those who acted in a defensive manner.
Pronounced formal thought disorder limited the amount
of information which could be obtained in a few cases. With
regard to affect and insight, data were available for 79
subjects. With regard to the other phenomenological
variables, data were available for 78 subjects.
Statistical analysis
This was conducted by the authors using the SPSS/PC +
version 3.0 (1989). Statistical associations were tested using
the x2 statistic. Where cell sizes rendered this unreliable,
the association was confirmed by an exact test using the
egret (1990) programme.
Results
When behaviour was rated by informants, no statistically
significant associations were found between aspects of
delusional phenomenology and action. In assessing the
phenomenological correlates of action when that action
was defined by the patient, the sample was divided using
the latent class analysis described above. Patients who
failed to act on their delusions or who acted very little
('non-actors') were compared with those who acted in an
aggressive or defensive manner ('actors').
When the levels of conviction of actors and non-actors
were compared, no statistically significant differences
were found.
When patients were asked why they believed their
delusions, 42 described evidence from external events (36
failed to do so) and 15 described evidence in the form of
internal events such as mood changes or hallucinations (63
failed to do so). There was no statistically significant
association between describing external or internal evidence
in isolation and acting on a delusion. When subjects were
asked whether either type of evidence existed, an association
was found with acting on the delusion as shown in Table 1.
When subjects were asked whether either type of evidence
had been apparent in the past week a similar association
was found (x2 = 9.17, d.f.= l, P< 0.003). When subjects
were asked whether they sought out evidence to confirm or
refute their belief, an association was again found with
acting on that delusion (Table 1).
When subjects were asked whether their delusional belief
made them feel elated or angry, no associations were found
with acting on that delusional belief. Associations were
found with feeling frightened (Table 1) and feeling sad
(x2 = 6.44, P<0.02). Feeling anxious was also associated
with action (x2 = 8.62, P<0.004) but the covariance with
feeling frightened was high.
Table 1
Associations between the ability to identify evidence
(internal or external) supporting the delusional belief and















Feeling frightened as a result of the
belief
feel frightened
does not feel frightened
total






23 (100) 46 (83.6)
0 (0) 9 (16.4)
23 (100) 55 (100)
x2 = 4.25, P<0.04
13 (56.5) 9 (16.4)
10 (43.5) 46 (83.6)
23 (100) 55 (100)
x2 = 12.92, P<0.001
19 (82.6) 26 (46.4)
4 (17.4) 30 (53.6)
23 (100) 56 (100)











= 15.77, d.f. = 3, P<0.002
No associations were found between preoccupation
with, or systematisation of, a delusional belief and the
likelihood of that belief being acted upon.
No association was found between any of the general
measures of insight used and the likelihood of the patient's
delusional belief being acted upon. When subjects were
presented with a hypothetical contradiction to their
delusional belief, an association was found between their
answers and the likelihood of them acting on that delusion
(Table 1).
Non-significant trends towards an association with action
were noted for some items relating to insight ("Are
you psychologically unwell . . .?", "Do you think that
medication might help you?") but not for others ("Do you
think that seeing a psychiatrist might help you ...?", "How
far do you think others share your belief?").
Further statistical analysis
As part of the testing of the MADS all subjects were
reinterviewed three to five days after the collection of the
data presented above. The same questions were asked
concerning the phenomenology of the principal belief. The
data from this second interview were analysed to test for
associations with delusional action as defined above. The
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associations with action were maintained for the affective
features (P<0.02 for feeling sad, P< 0.01 for feeling
frightened, and P<0.02 for feeling anxious). With regard
to the response to a hypothetical contradiction, a similar
trend was noted to that shown in Table 1, but this failed
to reach statistical significance. With regard to the ability
to identify information supporting the delusional belief and
actively seeking such information, the associations with
acting were not maintained.
An attempt was made to compare the two groups of
'actors' identified by latent class analysis, namely, those
who acted predominantly aggressively and those whose
actions were generally defensive. The numbers were small
(14 and 9) and no significant differences were noted between
the two groups.
In Paper I we suggested that delusions of persecution
are associated with action while delusions of catastrophe
show an inverse association. The associations noted above
were tested for delusions of persecution alone and for all
other delusions. Small numbers prevented the same process
from being followed for delusions of catastrophe. For
delusions of persecution (n = 24), the associations noted
above generally were maintained with the exception that
feeling sad as a consequence of a delusion was no longer
associated with action. For all other delusions (n = 55 for
affect and insight, n = 54 for all other variables) the
associations were again generally maintained with two
exceptions: feeling frightened as a consequence of a belief
and the ability to identify information supporting the
belief were no longer associated with action. The association
with being able to identify evidence apparent in the past
week was maintained, as were the other associations
noted above.
Discussion
When the testimony of informants was used to
define action, there was no association between
aspects of delusional phenomenology and the like¬
lihood of that delusion being acted upon. This
contrasts with the positive findings noted when
action is defined by the subject him/herself. The
discrepancy has been discussed in Paper I.
When the definition of action is based on the
subject's own description of his/her behaviour,
an ability to identify evidence, in particular evidence
in the past week, which supports the belief is
associated with action. Seeking information to
confirm or refute a delusional belief is strongly
associated. Emotional consequences of the belief,
such that subjects describe feeling sad, frightened
or anxious, show a similar association, as does
losing one's conviction in the face of a hypo¬
thetical contradiction. Aspects of phenomenology
not associated with action in this study were
conviction, preoccupation, systematisation, and
insight, as well as the emotional consequences of
anger and elation.
Action is a more likely consequence of a delusional
belief if the subject can identify evidence in support
of that belief; this finding is not simply a reflection
of intellectual function (Paper I). It is consistent
with the view of McGinn (1979) that action is
based on a combination of desires and beliefs and
triggered by 'noticings', internal or external cues
which precipitate action. The findings of the study
suggest that these 'noticings' are a far from passive
experience; action is rendered much more likely
where a subject actively seeks evidence to confirm or
refute a belief. The findings also raise the possibility
that some acting on delusional beliefs may be the
result of the subject testing beliefs in an attempt to
confirm or refute them. This interpretation would
in turn be supported by the finding (see below) that
acting on a delusion is more likely when the subject
is able to countenance evidence which contradicts
that belief.
The finding that emotions such as unhappiness,
fear and anxiety, when found as a consequence of
a delusion, are associated with action is consistent
with Bleuler's view (1924) that action is largely
a consequence of affectivity. The willingness of
patients who act on their delusions to countenance
hypothetical contradiction of their delusional beliefs
is perhaps surprising; it might have been expected
that patients who ignored contradiction would be
more likely to act. It is consistent, however, with the
findings that conviction and systematisation are not
associated with action and with the suggestion that
action is more likely when beliefs are questioned and
evidence is sought to confirm or refute them.
Previous studies have found an association
between the ability to countenance a hypothetical
contradiction and recovery from delusions. Brett-
Jones (1987) found this in subjects being treated
with psychotropic medication; Chadwick & Lowe
(1990) found that drug-resistant subjects who
were able to countenance a contradiction to their
delusional beliefs responded better to cognitive
behavioural therapy than those who were not so
able. They also found that noticing actual evidence
contradicting the belief was associated with recovery.
We have found that a positive response to a hypo¬
thetical contradiction is associated with acting on
delusional beliefs. These findings raise the possibility
that acting on delusional beliefs, particularly where
that action is designed to test out the validity of the
belief, is itself related to recovery; this issue is worth
further investigation.
That the associations between the ability to
identify information supporting a delusional belief
and acting on that belief were not maintained when
the subjects were reinterviewed three to five days
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later may suggest that the questions used to elicit
this information were unreliable. The inter-rater
reliability was good, however, and the findings
are consistent with each other. It is more likely that
the ability to identify information supporting
a delusional belief is a genuine but transient
element of the phenomenology. The affective
connotations of a belief, on the other hand, would
seem to be more stable over time. It is possible
that an affect-laden delusional belief is acted upon
only when the subject perceives certain information
which seems to bear out that belief; again, this
is consistent with the theoretical work of McGinn
(1979).
There remains the question of the degree to which
these associations are independent of phenomeno-
logical categories based on content of the delusion,
categories examined in Paper I. When persecutory
content was controlled for, the associations described
above were maintained. The results suggest that
the associations we have described are independent
of phenomenological categories based on content.
One exception may concern feeling frightened as
a result of a delusion, which is associated with
action for delusions of persecution but not for
other delusions.
Of the negative findings, the effect of conviction
has already been mentioned. The lack of an association
between action and elation may shed some light on
the apparent low incidence of violence in manic
patients (Schipkowensky, 1968). The lack of an
association between systematisation and insight and
action might be considered surprising in view of
previous findings (Hafner & Boker, 1973; Roback
& Abramowitz, 1979). Methodological differences
make direct comparisons with these studies difficult.
Hafner & Boker's study was limited to offender
patients, and Roback & Abramowitz used only
general measures of behaviour and did not attempt
to measure behaviour arising as a consequence of
specific delusional beliefs.
Recent writing on the subject of insight has
included the description of phenomenological
'dimensions' (David, 1990). The non-significant
trends which we report suggest that some of these
dimensions (e.g. ability to recognise illness) are
more strongly associated with action than others
(e.g. the ability to relabel as abnormal unusual
mental events).
Further research could usefully test associations
between delusions and actions based upon them in
a prospective study. Research on larger patient
populations may also be able to identify phenomeno¬
logical differences in the delusional beliefs of
aggressive and defensive 'actors'.
Acknowledgements
This research was conducted as part of a project funded by the John
and Catherine MacArthur Foundation. SW was supported by a
Wellcome Training Fellowship in Epidemiology.
References
Anderson, E. & Trethowan, W. (1973) Psychiatry (3rd edn).
London: Balliere, Tindall.
Bleuler, E. (1924) Textbook of Psychiatry (trans. A. A. Brill).
New York: Macmillan.
Brett-Jones, J., Garety, P. A. & Hemsley, D. (1987) Measuring
delusional experiences: a method and its application. British
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 26, 257-265.
Chadwick, P. & Lowe, C. (1990) The measurement and modifica¬
tion of delusional beliefs. Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology, 58, 225-232.
David, A. (1990) Insight and psychosis. British Journal of
Psychiatry, 156, 798-808.
EGRET (1990) EGRET Reference Manual. Seattle: Statistics and
Epidemiology Research Corporation.
Everitt, B. (1986) Finite mixture distributions as models for
group structure. In New Developments in Statistics for
Psychology and the Social Sciences (ed. A. Lovie), pp. 113-128.
London: Methuen.
(1989) Statistical Methods for Medical Investigations.
London: Edward Arnold.
Fish, F. (1974) Fish's Clinical Psychopathology (ed. M. Hamilton).
Bristol: Wright.
Hafner, H. & Boker, W. (1973) Crimes of Violence by Mentally
Abnormal Offenders. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Jaspers, K. (1963) General Psychopathology (trans. J. Hoenig &
M. Hamilton). London: Manchester University Press.
McGinn, C. (1979) Action and its explanation. In Philosophical
Problems in Psychology (ed. N. Bolton), pp. 20-42. London:
Methuen.
Merskey, H. (1980) Psychiatric Illness (3rd edn). London: Balliere,
Tindall.
Nelson, H. E. (1982) National Adult Reading Test (NART) for
the Assessment of Premorbid Intelligence in Patients with
Dementia: Test Manual. Windsor: NFER-Nelson.
Nimgaonkar, V., Wessely, S., Toone, L., el a! (1988) Response
to drugs in schizophrenia. A prospective study of the
influence of family history, obstetric complications and
ventricular enlargement. Psychological Medicine, 18,
583-592.
Roback, H. B. & Abramowitz, S. I. (1979) Insight and hospital
adjustment. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 24, 233-236.
Rutter, M. & Brown, G. (1966) The reliability and validity of
measures of family life and relationships in families containing
a psychiatric patient. Social Psychiatry, 1, 38-53.
Schmidt, G. (1986) A review of the German literature on delusions
between 1914 and 1939. In The Clinical Roots of the
Schizophrenia Concept (eds J. Cutting & M. Shepherd).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schipkowensky, N. (1968) Affective disorders: cyclophrenia and
murder. International Psychiatry Clinics, 5, 59-75.
Shore, D. (1979) Self mutilation and schizophrenia. Comprehensive
Psychiatry, 20, 384-387.
Silver, J. & Yudofsky, S. (1987) Documentation of aggression in the
assessment of the violent patient. Psychiatric Annals, 17, 375-383.
Slater, E. & Roth, M. (1969) Clinical Psychiatry (3rd edn).
London: Bailliere, Tindall & Cassell.
Taylor, P. (1985) Motives for offending among violent and
psychotic men. British Journal of Psychiatry, 147, 491-498.
ACTING ON DELUSIONS II 81
Taylor, P. (1985) Motives for offending among violent and
psychotic men. British Journal of Psychiatry, 147, 491-498.
, Garety, P., Buchanan, A., et al (1993) Measuring risk
through delusions. In Violence andMentalDisorder: Developments
in Risk Assessment (eds J. Monahan & H. Steadman). Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
SPSS/PC + (1989) SPSS/PC + Base Manual. Chicago: SPSS Inc.
Wechsler, D. (1981) WAIS-R Manual. New York: Psychological
Corporation.
Wing, J. K., Cooper, J. E. & Sartorius, N. (1974) Measurement
and Classification of Psychiatric Symptoms. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Alec Buchanan, MPhil, MRCPsych, Department ofForensic Psychiatry, Institute ofPsychiatry, Graham Dunn,
PhD, Department ofBiostatistics and Computing, Institute ofPsychiatry, Brian Everitt, PhD, Department
ofBiostatistics and Computing, Institute ofPsychiatry, Philippa Garety, PhD, Department ofPsychology,
Institute ofPsychiatry, Don Grubin, MRCPsych, Department ofForensic Psychiatry, Institute ofPsychiatry,
Alison Reed, mrcp, MRCPsych, Department ofForensic Psychiatry, Institute ofPsychiatry, Pamela Taylor,
mrcp, FRCPsych, Department ofForensic Psychiatry, Institute ofPsychiatry, De Crespigny Park, London
SE5 8AF; *Simon Wessely, ma, MSc, mrcp, MRCPsych, Department of Psychological Medicine, King's
College Hospital, London SE5 9RS
"Correspondence
Psychological Medicine, 1993, 23, 123-134. Copyright © 1993 Cambridge University Press
Acting on delusion: a review
ALEC BUCHANAN1
From the Department of Forensic Psychiatry, Institute of Psychiatry, London
synopsis The paper reviews the link between delusional beliefs and behaviour. The literature
pertaining to the link between normal beliefs and behaviour is briefly examined, emphasizing the
predominance of psychological and philosophical contributions to the topic. The psychiatric
literature describing actions consequent upon delusional beliefs is then reviewed. In conclusion,
those aspects of psychosis, distinct from delusional beliefs themselves, which may affect the
likelihood of a given belief being acted upon, are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Do psychotic patients act on their delusions?
Through the years many authors have thought
not. Otto Kant (1927) (quoted by Schmidt,
1940) noted that deluded patients frequently
failed to act in accordance with their views.
Hemsley & Garety (1986) wrote that in deluded
subjects 'one frequently striking feature is their
remarkable lack of action congruent with ap¬
parently sincerely held beliefs'. In 1923 Jaspers
reported that ' the attitude of the patient to the
content of his delusion is peculiarly inconsequent
at times'. An apparently inconsequential at¬
titude does not necessarily imply a failure to act,
however, and may simply render the prediction
of any action more difficult. Studies of mental
illness and crime have suggested that delusional
beliefs can affect behaviour. Gibbens (1958)
reviewed 115 cases of homicide admitted to New
Jersey State Hospital and found that one-third
of insane murderers had well-structured de¬
lusional motives for their crimes. Lanzkron
(1963) reported that 40% of insane homicides
occurred 'as offspring of a delusional system'.
Taylor (1985), interviewing a remand prison
population, considered that 46% of psychotic
men were driven to offend by their psychotic
symptoms.
A small literature exists concerning delusional
motivation for schizophrenic stereotypies
(Mayer Gross et al. 1960) and hospital at¬
1 Address for correspondence: Dr Alec Buchanan, Department of
Forensic Psychiatry, Institute of Psychiatry, De Crespigny Park,
London SE5 8AF.
tendance (Hutchesson & Volans, 1989). For the
most part, however, delusional motives for
actions tend to be reported only when those
actions lead to distress or suffering on the part of
the patient or others. Thus, delusional mo¬
tivation has been described in episodes of
violence, in other criminal activity and in the
context of self-harm. More mundane instances
of action based on delusions are seldom reported
and this bias has to be considered when conclu¬
sions are drawn from such reports as do exist.
This essay will first discuss the role of normal
beliefs in determining behaviour. While essential
to the discussion which follows, this is not an
area which has been extensively examined by
psychiatric researchers and debate has focused
principally on information drawn from the fields
of psychology and philosophy. The second part
of the paper will review the various types of
delusional belief which have been implicated in
behaviour. Among the many factors affecting
the likelihood of a psychotic patient acting on a
delusional belief, factors such as personality and
previous experience, will be elements of the
psychosis distinct from the belief itself, elements
such as perceptual changes, insight, motor
changes and cognitive functioning. These ele¬
ments will be reviewed in the third part of the
paper.
Finally, mention must be made of what will
not be discussed. A considerable literature now
exists pertaining to the nature of delusions.
Principal components analyses by workers such
as Kendler et al. (1983) and Garety & Hemsley
(1987) have identified dimensions such as con-
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viction and preoccupation. These dimensions
bear some similarity to the criteria for delusional
beliefs described by workers such as Kraupl-
Taylor (1983). It might be expected that each of
these dimensions would affect substantially the
likelihood of a belief being acted upon but, to
the author's knowledge, no research has been
conducted in this area. For the purposes of this
paper, the definition of delusion will follow the
criteria suggested by workers such as Mullen
(1979) and Kraupl-Taylor (1983), namely, that
they are false beliefs, held with conviction and
regarded by the subject as self-evident which are
not amenable to reason and inherently unlikely
in content.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A review of the link between abnormal beliefs
and behaviour demands some discussion of the
role of normal beliefs in the genesis of action. In
the 1940s and 1950s the early behaviourists (e.g.
Hull, 1943; Guthrie, 1952) opposed the then
widespread notion that action must be explained
in terms of purpose. They argued that human
behaviour could be better explained in terms of
'receptor impulses' and 'movements'. The elu¬
cidation of these 'primary principles' would in
turn allow a rigorous definition of terms such as
'
purpose' and ' intention'. In the words of Hull:
The present approach does not deny the motor reality
of purposive acts (as opposed to movements), of
intelligence, of insight, of goals, of intents, of stirrings
or of value; on the contrary, we insist upon the
genuineness of these forms of behaviour. We hope
ultimately to show the logical right to the use of such
concepts by deducing them as secondary principles
from more elementary objective primary principles
(pp. 25-26).
While beliefs are clearly important if be¬
haviour is to be explained in terms of purpose,
their role is less clear when this behaviour is
explained in terms of'primary principles'. Hull
was clear that purposive behaviour could be
derived from postulates involving only 'stimu¬
lus' and 'movement'. The role of goal directed
thought was similarly dismissed by Guthrie
(1952) who suggested that thinking, like action,
was a product of conditioning and tended to
occur when action was blocked. These authors
aspired to a science which was more rigorous
and quantitative. As Hull wrote in 1951:
the continuous quantitative use of relevant postulates
and corollaries will hasten the elimination of errors
and the day when mammalian behaviour will take its
place among the recognised quantitative systematic
sciences (p. 2).
But it was not the advocacy of a rigorous
scientific method which concerned other authors,
rather the theory which lay behind the writings
of Guthrie and Hull. Keith Campbell (1970)
noted that behaviourists had placed 'the mind'
not behind an action but in the behaviour itself
and hence, worryingly for a philosopher, omitted
the causal element in mental concepts. In the
second half of the twentieth century philoso¬
phers' arguments have followed two related
themes, both of which allow a pivotal role for
belief in the explanation of action. The first has
been expanded by Papineau (1978) who argues
that the reasons behind an action involve, first,
a desire and, secondly, a belief that the action
will contribute to the satisfaction of that desire.
He acknowledges that everyday explanations of
action commonly invoke only a desire or a belief
but argues that both are in fact required; we
mention only that part of the cause which is
most surprising, least generally known or most
morally significant. The second theme has been
described by Charles Taylor. Taylor (1964)
explains behaviour in terms of Aristotelian
teleology, that is, he argues that our present use
of the terms 'action' and 'behaviour' do not
allow them to be broken down into units of
stimulus and response but require an explanation
of behaviour in terms of its purpose. Thus, he
differs from Papineau in regarding behaviour as
'
pulled' into existence by its purpose, as opposed
to 'pushed' into existence by the belief and
desire of its agent. Taylor's teleological ex¬
planation of human behaviour clearly implies
certain knowledge or beliefs on the part of the
subject as well as a desire to act. The author
refers to the 'Canute view' of those who reject
purposive explanations of action and is graphic
in his description of the logical consequences of
behaviourist theory:
The area in which we can attribute responsibility, deal
out praise or blame, or mete out reward or pun¬
ishment, will steadily diminish - until in the limiting
case, nothing will be left; the courts will be closed or
become institutes of human engineering, moral dis¬
course will be relegated to the lumber-room of history
(pp. 42-13).
The emotive quality of Taylor's plea is not a new
feature of this debate. In the sixteenth century
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the use of teleological arguments to demonstrate
the existence of a deity led Francis Bacon to
compare teleological explanations to vestal
virgins: 'They are dedicated to God, and are
barren' (quoted by Papineau, 1990).
Even as they were written, the views of Hull
and Guthrie were not universally held. William
Hunter (1930) referred to the importance of
'symbolic processes' in influencing man's in¬
stinctive behaviour, invoking a model more
cognitive than that allowed by some be¬
haviourists. In 1932, Krechevsky published his
claim to have found empirical evidence that rats
running in mazes formed hypotheses to assist
them in solving problems. In the second half of
the twentieth century writers in medicine and
psychology have been more prepared to en¬
tertain a cognitive view of behaviour where a
subject's knowledge and beliefs assume a greater
role. Austin (1956-7) described some of the
elements in his 'machinery of action' as con¬
sciousness, voluntariness, self-control, knowl¬
edge and foresight. Fulford (1989) developed
this theme in Moral Theory andMedical Practice,
writing, 'in the case of raising my arm, what has
to be specified, in addition to the state ofmotion
of my arm, is my purpose in raising it'.
Psychologists such as Spence (1956) and Mowrer
(1960) still draw heavily on a view of learning
based on Pavlovian conditioning but Mowrer's
references to subjects 'learning to be afraid' and
'learning what to do' make it clear that he gives
greater weight to the cognitive processes of his
subjects than did his predecessors. McGinn
(1979), developing the work ofDavidson (1971),
divides bodily movements into active and pass¬
ive. Action is based on reasons and reasons for
actions are based on a combination of desires
and beliefs; in McGinn's words, 'desire without
belief is blind, belief without desire is pur¬
poseless'. He adds several qualifications to this
description ofaction. First, he argues that desires
and beliefs exist in a dynamic state in the
conscious mind and that interaction occurs
between them; 'beliefs must be reckoned in the
light of the pattern of desires'. Secondly, he
argues that no general law of action can be
derived from this framework; 'what was suf¬
ficient to make me cross the road on a certain
occasion will almost certainly not be repeated'.
Finally, he considers that belief and desire are
not in themselves sufficient to produce the will to
act and that this will is dependent on what he
calls 'noticings', internal or external cues which
precipitate action.
In the second half of the twentieth century the
influence of purely behaviourist explanations of
human action has diminished. Recent medical
and psychological writing has focused more on
the influence of belief on human action and this
reflects the tenor of philosophical writing on the
subject. The role of beliefs in behaviourist theory
is vague and this may go some way to explaining
the lack of research in the psychological litera¬
ture into actions based on delusional beliefs.
DELUSIONS IMPLICATED IN ACTION
This section will review the literature pertaining
to the behavioural consequences of delusional
beliefs. Ideally, such a review would be informed
by epidemiological data providing information
as to the likelihood of a particular type of
delusion being acted upon. Unfortunately, most
reports in this area are anecdotal and allow no
such estimate of risk. In the absence of such data
reference will be made, where the original
literature allows, to descriptions of phenom¬
enology to illuminate the link between abnormal
belief and behaviour.
Delusions of persecution
Reports of actions based on delusional beliefs
most frequently concern persecutory delusions;
often these reports focus on violence inflicted on
others. On 20 January 1843 Daniel McNaugh-
ton, apparently under the impression that he
was attacking the Prime Minister, Sir Robert
Peel, fired at and mortally wounded Edward
Drummond who was Sir Robert's Private
Secretary. At his trial it emerged that McNaugh-
ton believed he was the victim of a conspiracy
and that he was being followed by spies sent by
Catholic priests with the aid of the Tories, of
whom Peel was the leader. At his trial he stated:
The Tories in my native city have compelled me to do
this... They have accused me of crimes of which I am
not guilty; they do everything in their power to harass
and persecute me; in fact, they wish to murder me
(Rollin, 1977, p. 92).
McNaughton was found not guilty and the
'McNaughton Rules', which govern the use of
an insanity defence in English courts, were the
direct outcome of his case. In this century many
authors have recorded persecutory delusions in
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mentally ill offenders but often make only vague
reference to the motive for the crime. Bach-y-
rita (1974) and Bach-y-rita & Veno (1974),
examining 62 violent prisoners, found 13 who
demonstrated 'subtle delusional systems' and
who 'warranted a diagnosis of paranoid schizo¬
phrenia'. Green (1981), looking at 58 male
homicidal patients in Broadmoor Hospital re¬
ported that in 27 cases the act of killing
'appeared to be a response' to the patients'
persecutory beliefs. Shore et al. (1988, 1989)
examined the subsequent criminal records of
mentally ill people arrested near the White
House, in many cases trying to see the President.
They found that among those with no record of
violent behaviour persecutory delusions were
significantly associated with future violence.
They gave no further details as to the nature of
the delusions. Other authors give fuller descrip¬
tions. Maas et al. (1984) describe the case of a
man who killed both parents claiming that they
had tried to kill his children by drowning them
in battery acid. Reviewing the records of 10 men
charged with patricide, Cravens et al. (1985)
found four cases where the father was considered
by the patient to pose threats of 'physical or
psychological annihilation". Mawson (1985)
found 14 patients with delusions of poisoning in
a case-note study at Broadmoor Hospital and
' in all but one the symptom seemed an important
antecedent factor to serious violence'. In a study
of 15 matricidal men Campion et al. (1985) refer
to a schizophrenic patient who killed his mother
because he was convinced that she was a sadist
who tortured him. Other authors have reported
actions based on persecutory beliefs in as¬
sociation with Capgras delusions (Crane,
1976; Weinstock, 1976; Christodoulou, 1978;
Romanik & Snow, 1984; Tomison & Donovan,
1988); De Pauw & Szulecka (1988) report that
a patient attacked her mother believing that
every time her mother put on her glasses she
changed into a local woman who she disliked
intensely. Hafner & Boker (1973) found that 8 %
of their sample of 263 violent schizophrenics
exhibited 'paranoid feelings of malaise' and felt
that these patients were especially likely to act
on their delusions when they perceived an
immediate threat to their lives or when per¬
secutory beliefs were accompanied by bodily
hallucinations or delusions of bodily harm.
Persecutory delusions have also been de¬
scribed in cases of self harm, but here again the
degree to which the delusional belief motivates
the act is often unclear. In some cases, such as
that described by Mintz (1964) where a cook on
board ship cooked and ate his index finger in an
attempt to ' rise above his persecutors in the way
that Christ had', it is difficult to see any logical
link. In other cases, such as those of ocular self-
mutilation described by Shore et al. (1978),
Shore (1979) and Yang et al. (1981) or of auto-
castration described by Mendez et al. (1972), the
link between persecutory belief and action seems
vague. Blacker & Wong (1963) are more specific,
describing the case of a man who castrated
himself believing that evil spirits were using his
body to perform unnatural acts. Standage et al.
(1974) describe a case of genital self-mutilation
in a female schizophrenic who believed that the
men in her community were going to sexually
molest her. Firesetting, eating and hospital
attendance have also been claimed to be influ¬
enced by persecutory delusions. Virkunnen
(1974) found that three out of 30 cases of arson
committed by schizophrenics represented an
attempt to escape persecutors. In 1911, Bleuler
had described the case of a woman refusing to
drink milk because she believed it was poisoned,
and Lyketsos et al. (1985) have described cases
where the eating habits ofchronic schizophrenics
have been influenced by similar fears. Hutches-
son & Volans (1989) have described patients
whose persecutory delusions led them to attend
hospitals with unsubstantiated complaints of
being poisoned.
Delusions of jealousy and grandiose delusions
The propensity of jealous delusions to be acted
upon in a manner dangerous to others has been
described by Shepherd (1961) and Mowat (1966).
Gilles (1965) described the case of a schizo¬
phrenic who murdered his wife, telling his
psychiatrist, 'a mysterious power told me she
was being unfaithful'. More recently, Hafner &
Boker (1973) noted delusions of love and
jealousy in 11-2% of their sample of violent
schizophrenics as against 1-4% of non-violent
schizophrenic controls. Of the 14 patients at
Broadmoor with delusions of poisoning de¬
scribed by Mawson (1985) six also had delusions
of jealousy.
Actions based upon grandiose delusions were
described in 1823 by John Haslam. Shortly after
the New Bethlem Hospital was built in St
George's Fields in London Haslam described
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the case of Thomas Lloyd, whose confidence in
his madrigal and linguistic abilities led him to
dance and sing in public and address foreign
visitors in miserable French. In the presence of a
hypomanic affect, however, it becomes debatable
whether such phenomena should be attributed
to the mood state or to the delusional belief.
Kraines (1957) wrote that:
the manic patient who says that he is the son of God
is not expressing a delusion of symbolic significance
as would be true in schizophrenic thinking, but has
merely left unsaid the feelings that he is superior, that
he is capable of undertaking any enterprise, that he is
superior enough to be as powerful as the poetic
concept of'Son of God' (pp. 280-281).
Should such a patient attempt to walk on water
it is not clear whether this would occur as a
consequence of his belief or his mood. This
point will be returned to in the discussion of
drive, motivation and affect.
Delusions of passivity
The influence of delusions of passivity on
behaviour is alluded to by Tomison & Donovan
(1988) in their description of a 23-year-old man
who attacked two others with a Stanley knife,
but no details are given. Two studies of
matricidal men (Green, 1981; Campion et al.
1985) also mention passivity, but in association
with command hallucinations. Planansky &
Johnston (1977) are more explicit. Looking at 59
male schizophrenics who had attacked others or
made verbal threats to kill, they identified nine
cases where the subject 'had to attack against
their will, as if directed by others or by an
impersonal force'. Delusions of passivity have
also been described in cases of self-mutilation
(Rosen & Hoffman, 1972; Sweeney & Zamecnik,
1981); Shore et al. (1978) describe the case of a
man who enucleated both of his eyes believing
that 'a force' had overpowered him and had
taken control of his actions.
Delusions of ill health or bodily change
Delusions of ill health or bodily change have
been described by Green (1981) in matricidal
men and by d'Orban & O'Connor (1989) in
women who kill their parents. Jones (1965)
studied 13 chronic schizophrenic patients with
stereotypies. One of his cases touched his ear
repeatedly, explaining that it controlled the
pumping of his blood. Hafner & Boker (1973)
considered that delusions of bodily harm, when
linked with persecutory delusions, were associ¬
ated with violence in schizophrenics. Delusions
of bodily change leading to self harm were
described in 1928 by Lewis, while Beilin (1953)
reported the case of a Polish labourer who
amputated his penis, claiming that there had
been a change in his body contour and that he
was assuming the form of a woman. Sweeney &
Zamecnik (1981), reviewing predictors of self-
mutilation in patients with schizophrenia, de¬
scribed instances ofpatients acting on beliefs that
their blood needed to be cleansed or that a limb
required surgical investigation.
De Clerambault's syndrome and Capgras
De Clerambault (1942), quoted by Goldstein
(1987), includes-in his original description of
the eponymous syndrome - a description of a
man who repeatedly struck his ex-wife in public.
Goldstein reviewed seven cases of erotomania
and found that all had acted on their delusions,
several to the extent ofmaking physical assaults.
Enoch et al. (1967) and Taylor et al. (1983) both
emphasize the possibility of physical assaults
consequent upon the imagined infatuation, but
a recent review referring to the 'spectre of
dangerousness' in de Clerambault's syndrome
concludes that 'the evidence that it usually
represents anything more than an apparition
remains unconvincing' (Bowden, 1990). Capgras
syndrome has been linked with violent behaviour
in several case reports (Crane, 1976; Weinstock,
1976; Christodoulou, 1978; Shubsachs &
Young, 1988; De Pauw & Szulecka, 1988;
Tomison & Donovan, 1988; Silva et al. 1989);
Romanik & Snow (1984) describe the case of a
57-year-old woman who pointed a loaded gun at
two meter readers believing that one of them
was a homosexual who had been impersonating
her by wearing a mask since he was eight. He
had acted like a prostitute and sullied her
reputation. Fishbain (1987) attempted to quan¬
tify the frequency of Capgras delusions but his
paper highlights the methodological problem
that Capgras delusions are usually reported only
when attention is drawn to them by violent
behaviour.
Delusions of guilt
Reports of delusions of guilt associated with
behaviour usually involve self harm. Numerous
examples exist in the literature of such an
association in depression (e.g. Albert et al. 1965)
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and even mania (Hartmann, 1925) and in
depression the frequency of suicide attempts has
been shown to correlate with delusional ideation
(Miller & Chabrier, 1988). In schizophrenia,
MacLean & Robertson (1976) describe the case
of a man who enucleated his own eye when
preoccupied with his 'sins'. Numerous reports
exist of self-inflicted eye injuries (Westmeyer &
Serpass, 1972; Shore et al. 1978; Crowder et al.
1979) and genital self-mutilation (Beilin &
Gruenberg, 1948; Greilsheimer & Groves, 1979;
Waugh, 1986) in the presence of delusions of
guilt which do not appear to be mood congruent.
Religious and sexual delusions
Delusions with religious or sexual themes are
common in psychiatry and similar themes are
evident amongst those delusions which are acted
upon. Witherspoon et al. (1989), reviewing the
literature on self-inflicted eye injuries, found
that 34 out of 85 patients gave religious reasons
for their action. Often these are associated with
delusions of guilt. Waugh (1986) describes a
schizophrenic man who severed his testicles with
a razor blade stating that he felt evil and that
self-castration was the only way to gain for¬
giveness. In other cases religious beliefs in
themselves seem to have motivated an act of self
harm. Kushner (1967) quotes a schizophrenic
who was ' sure that he had castrated himself in
search ofpurification and not because of feelings
of guilt'. In many cases the religious motivation
is described in very general terms (Gorin, 1964;
Anaclerio & Wicker, 1970; Crowder et al. 1979;
Tapper et al. 1979; Sweeney & Zamecnik, 1981);
Tenzer & Orozco (1970) describe the case of a
woman who removed her own tongue after
receiving a message from God that 'duty
demanded it'. In other cases the motivation is
more specific. Shore (1979) describes a patient
who was found with a pencil lodged in his right
eye who quoted Matthew 5: 29,' And if thy right
eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from
thee, for it is profitable for thee that one of thy
members should perish, and not that thy whole
body should be cast into hell.' Greilsheimer &
Groves (1979) describe a case of genital self-
mutilation invoking a similar passage at Mat¬
thew 18:7-9. Waugh (1986) describes a man
who castrated himself in response to a later
passage at Matthew 19: 12, 'There are eunuchs
born that way from their mother's womb, there
are eunuchs made so by men and there are
eunuchs who have made themselves that way for
the sake of the Kingdom of Heaven.' A religious
component is frequently present in delusionally
based acts which harm others (Maas et al.
1984); Campion et al. (1985) report the case of
a 23-year-old man who killed his mother
believing she was the devil.
Sexual ideation was present in the motivation
of 21 out of 85 cases of ocular self-mutilation
reviewed by Witherspoon et al. (1989). Fre¬
quently associated with guilt in such cases (e.g.
MacLean & Robertson, 1976; Crowder et al.
1979), such ideation may also be implicated
when the harm is directed at others. Cravens et
al. (1985) described homosexual delusions fo¬




In the cases described a delusional belief is an
important contributor to the psychotic indi¬
vidual's course of action. In many cases,
however, the belief in question was held for a
considerable period before being acted upon.
And many patients hold similar beliefs without
doing anything about them. As mentioned in
the discussion of theoretical considerations,
McGinn (1979) has argued that in addition to a
belief itself, 'desire' and 'noticings' are required
to explain an action. Is it possible to find
equivalents for these terms in psychiatric pheno¬
menology and hence use McGinn's model as a
framework to investigate delusional action? This
section will consider those elements of psychosis
which affect the likelihood of a belief influencing
a patient's behaviour.
Perceptual changes
Foremost among these elements may be the
perceptual changes associated with schizo¬
phrenia. These will be examined with regard to
two areas, namely, the perception of form and
the perception of emotion. Cutting (1985)
considers that although basic visual processes
are probably normal in schizophrenia a deficit
exists in the appreciation of visual form. He
quotes Levin & Benton (1977), who demon¬
strated that chronic schizophrenics were worse
than neurotics in their ability to recognize faces.
Auditory perception may also be affected and,
reviewing other modes of perception. Cutting
k
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concludes that there is evidence for a disorder of
body image perception in some patients (Wecko-
wicz & Sommer, 1960; Cleveland et al. 1962).
Examples given by the authors make clear the
threatening nature of these perceptual changes:
Weckowicz & Sommer quote the case of a man
whose eyes were being pulled out so that in the
mirror they appeared to be completely out of
their sockets. Several workers have commented
on the propensity of perceived threat to lead to
violent action in psychosis (e.g. Mullen, 1988).
Perception of emotion has been found by
several authors to be abnormal in schizophrenia.
Dougherty et al. (1974) showed photographs of
facial expressions to schizophrenic and control
subjects and found that schizophrenics were
significantly worse at identifying the emotion
shown. Iscoe & Veldman (1963) found that
schizophrenics did worse than controls when
asked to arrange nine drawings in order from
'happy' to 'sad' and argued that they had
difficulty in perceiving 'subtle emotional gradu¬
ations'. Spiegel et al. (1962) found schizo¬
phrenics 'normally sensitive to the nuances of
facial expression' but found that, while they
were able to arrange facial expressions in order
from angry to happy, they were unable to derive
the criteria they were using. Similar findings
have been described with reference to emotion in
speech. Turner (1964) tested the ability of 60
schizophrenics and 30 controls to identify the
emotional flavour of a taped nonsense sentence
and found that the performance of schizo¬
phrenics was impaired. Studying 24 acute schizo¬
phrenics Jonsson & Sjostedt (1973) found that
they did worse than controls when asked to
identify the emotional intonation of spoken
single words. Perceptual changes such as these
may correspond to the 'noticings' described by
McGinn (1979) as triggers for action based on
belief. The abnormal sensitivity of schizo¬
phrenics to certain emotional themes (Brodsky,
1963; Cutting, 1985) may also affect the like¬
lihood of their acting on their delusions. Finally,
it is possible that the decreased empathic ability
of schizophrenics described by Milgram (1960)
allows them to act in ways which cause harm to
others.
The importance of these perceptual changes
has been alluded to by several authors. MacLean
& Robertson (1976) considered that a perception
that an alarming change was occurring in one's
body contributed to self-mutilation in psychotic
patients. Mowat (1966) found that many of his
sample ofmorbidly jealous murderers described,
as grounds for their delusional beliefs and
subsequent action, a change in their wives'
emotional attitudes. In their review of homicidal
aggression in schizophrenic men Planansky &
Johnston (1977) conclude that 'transient misper-
ception of danger to life, very frightening and
potentially ominous, was directly revealed by
some men'. Of relevance here may be the work
of Bemporad (1967) and Reich & Cutting (1982)
showing that schizophrenics faced with visual
problems were more likely to approach them by
concentrating on details rather than on any
overall view. In the words of Shakow (1950): 'If
there is any creature who can be accused of not
seeing the forest for the trees, it is the schizo¬
phrenic'. It may be that schizophrenia renders
sufferers prone to concentrate on one or two
threatening aspects of a situation which would
be innocuous if viewed in overall perspective.
Insight
Insight might be expected to influence the
likelihood of a patient acting on his or her
delusions. A persecuted man might be less likely
to take defensive measures if he had a suspicion
that his persecutory beliefs were part of a
psychiatric illness. Little research has been
conducted in this area. Roback & Abramowitz
(1979) studied the behaviour of schizophrenics
in hospital and found that patients with a
greater level of insight were rated as better
adjusted behaviourally on 9 out of 12 measures.
Van Putten et al. (1976), Lin et al. (1979) and
Bartko et al. (1988) all found that compliance
with treatment was improved in patients who
were rated as exhibiting more insight. The
principal methodological problem with all four
studies is that decreased insight and behavioural
disturbance could both be indicators of the
severity of a patient's illness. The patients of
Roback & Abramowitz who were insightful and
behaviourally adjusted may have been less ill
and the subjects in the other three studies may
have possessed insight and complied with medi¬
cation for the same reason. In any case,
influencing behaviour in general is not the same
as influencing actions based on delusions. Until
further research is conducted the case for insight
affecting delusional behaviour must be regarded
as unproven, although common sense would




In depression, psychomotor retardation inhibits
all types of action and the increased risk of
suicide attendant on the lifting of this retardation
with treatment has long been recognized. In
schizophrenia, the catatonic symptoms have
been reviewed by Abrams & Taylor (1976). Of
these, the possibility of explaining stereotypies
in delusional terms has already been mentioned
(Jones, 1965). As pointed out by Mayer Gross et
al. (1960), however, this is very different from
establishing a psychological cause and in any
case the behaviours described by Jones are
invariably of little consequence. Other catatonic
symptoms such as negativism and stupor will
influence actions based on delusions in the same
non-specific and inhibitory way in which they
influence all behaviour.
Drive, motivation and affect
Perhaps more important influences on motor
behaviour in psychosis are such factors as drive,
inclination and motivation. These concepts are
very close to that of 'desire' as described by
McGinn (1979) who considered it a pre-requisite
for action based on belief. They also bear
comparison with the concept of ' affectivity'
described by Eugene Bleuler in 1924.
Action is for the most part influenced by affectivity, if
one at least agrees with us when we designate the
force and direction of the impulses, or of the 'will' as
partial manifestations of the affects. He who is happy,
sad or furious will react accordingly (p. 143).
In normal subjects the drive and inclination to
act are closely linked to the affective and
emotional aspects of a belief and it seems likely
that the likelihood of a delusional belief being
acted upon will be influenced by similar factors.
In depression the link between a delusional
belief and its affective component is so close that
it becomes impossible to distinguish the two: the
fact that psychiatrists use the term 'mood
congruent' to describe certain delusions reflects
the fact that these delusions are regarded as
having an emotional quality which is inseparable
from the belief itself. Any discussion of whether
a psychotically depressed patient kills himself
because of what he believes or because of what
he feels rapidly becomes one of semantics.
Similarly, in mania it is difficult to differentiate
between grandiose delusions and hypomanic
affect as the cause of a patient's extravagant
behaviour.
In chronic schizophrenia a reduction in the
capacity to experience pleasure has been de¬
scribed by several authors (Harrow et al. 1977;
Watson et al. 1979; Cook & Simukonda, 1981).
It is unclear whether a similar reduction occurs
in the capacity to experience other emotions,
although work previously mentioned describing
schizophrenics' difficulties in perceiving such
emotions as anger (Spiegel et al. 1962) provides
some circumstantial evidence that this is the
case. If this is so it might be expected that the
delusional beliefs of schizophrenics, charged
with less emotion than those of others, should be
acted upon less often. Other workers, however,
have reached different conclusions. Feffer (1961)
presented neutral and emotionally charged
words to schizophrenic subjects and normal
controls and found that schizophrenics avoided
words with an affective connotation. Garety &
Hemsley (1987) found that a high proportion of
deluded subjects found their delusions distress¬
ing. The work of Vaughn & Leff (1976) showing
that schizophrenics living with high 'expressed
emotion' (EE) relatives were more prone to
relapse, and later work (Leff et al. 1982) showing
that relapse rates fell when EE was reduced
would suggest that, in some cases, schizophrenics
are over sensitive to emotion. It seems likely that
the emotional responsiveness of schizophrenics
is not simply reduced but altered in quality. It
may be that schizophrenics may attach emotion
inappropriately to certain beliefs, including
delusional ones, and are then more likely to act
upon them.
Cognitive factors
In this connection mention must be made of
cognitive factors which may influence delusional
behaviour. With regard to depression the effect
of psychomotor retardation has already been
discussed. With regard to schizophrenia several
mechanisms have been proposed while little
confirmatory evidence has emerged. An im¬
paired ability to make probabilistic judgements
has been described (Huq et al. 1988). Frith
(1987) described a model for first rank symptoms
and 'negative signs' in schizophrenia. First rank
symptoms, he argued, are consequent upon
defective monitoring of action while negative
signs result from an imbalance between 'willed
intentions' and 'stimulus based intentions'. A
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later paper (Frith & Done, 1989) provided some
experimental evidence for the first of these
proposals but not for the second relating to
negative symptoms and the implications for
delusional behaviour are unclear. Robertson &
Taylor (1985) tested a group of men held in
prison or maximum security hospital on criminal
charges and found that their deluded group
showed a deficit of 'immediate memory'. It is
possible that such memory deficits are the result
of the impaired use of mnemonic strategies:
Bauman (1971) showed that schizophrenics'
memory for three letter sequences failed to
improve even when it was pointed out to them
that the sequences began with consecutive letters
of the alphabet. Robertson & Taylor argued
that, as a consequence of their memory deficits,
deluded patients were likely to misinterpret
external stimuli. Other specific cognitive deficits
have been invoked with regard to perception
and have already been discussed. In more general
terms it is agreed that the relatively intact
cognitive function of chronic paranoid patients
is associated with a greater propensity for violent
action than the impaired cognitive function of
patients with an acute psychosis (Krakowski et
al. 1986). It is not clear that this association
represents a causative link however, or what
form such a link might take.
Although a distinct thread has yet to emerge
from the investigation of cognitive function in
schizophrenia, this area of research does offer
some correspondence with theoretical writing
on the subject. The views of Fulford (1989) with
regard to the importance of belief in the genesis
of action have already been mentioned. The
work of the same author offers the tantalizing
suggestion that the link between a delusional
belief and an ensuing action may be impaired in
a way which is inseparable from the genesis of
the belief itself. Fulford rejects the conventional
definitions of delusion pointing out, inter alia,
that many delusions are not beliefs at all but
value judgements. He suggests that delusions
could better be described as 'defective reasons
for action'. Could these defective reasons be the
products of defective reasoning of a type not
previously described? Fulford argues that the
nature of the deficit is unclear and that con¬
siderable clinical and philosophical work is
required even to clarify the issues involved.
Other factors
Several other aspects of the mental states of
psychotic patients have been implicated in
delusional action. Shore (1979) reported that
flattening of affect allowed the schizophrenic
patient to injure himself severely as a conse¬
quence of his delusions. Other authors (Greil-
sheimer & Groves, 1979; Waugh, 1986) have
also reported flattening of affect in association
with self harm based on delusions and Mullen
(1988) has argued that 'emotional blunting' is
associated with violence in schizophrenia. Haf-
ner & Boker (1973), however, in their large
study of mentally abnormal offenders, found
that 'only a small proportion of schizophrenic
offenders have flatness of affect'. Some of the
issues involved have been discussed in the section
covering drive, motivation and affect. The degree
of systemisation of delusional beliefs was found
by Hafner & Boker to be related to violent
behaviour, and several less methodologically
sound studies, reviewed by Krakowski et al.
(1986), have reached similar conclusions. The
presence of hallucinations or perceptual changes
in cases where delusions of jealousy and poison¬
ing are associated with violence has been referred
to by Shepherd (1961), Mowat (1966) and
Varsamis et al. (1972). In mania, Schipkowensky
(1968) has invoked the 'pathologically increased
social connection of the manic' to explain what
he regards as a very low incidence of violence in
these patients (quoted by Krakowski et al.
1986). Psychodynamic factors are important
concomitants of delusionally motivated self
harm according to Maclean & Robertson (1976)
who state that 'castration fears, failure to resolve
oedipal conflicts, repressed homosexual im¬
pulses, severe guilt and self punishment are
ubiquitous in such cases'. Other authors describe
such theories as 'unwarranted generalization'
(Tapper et al. 1979) or 'subjective' (Sweeney &
Zamecnik, 1981); the debate here has echoes of
a more general one concerning the relevance of
psychodynamic theory to psychiatry.
CONCLUSION
An improved understanding of the likelihood of
delusional beliefs being acted upon would help
psychiatrists to assess risk to the psychotic
patient and to others. In this context it would be
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advantageous to be able to attribute risk to the
belief itself or to other features of the patient's
psychosis. Such an understanding would also be
relevant to the study of the phenomenology of
delusions. If a patient holds a beliefwith absolute
conviction yet fails to take the appropriate
action (or feel the appropriate emotion), does
this indicate that the patient's conviction is in
fact less than absolute, that the belief somehow
means less to them than it would to others or
that the patient has some insight into his
condition? The answer is far from clear and
experimental designs which allow investigation
of delusional action may offer some insight into
the nature of delusions themselves.
This paper has reviewed the theoretical basis
for action, pointing to the reappearance of
beliefs as important causes of action after a
period during which more behaviourist explana¬
tions held sway. Recent explanations have been
described in which action is seen as being caused
by a combination of belief and desire and
triggered by factors such as 'noticings'. It has
been argued that these concepts correspond to
some of the findings of psychiatric research.
'Desire' may well correspond to psychiatric
concepts of motivation, drive and inclination
and ' noticings' find likely equivalents in the field
of perceptual changes, perhaps influenced by
other cognitive aspects of psychosis. The cor¬
respondence is far from exact, however, while
the details of how desires and beliefs are triggered
by 'noticings' to form the intention to act have
not been clarified for healthy subjects, let alone
for patients suffering from psychosis. As Fulford
(1989) has pointed out, avenues of research in
this area are legion and underexplored.
In 1941 Aubrey Lewis wrote:
Patients often do not act in accordance with their
delusional beliefs, especially when these are fleeting or
chronic... But this is, on the whole, unusual in the
early or acute stages of the illness: a patient will then
act on his beliefs violently or in terror; he may go to
the police or be driven to suicide (p. 1189).
Lewis alludes to two factors which have been
discussed here, namely the chronicity of delu¬
sions and their emotional context. Further
research could also usefullymeasure such aspects
of delusional belief as conviction and preoccu¬
pation and quantify the behavioural correlates
of these components. Measurements of the
behavioural correlates of other aspects of psy¬
chosis, such as affective incongruity and insight,
would also be of value. Past behaviour may be
the best predictor of future behaviour, but an
improved understanding of action based on
delusional beliefmay help psychiatrists to refine
and define this maxim.
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